

IMAGINING MIAMI:
TOWARD A THEORY OF ETHNICITY IN THE POSTMODERN WORLD

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Metropolitan Miami has long captured the world's attention in a provocative way. During the 1980s, a series of violent racial disturbances focused local, national and international attention on Miami as analysts and observers scrambled to account for the "Magic City's" demise. What has emerged from this multitude of overlapping, intersecting and competing claims is an image of Miami as an urban area in which three distinct ethnic groups--Hispanics, Blacks and Anglos--are pitted against one another in a zero-sum battle for limited political, economic and social resources. A close examination of these various claims reveals, however, that neither the issues and problems over which groups struggle, nor the identities and interests around which group members coalesce, are well grounded in empirical fact.

Recognizing the gap between objective conditions and subjective "realities" in Miami, this research addresses ethnic conflict from a new direction. The analysis focuses on cultural, political and economic processes that construct explanations for social phenomena that become widely accepted

independently of their basis in fact. By elevating the role of perception and the manner in which perceptions are created, manipulated, used and changed, the investigation is less concerned with (although never ignorant of) objective conditions, focusing instead on how reality is socially and politically constructed.

Data are drawn from an ethnographic analysis of claims-making activity in Miami from 1960 through 1990, including in-depth interviews with community leaders, politicians, journalists and business people in Miami, and a comprehensive review of the periodical and popular literature on Miami.

Results indicate that ethnic conflict and ethnic identities in Miami are most accurately viewed as competing discourses, or definitions of reality, that, although not well-grounded in empirical data, can be traced to the tug and pull of vested interests and the changing nature of power and politics--locally, nationally, and internationally. Given the social, political and economic trends expected to take place in the future, Miami qualifies as a bellwether of urban issues throughout the US. Furthermore, this particular approach to understanding social reality in general, and ethnicity in particular, has implications that extend well beyond the confines of Metropolitan Miami.

CHAPTER 1 POSTMODERN MIAMI

Every major national transformation the United States is undergoing--from the postindustrial revolution to the aging of America, and from the third great wave of immigration into the United States to the redefinition of American sexual relationships --has converged on Miami. How Miami solves, or fails to solve, those problems cannot but provide clues as to how the whole country will cope with the massive changes - full of both peril and opportunity - that are transforming the lives of us all.

T.D. Allman (1987)

Miami: City of the Future

For the past thirty years, Miami has captured the world's imagination in powerful and provocative ways. Images of tourists leisurely strolling along sun-drenched beaches compete with images of the sunstroked bodies of Haitian refugees washed up along those same shores. Never too far removed from the glitz and glitter of an "American Riviera" are the burning buildings and broken glass of a "Paradise Lost." The multitude of metaphors that have been used to characterize Miami facilitate little more than the understanding that Miami is a city not easily understood. Yet, frequent references to Miami as a "City of the Future" or the "Prototypical City of the 21st Century" suggest that if the rest of the United States, if not the world, is to confront and cope with the numerous social, cultural, economic and political trends that have converged, sometimes violently, on South Florida in recent years, then Miami is a city that must be understood.¹

The analysis that follows is an attempt to understand social "reality" in Miami. The goal is not simply to elucidate the political complexities of a dynamic and multifaceted urban area. Instead, Miami provides the laboratory

in which to explore a variety of social, political, economic and cultural phenomena--the implications of which extend far beyond the confines of the Metropolitan Miami area. The focus is on ethnicity and ethnic group relations--topics of undeniable relevance in today's strife-ridden world and ones with which Miami is closely associated. Again, the goal is not to simply add to the volume of literature already written on a fascinating topic, but to approach ethnic relations, and Miami, from a new direction. The hope is that the "City of the Future" may offer some insight into how the prospects for a more peaceful future can be improved, not just for Miami, but for the world.

This project originally began as a modest attempt to explore the roots of urban rage in Metropolitan Miami. In May of 1980, twelve years after the devastating Watts riots of 1968 and twelve years before Los Angeles again would erupt after the acquittal of the police officers accused in the beating of Rodney King, Miami was engulfed in the flames of one of the worst racial upheavals in US history. The public reaction was one of shock, bewilderment and utter disbelief. Over a three day period, entire neighborhoods were destroyed, fires set, windows broken and homes and businesses looted. In addition to severe property damage, eighteen human lives were tragically lost--some through astonishing displays of hatred and disgust.

The following account by Marvin Dunn (Forthcoming) vividly illustrates a level of horror and hostility seldom captured by academic analyses of urban conflict. The story is of a brutal attack on two brothers who were driving through Liberty City on their way home from the beach the evening the McDuffie verdict was announced:

The Kulp brothers, from all accounts, were beaten continuously by a variety of people for about fifteen to twenty minutes. They were punched, karate-kicked and struck with rocks, bricks, bottles and pieces of concrete, one of which was later recovered by homicide detectives, weighed 23 pounds. At

one point, someone picked up a yellow *Miami Herald* newspaper dispenser and brought it down on Jeffrey Kulp's head. They were shot several times with a revolver and run over by a green Cadillac, whose driver then came over and stabbed them with a screwdriver.

Sergeant Patrick Burns, one of the first police officers to arrive, described the scene as follows:

I ran over and grabbed one Kulp brother, . . . he was still fibrillating, sort of jumping, you know. His head had been split open with an axe it looked like. I ran over and rolled the other brother over. His head was looking up but his body was so mutilated it was like all out of the natural way of lying down. He had his head split open too, and he had a rose coming out of his mouth. (Dunn Forthcoming)

Residents of Dade County were suddenly faced with the startling reality that the devastation that surrounded them was not the result of 100 mile an hour winds, torrential rains or some freak occurrence of nature, but was the direct result of human outrage. People outside of Miami were equally shocked to learn that such an urban nightmare had befallen a city well known as America's favorite playground. As has often been the case in crises such as this, public officials, the media and casual observers need not have looked too far to understand the hopelessness, anger and despair that became so evident in Liberty City during May of 1980. Yet, as is also often the case, they did not look far enough.

The most cursory overview of Miami's history reveals a great deal of racial tension dating back to the founding of the city in 1896. Liberty City was not the first, but only one--albeit the most destructive--in a series of social upheavals beginning in 1968. Also not difficult to recognize was that many of the conditions about which Blacks in Miami complained in 1968 remained unchanged in 1980. What had changed, and changed dramatically, was the broader social, political and economic context surrounding a Black population

in Liberty City that continued to live in despair. It was around these changes that the explanations for the Liberty City riots coalesced.

Most every account of what had happened on May 18, 1980, called attention to the impact of immigration on Metropolitan Miami. Miami was portrayed as a city that continuously suffered the effects of social and political turmoil throughout the Third World and as an area that had fallen prey to foreign invasion. Reports of this nature consistently emphasized the devastating consequences of the immigrant influx for the native Black population in Miami. A particularly frequent claim attributed the anger and hostility of Blacks in Miami to the loss of jobs to incoming Cuban refugees. Racial disturbance continued to plague Miami throughout the 1980s, and this explanation appeared to gain credence over time.

A brief review of the literature on Miami during the 1980s revealed that, despite the prevalence of the claim that Cuban immigrants had taken jobs from African Americans, very little empirical evidence had been brought to bear on the issue of job displacement in Miami. This was puzzling given the amount of local, national and international attention focused on the city in recent years and suggested a fruitful area for further research. Armed with a multitude of statements defining "the problem" in Miami as one of fierce competition between immigrants and the native minority over scarce economic resources, this analysis began as a relatively straightforward attempt to demonstrate the economic impact of immigration on Black Americans in the Metropolitan Miami labor market.

Several factors became apparent immediately. First, there is nothing "straightforward" about measuring job displacement of one individual or group by another. This is likely to be the case in any area, at any time and between any groups. It is particularly true in a city like Miami that has

undergone very rapid demographic and economic changes over the past thirty years. The local economy is in a state of flux that continues to transform an area once dependent on the tourist trade into a major center of international banking and commerce. Furthermore, the labor pool is composed of individuals from very diverse backgrounds--including an unknown, but estimated to be substantial, population of undocumented workers. Obtaining accurate longitudinal labor market data by race and ethnicity is itself a trying task.

Secondly, the results of a preliminary empirical analysis did not appear to support the displacement thesis (see Appendix A). Although admittedly limited in scope, the findings were sufficient to challenge the strength and validity of the job displacement claim in Miami. Further investigation revealed that other analysts had begun to reach similar conclusions.² The public perception of an immigrant job takeover, however, persisted unscathed. No definitive statement on labor market substitutability can be based on this or any other existing analyses of Metropolitan Miami; and labor market competition between natives and newcomers remains an interesting area for research. What the existing set of circumstances in Miami did unequivocally suggest was the need for an alternative approach to ethnic conflict in Miami.

When the results of the labor market analysis did not support the original hypothesis--that Cuban immigrants had displaced Black workers in Miami--my initial response was to simply discount the negative findings. I remained puzzled, however, by the widespread and seemingly uncritical acceptance of the Hispanic job takeover in Miami, in the absence of empirical evidence to support that claim. It then occurred to me that perhaps the research question itself was flawed and, as such, the methodological strategy

an improper one. I began to focus not on the reality of job displacement, but on why and how this particular theme gained prominence.

A closer examination of the history and nature of social and political turmoil in Miami revealed a variety of situations and scenarios characterized by an incongruity between subjective perceptions and objective facts. And I quickly realized, as had *Miami Herald* columnist Juanita Greene almost thirty years before, that "Miami is dealing with a situation in which feelings are as important as facts" (Greene 1965b). On the basis of that realization, my entire focus shifted in a different direction--away from unemployment rates and wage differentials, toward the sociopolitical mechanisms by which "facts" and "images" are created and the role these imagined realities play in determining social outcomes. This analytical shift not only provides needed insight into an issue of great relevance for Metropolitan Miami, but also suggests critical changes for the study of ethnic and race relations more generally.

The State of the Field

Race and ethnicity are popular topics of discussion and debate, and there is certainly no shortage of material, scholarly or otherwise, that attempts to elucidate these very complex social phenomena. In spite of the amount of attention focused on the topic, however, little progress has been made toward an accurate understanding of ethnicity and ethnic group interaction. This is not only the case in the United States, but throughout the rest of the world as well. Observers of all backgrounds appear to have been caught off guard by the continued force of ethnicity as a critical factor in social and political mobilization worldwide. Similarly, analysts and policy makers alike seem ill-prepared to explain or cope with the persistence and

resurgence of what has conventionally been viewed as an archaic form of cultural attachment.

The efforts of social scientists to explain and predict social and political behavior in the postmodern world have been clouded, to a large extent, by the persistence of certain widely held views on ethnicity--views that are rooted in the theoretical and epistemological foundations of both liberal pluralist and Marxist thought. In the United States, for example, explanatory theories of ethnic and race relations have tended to focus on assimilation, or the adaptation of one group to the core culture and structures of another group. This perspective has long dominated research on race and ethnicity and dates back to the work of Park and Burgess (1924, 735) who defined assimilation as "a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups, and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life." Milton Gordon's (1964) seminal work *Assimilation in American Life* built on Park's framework to delineate very specific stages through which groups adapt to a core society.

These, and the works of other assimilation theorists, portray interaction among different ethnic and racial groups as a relatively peaceful process that results in a smooth progression through established and universal stages of adaptation to a core or common culture. This perspective, heavily laden with the assumptions of political liberalism, ignores the role of power, conflict and inequality in the relations among different ethnic and racial groups and assumes, in the final stage of intergroup interaction, that social, cultural, economic and political distinctions based on race or ethnic group identity will fade or "melt" away.

This framework came under increasing attack by various neo-Marxist analyses that emphasized the interactive structure of class, race and ethnicity.³ Rather than a "melting pot" which creates a new amalgamation of relatively equal and culturally homogeneous peoples, these analysts focus on the persistence of power and resource inequalities between whites and nonwhites. Emphasis is placed on the conflict, subordination and exploitation that characterizes intergroup relations. This neo-Marxist challenge recognizes differences among ethnic and racial groups, but not as distinct forms of group identity or social stratification. Instead, racial and ethnic divisions are considered to be a product of the class stratification of American capitalism (Feagin 1989, 33-40).

In the 1960s, when modernization theorists began to use the United States and other Western countries as models for understanding, predicting and promoting world development, they conceptualized ethnicity as a "traditional" form of social identity that would pass away with the advent of "modernity."⁴ This development literature also came under attack by more radical scholars for its ethnocentric, Western value biases and inattention to power and conflict. Many of modernization theory's harshest critics were Marxist scholars who argued against a smooth progression from traditional societies based on affectivity, ascription and particularism to a modern world in which functionally specific interest groups interact in a free and open market (Parsons 1951). They posited, instead, a revolutionary progression in which class consciousness would prevail and the mass of workers would rise up to overthrow the world capitalist system (Parkin 1979; Tucker 1978).

Interestingly, despite the fact that liberalism and Marxism are often portrayed as diametrically opposed, these two schools of thought actually share similar views and commit similar mistakes. Both present a deterministic and

unilinear conceptualization of social change, both deny a role for race and ethnicity in social stratification and political mobilization, and both are mistaken. Also interesting, however, is the current unwillingness of some scholars to recognize the errors and their continued efforts to reinterpret world events in a favorable light.

In his 1990 presidential address before the American Political Science Association, Lucian Pye focused on the crisis of authoritarianism brought about by a world culture of modernization (1990, 3). Pye explicitly interpreted this "Great Transformation" as a vindication for modernization theory, pointing out that he and his colleagues had, as early as the 1950s and '60s, predicted that economic growth, the spread of science and technology, and the acceleration and spread of communications would bring about democratic transitions worldwide (1990, 7).

While Pye and others now celebrate events in Eastern Europe and elsewhere as the "end of history,"⁵ groups such as the Serbians, Croatsians and Muslims in the former Yugoslav Republic engage in daily struggles that will go down in history as among the most bloody, violent and destructive human pillage known to the modern world. This tragic set of circumstances presents an unusual paradox described by Benjamin Barber (1992, 53) as "Jihad vs. McWorld." McWorld refers to the trends in technology, ecology, communications and commerce, also discussed by Pye, that are quickly integrating the world into a homogeneous global network. Jihad makes reference to the war, bloodshed and "retribalization of large swaths of humankind" that appear to be simultaneously tearing the world apart at the seams.

The persistence of ethnic group conflict in a postmodern, postindustrial, post-Cold War world has renewed scholarly interest in the

subject of ethnicity and ethnic relations. To a large extent, however, many current approaches remain beholden to the tenets of liberalism and Marxism. Nelson Kasfir (1979) specifically blames the lack of analytic advancement in the study of ethnicity to the various assumptions held by these two dominant schools of thought. Liberal modernization theorists view ethnicity as based on objective indicators, which produce deeply held values, primarily among the masses, or those who have not gained elite status. Neo-Marxist analyses contend that ethnicity is subjective, a direct consequence of ideology rather than economic material relationships, and that its political uses are most frequently traced to members of the bourgeoisie, who advocate ethnic demands as a consequence of their rational calculations in pursuit of desired resources (1979, 91-92).

Kasfir and others have advanced the study of ethnicity by combining these schools of thought and treating the various themes addressed by each as an empirical continuum along which instances of ethnic political behavior can be placed, depending on the characteristics of individual cases. In other words, ethnic identity is based on both objective indicators and subjective perceptions, and ethnic political behavior can be motivated by any combination of rational calculation and primordial values. The goal of analysis, therefore, should be to understand how a particular identity is activated in the pursuit of a particular goal (Kasfir 1979, 95).

New Directions

Social relations in Miami resemble, although in a relatively less tragic fashion, the type of ethnic strife now occurring worldwide. In a discussion about relations among ethnic groups in Miami, former four-term mayor Maurice Ferre described the city as the "Beirut of the West" (Warren et al. 1986,

632). *Miami Herald* political editor Tom Fiedler also warned of the "Balkanization" of Miami, stating that

we as a community, and as a state - if not as a nation - seem to have forgotten the essence of America. We are behaving instead like Serbs or Croations or Azerbaijanis or Russian Georgians. We must stop before we start shooting like them (1992, 4).

Miami not only illustrates the persistence of ethnic conflict, but also the inability of existing analyses to grasp the complexity of social relations in a dynamic and interdependent world. Primordial attachments do not appear to have vanished in what has been referred to as "the city of the 21st century." And despite the prevalent portrayal of social tensions in terms of economic competition between ethnic groups, the origins of such claims cannot be directly traced to the material conditions about which they purport to refer. In actuality, at any given point in time a variety of competing claims coexist in and about Miami and do so irrespective of their basis in empirical fact.

What emerges from this set of circumstances is a discrepancy between public perceptions and objective conditions that is not restricted to the issue of an immigrant job takeover or any other single variable. Several accounts of race and ethnic relations in Miami have acknowledged the significant role that perception has played in generating tension and hostility, but no attempt has yet been made to bridge the gap between private perceptions of a "problem" in Miami and the public issue of ethnic conflict.

This research addresses the issues of ethnicity and ethnic conflict from a new direction. The analysis operates on the assumption that collective images of the social world are the outcome of various historical, cultural, political and economic processes deeply embedded in history. The focus is on how these processes construct explanations for social phenomena that become widely accepted independently of their basis in fact. The relevance of this

perspective to understanding racial and ethnic conflict in Miami is partially captured by W.I. Thomas's well-known maxim: "If people define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (1924, 584).

A substantial body of literature provides a strong theoretical foundation for this approach. Many analysts, from diverse disciplinary perspectives, have challenged the assumption of "a world of facts with determinable meaning and a world of people who react rationally to the facts they know" (Edelman 1988, 1). The result is an epistemological shift away from many of the tenets of positivist thought that have long dominated social science research. This shift is embodied largely, but not entirely, in the writings of postmodern and poststructuralist philosophers. Interestingly, this intellectual current, which seeks to expose the elusiveness, dynamism and "intertextuality" of social phenomena, resonates well with Metropolitan Miami's image as a city of illusion. In fact, in a recent critique of postmodern analysis, one author made specific reference to Miami as "that enclave of postmodernism" (Palmer 1990, 171).

The terms postmodernism and poststructuralism refer to a broad and diverse body of scholarship, and as one author pointed out "There are probably as many forms of postmodernism as there are postmodernists" (Rosenau 1992, 15). It is possible, however, to identify some basic themes underlying this approach. In general, these works reject established boundaries and existing definitions of what constitutes "reality" and instead emphasize the ambiguous, subjective and relative nature of meaning itself. Postmodernists and poststructuralists seek, among other things, to expose how structures of power and domination are embedded not only in political and economic systems, but also in social discourse. They point to a world in which "the production of meaning has become as important as the production of labor in shaping the

boundaries of human existence" and view as essential the need to "challenge those mystifying ideologies that separate culture from power and struggle while simultaneously treating difference as a technical rather than a political category" (Giroux 1991, 226).

Political scientist Murray Edelman (1988) draws explicitly on the work of postmodern scholars in his conceptualization of politics as a "spectacle" that continuously constructs and reconstructs social problems, crises, enemies and threats. He cautions observers that the claims that make up the political spectacle are not to be viewed as factual statements, but as devices for creating disparate assumptions and beliefs about the social and political world. In Charles Lindblom's recent book *Inquiry and Change* (1990, ix), he chooses to consciously distance himself from the "abstractions of Marcuse, Gramsci and Habermas," but does raise key questions about the epistemological assumptions that have long dominated the social sciences.

The study of "agenda-setting" provides additional insight into the inherently political nature of the social definition of reality. The public agenda consists of a range of issues, popular concerns, priorities and values that are salient to a given community. In an attempt to explain and predict which sets of issues, from a complex of confusing and conflicting disputes, are most likely to gain the attention of the polity, agenda-setting theorists focus their analyses on "how problems develop, how they are defined, the courses of action formulated . . . and the legitimation of one course of action over the other" (Hoppe 1969, 2). This approach challenges the narrow focus on decision making within institutions by contending that the battle over policy may well be decided in the preliminary stages of issue emergence and that by focusing only on the institutional agenda, scholars have tended to overlook an equally influential process of "nondecision making," or the means through which demands for change in the existing

allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are even voiced (Bachrach and Baratz 1970; Jones 1984).

Within the field of sociology, a number of theorists have similarly emphasized the subjective nature of social problems. Howard Becker states, "If any set of objective conditions, even non-existent ones, can be defined as a social problem, it is clear that the conditions themselves do not either produce the problem, or constitute a necessary component of it" (Becker 1966, 6). Herbert Blumer (1971, 305) also argues that "knowledge of the objective makeup of social problems is essentially useless"; and Armand Mauss (1975, 45) contends that "individuals and interest groups will simply generate a social problem out of their own interests, with or without the data from objective reality." In *Constructing Social Problems* (1987), Malcom Spector and John Kitsuse build on the theoretical foundation of these earlier works to present an analytical framework that requires researchers to concentrate on the processes by which certain conditions in society come to be defined as social problems. The analysis of social problems, according to Spector and Kitsuse, need not address "actual conditions" themselves, but rather how they are defined by members of society. It is the "claims-making activity" of various actors--journalists, politicians, social workers, union organizers--that defines a social problem (1987, 75).

These analysts focus on social and political discourse, but are continuously cognizant of the fact that discursive interaction occurs in a context characterized by an unequal distribution of power, influence and material resources. As Gusfield (1981, 8) cautions, "The public arena is not a field on which all can play on equal terms; some have greater access than others and greater power and ability to shape the definition of public issues." He writes,

The social construction of public problems implies a historical dimension. The same "objective" condition may be defined as a problem in one time period, not in another. But there is more to the analysis of public issues than the idea of historicity. At any specific moment, all possible parties to the issue do not have equal abilities to influence the public; they do not possess the same degree or kind of authority to be legitimate sources of definition of the reality of the problem. (Gusfield 1981, 8)

Agenda-setting theorists make a similar claim when emphasizing that the public agenda is formed through the normal struggle of social forces and that, "at any point in time, it will reflect the existing balance of those forces, or the mobilization of bias within a community" (Cobb and Elder 1972, 161).

Methodological Challenges

All of the aforementioned works, drawn from political science, sociology and policy analysis, share the belief that "objective conditions are seldom so compelling and so unambiguous that they set the policy agenda or dictate the appropriate conceptualization" (Majone 1989, 24). Meaning is to be viewed as relative, multiple and changing. Objects, events, circumstances and situations (read: reality) acquire meaning based on the context in which they occur and the actors or interests by whom they are interpreted or defined. In other words, whether a particular "problem" is recognized to exist, whether it qualifies for consideration and how it is to be considered are functions of the sociopolitical nature of the claims-making process itself (Spector and Kitsuse 1987). As such, the analyst need not compete with members of society as an arbiter of accurate knowledge, but rather must study how members of society "define, lodge, and press claims; how they publicize their concerns, redefine the issues in question in the face of political obstacles, indifference, or opposition; and how they enter into alliances with other claims-makers" (Joel Best 1989, xiii).

Casting the research problem in this manner has profound implications for Miami specifically, as well as the study of ethnicity and ethnic relations in general. Most research on the topic of ethnic relations in Miami sets out to document certain objective conditions about which grievances have been expressed--whether it be job loss, income differentials or language discrimination. These studies may provide valuable insights, but in the end, what is more important from the standpoint of interethnic conflict is the perception of these 'realities' rather than objective conditions themselves.

This study of ethnic relations in Miami focuses on the processes that transform private perceptions into public images. By elevating the role of perceptions and the manner in which these perceptions are created, manipulated, used and changed, the investigation is less concerned (although not ignorant of) the objective conditions, focusing instead on the very manner in which perceived reality is constructed. Compared to conventional survey techniques, such an approach necessarily calls for a different methodological strategy. The information presented in the following chapters is based on an ethnographic analysis of claims-making activity in and about Metropolitan Miami from 1960 to the present. Data are drawn from a variety of sources, including in-depth interviews with community leaders, politicians, journalists and business people; a thorough review of the periodical and popular literature on Miami, including the *Miami Herald*, the Black-owned and operated *Miami Times*, and the Latin *Diario Las Americas*; analysis of public documents; and participant observation (see Appendix B).

What is new in this approach is the attempt to systematically bring together a wide range of theoretical traditions and empirical observations. Many of the contemporary challenges to mainstream social science remain at the level of theoretical discussion and debate. Much less common is the

attempt to examine the empirical applicability of these various philosophical insights.⁶ Parallel, however, to the epistemological shift in the study of social phenomena is a similar call for alternative methodological approaches. In a recent volume, *A Case for the Case Study* (Feagin et al. 1991), several scholars attempt to restore the case study as a methodological tool in social science inquiry. Through theoretical discussion as well as empirical application, the contributors illustrate the utility of the case study not merely as a supplement to other methodologies, but as a distinctive means of providing valid social knowledge: "We contend that the case study method is essential if social science is to grapple with major social issues on both the historical and the contemporary scenes. Such matters lie beyond the grasp of the natural science model" (Sjoberg et al. 1991, 28).

Orum and Feagin (1991, 121) specifically bemoan the strikingly "small number of theoretically informed, relatively comprehensive, in-depth analyses of major U.S. cities" and conclude their study of Austin and Houston by remarking that "there is no substitute, particularly in realms where one seeks, as we did, some fresh understanding of an old issue, for the intensive study of a single case. Our research alerted us to the role of growth visions and other critical matters in a way that no research, using census or other quantitative evidence, could have" (1991, 145).

Certainly ethnicity qualifies as an "old issue in need of some fresh understanding"; and, in the terminology and criteria used by case study advocates, Miami clearly constitutes a "critical case" for any analysis of contemporary ethnic phenomena (Yin 1984). There are, without question, certain factors that make the Miami case unique; but, given the demographic, political and economic trends predicted for the future, Miami is very likely to serve as a model for social and political relations nationwide. It is also

important to point out that the very rapid quantitative and qualitative changes taking place in Miami over the last several years have resulted in a political and social system that is, in many ways, more akin to that of "new" or developing nations than to the established patterns of more advanced states (Maingot 1986, 87).

Not only does the city of Miami serve as an ideal laboratory in which to closely examine the nature of ethnicity and ethnic group relations, but the approach itself provides the opportunity to illuminate elements of social and political interaction that have heretofore been obscured by the epistemological and methodological premises of conventional analytical techniques. Analysts may ask, for example, whether it is accurate to characterize social tensions in terms of *ethnic* conflict? If so, why does conflict manifest itself through ethnic divisions rather than class? And what, in fact, constitutes ethnicity? Rather than accepting ethnic identities as distinctions or differences rooted in deep historical and experiential factors, this approach allows for an interpretation of ethnicity itself as a socially and politically constructed phenomenon. As such, this study of ethnic relations in Miami shares Bahr and Caplow's (1991, 86) contention that "the construction of social reality produces structures too intricate and multifaceted to be adequately described from any single perspective" and answers the call for holistic analyses, more interdisciplinary work, and greater recognition of multiple contexts and historical transitions (Bahr and Caplow 1991; Yin 1984).

The chapters that follow examine different discourses--sets of publicly stated claims, grievances, beliefs, perceptions, attitudes, opinions and concerns--that depict Miami's political environment at one point in time. The objective is to explain the origins and the processes that construct the competing narratives and to show how and why they change over time.

Chapter 2 traces the historical processes that transformed Miami's image from that of a "Magic City" to a "Paradise Lost." Chapter 3 documents a variety of grievances associated with immigration to Miami that range from the loss of jobs to the threat of moral degradation. These claims are shown to be situated within a broader discourse, which defines immigration to Miami as a foreign threat and the immigrants as unwelcome invaders. Chapter 4 traces the emergence and legitimation of the "Cuban Success Story" as it relates to the changing character of power and politics in Washington as well as Miami. Nelson Mandela's visit to Miami in 1991 is discussed in Chapter 5, in order to highlight both the symbolic nature of ethnicity and ethnic relations and the need to place local level analyses in a global context. The concluding chapter summarizes the insights to be gleaned from this approach to ethnic relations and the application of this case study for future analyses of social and political relations in the US and abroad.

Concluding Remarks

It is widely accepted that Miami is an arena of competition among ethnic groups, competition that, at times, translates into social conflict. Raymond Mohl (1990, 40) has pointed out, for example, that the tension between Blacks and Hispanics in Miami was superimposed on a much longer history of racial conflict that dates back to Miami's origin as a city in 1896. The approach presented here emphasizes that it is this long history of conflict and social struggle in Miami that led to the definitions of reality that now circulate in and about Miami, definitions that both create and sustain tensions between different ethnic groups. In other words, a historical, sociocultural and political analysis of intergroup relations in Miami does not serve as a mere backdrop for understanding the current turmoil, but rather serves as the very

data necessary for understanding how ethnicity and ethnic conflict have been socially constructed.

Recognizing the social and political processes that define "reality" need not deny the existence of any referents for meaning nor degenerate into an endless spiral of relativity (Edelman 1988, 4-6). The intent is merely to expose the boundaries and conditions within and the processes through which meaning is produced. Unemployment, for example, is real; Castro and Mandela are real; riots, death and destruction are also real. But how these issues, actors and events are defined, expressed, interpreted, responded to and explained are all processes distinct from empirical conditions themselves. It is these processes, embodied in social and political discourse, that construct reality, or "realities" as the case may be.

Miami is a composite of images, none of which are devoid of material referents, but all of which are constructed through processes distinct from the content or conditions that they appear to reflect. This research is guided by the proposition that these images can, with the proper methodology, be traced to the tug and pull of vested interests and community politics. Once constructed, however, these images, perceptions or constructed realities take on a significance independent of their basis in "fact." In other words, images of reality reinforce, as well as reflect, established configurations of political, economic and social and cultural power. Understanding the processes that construct these images may provide insight into the nature of power and politics in Miami and perhaps suggest possibilities for 'imagining' a more peaceful Miami and a more peaceful world.

Notes

1. On October 29, 1992, the Florida Planning Council sponsored a statewide conference in Miami organized around the theme "Rediscovery of America: Miami--Prototypical City of the 21st Century."
2. The labor market debate is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. For studies that present data that refute the job displacement thesis, see Card (1990), Cruz (1991), and Portes and Stepick (Forthcoming).
3. *Internal colonialism*; widely associated with the work of Robert Blauner (1972) and Carmichael and Hamilton (1967), views racial and class stratification as related systems of oppression. Emphasis is placed on institutionalization of racial discrimination and the social, political and economic processes through which white dominance is maintained. The *split labor market* perspective is another class-based theory of racial and ethnic antagonism. Split labor market theorists demonstrate how the ethnic and racial divisions among the working class serve the interests of the dominant class, or capitalists (Bonacich 1980, Greenberg 1980).
4. This is a voluminous literature, but for seminal statements see Apter (1965), Inkeles and Smith (1974), Lerner (1958) and Pye (1963). For an overview and contemporary defense of the modernization literature, see Almond (1990).
5. See Francis Fukuyama's widely cited and much debated expose, *The End Of History and the Last Man*, 1992, New York: Avon Books.
6. Social problem theorists (Spector and Kitsuse 1987) and agenda-setting theorists (Cobb and Elder 1972) have recognized the need for and called for more empirical analysis to test and refine the theoretical propositions being advanced in their work. With regard to postmodernism, however, any attempt to empirically test or refine theoretical propositions, with the goal of establishing universal laws, would be arguably inconsistent with the intellectual endeavor of that body of scholarship (Rosenau 1992).

CHAPTER 2 FROM "MAGIC CITY" TO "PARADISE LOST": THE EVOLUTION OF ETHNIC CONFLICT IN MIAMI

On May 18, 1980, billows of grey-black smoke darkened the sky over Liberty City, a neighborhood on the north side of Metropolitan Miami. The flames continued to burn for three days as Miami suffered one of the worst race riots in US history. Before the last of the smoldering was extinguished, eighteen people had died, two hundred seventy lay injured, and property damage reached an estimated \$200 million (Porter and Dunn 1984, xiii).

In the aftermath of the riot, analysts, politicians, local leaders and the media scrambled to explain how such a violent, destructive uprising could transpire in one of America's favorite playgrounds. The specter of burning buildings seemed as strangely out of place under the sun-drenched palms as did a 1960s-style urban race riot at the beginning of the 1980s. As one observer noted, this was "the worst rioting in any of the nation's cities since the upheaval in Detroit in 1967" (Levine 1985, 59). It was distinguished, according to some, by a particularly high level of violence and complete disdain for the sanctity of human life and property:

Before the Miami riot of 1980, in order to find instances in American history where Blacks had set out intentionally to kill white people, one would have had to go back to the days of Nat Turner and a few slave rebellions of the pre-Civil War South. When the ashes finally cooled, Miami awakened to an old reality; all was not well in the bowels of the city (Dunn Forthcoming).

The so-called "McDuffie riot" of 1980 (named for the man whose beating sparked the riots) was not the first such disturbance in Miami, nor was it the

last. By the end of the decade, Miami had become a city synonymous with social upheaval. The tendency was to view these events, if not Miami itself, as an aberration. But as Los Angeles showed in April 1992, the turmoil that plagued Miami throughout the 1980s more accurately qualified the city as a harbinger and not an outlier in race and ethnic relations throughout the US.

Miami and Los Angeles both demand an immediate and comprehensible explanation of what took place and why. But on-the-spot analysis leads to fragmented and superficial interpretations of extremely complex social, political and economic variables. Although often exacerbated by the convergence of contemporary events, social rebellions must be viewed as multifaceted phenomena, the origins of which are deeply rooted in historical events. This chapter traces major social, political and economic trends, highlighting significant events and introducing relevant actors, in order to present a historical interpretation of the evolution of ethnic conflict in Miami from the late 1950s to the present.

A truly comprehensive overview of ethnic relations in Miami¹ would have to begin much further back in South Florida history. The common portrayal of Miami as a sleepy, southern town just recently come to life belies the fact that the geographic area at the edge of the Everglades has always been the uneasy meeting ground of peoples of strikingly different cultural backgrounds.

Such an overview would have to begin, for example, with the interaction between Spanish explorers and native inhabitants, primarily Seminole Indians, throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It would have to examine the relations between immigrants from the Bahamas and settlers who migrated from the North. A truly comprehensive account of the impact of the Cuban influx in South Florida would likewise have to begin

long before Castro's overthrow of Fulgencio Batista in 1959. Communities of Cubans were scattered from Key West to Tampa, working in thriving cigar industries, drinking cafe cubano and arguing politics before Castro and his comrades launched their attack on the Moncada Barracks, and well before Miami's Eighth Street was referred to as Calle Ocho. Indeed, as far back as the Cuban revolution of 1933, and almost fifty years before the first "Marielito" ever set foot on Miami's shores, Anglo residents were complaining about the "infiltration of Cubans" (Boswell and Curtis 1984; Dunn Forthcoming; Parks 1981).²

The history of Miami is a history of social cooperation and social conflict along ethnic and racial lines. During certain time periods these dividing lines have been more firmly drawn than others, but the divisions have never remained constant. Instead, from the beginning, ethnic relations in Miami have been remarkably fluid--both in terms of the social identity of individuals and groups and in the relations between groups.

Until the late 1800s, Indians were a fierce and prominent force in South Florida. Blacks were also a growing presence in the region, and throughout the first half of the nineteenth century these two groups maintained a close and pragmatic alliance. The Dade Massacre of 1835 saw Blacks and Seminoles join forces to wage a bloody attack against the advancing US military. The severity of the attack, in terms of loss of soldiers' lives, ranked second only to General Custer's battle forty years later (Allman 1987, 150; Kearney 1986). Today, the only sizable American Indian population residing in Dade County are the Miccosukee who, living a fairly destitute existence in the Everglades, have little interaction with or connection to any other ethnic group (Rodrigues 1990).

Unlike the Indians, the Black population continued to expand throughout the twentieth century, sometimes at a rate that surpassed that of Whites (Mohl 1991, 112). Much of the growth in Miami's Black population can be attributed to immigration from the West Indies. In 1920, for example, Black immigrants from the Bahamas comprised 52 percent of Miami's Blacks; and Miami had a larger population of Black immigrants than any other city in the United States except New York (Mohl 1991, 137; 1987).

Blacks have consistently composed fifteen to twenty percent of the population in Dade County and represent diverse regional, cultural and linguistic backgrounds. This diversity has often been a source of fragmentation within the Black community, but the factors that separate one element of the Black population from another have not remained constant. At the turn of the century, for example, a great deal of tension existed between Bahamian Blacks and American Blacks, many of whom were former slaves who were migrating from North Florida and Georgia. Both came seeking better economic opportunity, but they shared few cultural commonalities and developed a mutual distrust (George 1978; Johnson 1988). Today, the distinction between descendents of Bahamian Blacks and those from elsewhere in the US is largely irrelevant. It has been replaced, however, with tension such as that which now characterizes relations between established resident Blacks in Miami and Haitian newcomers (Stepick et al. 1990, 46).

Jews also compose a significant proportion of the population in Miami and have suffered discrimination and persecution similar to that experienced by Blacks and other ethnic minorities. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, it was not uncommon to see signs that read "No Jews or Dogs" posted outside many of the hotels in Miami Beach (Sheskin 1991, 163). Today, Jewish residents own many of those hotels in Miami Beach and

constitute a large and powerful force in the political and economic life of Metropolitan Miami. When it comes to ethnic categorization, however, the Jewish population has been largely subsumed under the heading of "Anglo," or more appropriately "Non-Latin White."

Miami, like many other cities, has changed dramatically over the last one hundred years. Throughout this time, ethnicity was and continues to be a very salient form of social stratification and group identification. The reasons for this are complex, but cannot be analyzed in isolation from the changing character of power and politics in Miami. This chapter analyzes Miami politics over the last thirty years. The late 1950s is an appropriate starting point for the analysis because of the particular social, political and economic factors that began to take shape at that time, factors that define the tenor of life in contemporary Metropolitan Miami.

Magic for Whom? Miami from 1950 to 1960

By the 1950s, sunny beaches, warm temperatures and a tropical allure had earned Miami its reputation as a "Magic City." Tourists flocked from the northern United States as well as Canada and South America to soak up the sights and sounds of Miami. As the decade wore on, however, it became increasingly clear that in addition to sun, surf, and tourists, Miami was also home to a sizeable population of Blacks who had grown frustrated at not being afforded the same opportunity as their White counterparts to reap the benefits of the "Magic City" (Chapman 1991; Parks 1981).

Prior to the 1960s the demographic makeup of Miami was similar to that of other cities throughout the southern United States. In 1950, 13.1 percent of the population of Dade County was Black, and an estimated 4 percent was Latin. As mentioned above, the population of Blacks included a significant number of

immigrants and descendents of immigrants from the Bahamian islands. The small Latin population at the time consisted primarily of Cubans, many of whom had fled to Miami after the Cuban revolution of 1933 (Boswell and Curtis 1991, 145). Among the remaining White population, approximately 54,000 were of Jewish origin (Sheskin 1991).

Following the Jim Crow habit of the rest of the South, Miami was a very segregated city. As Joan Didion has pointed out

Miami blacks did not swim at Dade County beaches. When Miami blacks paid taxes at the Dade County Courthouse they did so at a separate window, and when Miami blacks shopped at Burdines, where they were allowed to buy although not to try on clothes, they did so without using the elevators (Didion 1987, 47).

The majority of Blacks were forced to live in small, overcrowded slums. One such area was the downtown district of Overtown, known at the time as "Colored Town." Despite the deplorable living conditions--most residents lived in dilapidated shacks with no electricity, bathing facilities, or hot water--by the 1940s this area had evolved into an important center of Black culture in South Florida (Mohl 1988, 215). The Overtown of the 1940s and 1950s was said to be reminiscent of Harlem's Renaissance of the 1920s. This analogy remains prominent in Black discourse today, as former residents frequently make reference to Overtown as

a viable community in which people had common causes and related to each other. There was economic development, businesses, furniture stores, a soda water bottling company. The professionals, doctors, lawyers, others, were there. It was a focal point for black people. Segregation, of course, contributed to that, but segregation caused it to be a community where people had a real sense of community. (Hampton and Fayer 1990, 650)

All of Miami at this time, including Overtown, was reaping the benefits of a booming tourist industry.³ After World War II, Miami developed into the premier winter vacation resort for the eastern US and also became the destination of an increasing number of retirees from the North. The tourism

industry was at a peak in the 1950s as television personalities such as Jackie Gleason and Arthur Godfrey touted the magic of Miami. Huge, new luxury hotels began to spring up, and visitors arrived en masse. The tourist trade generated the bulk of Miami's jobs, primarily in service industries such as hotels, restaurants and entertainment. A growing market for resort wear also helped to rejuvenate the local garment industry (Levine 1985, 53).

In addition to an expanded and diversified service sector, Miami also experienced a construction boom during the post-War era. From 1940 to 1960, Dade County's population increased by 90 percent every ten years. During the 1950s alone over 50,000 new residents settled in Miami each year. The building industry flourished as the influx of people stimulated the construction of new homes and businesses (Levine 1985, 53; Stepick 1989).

Miami was growing rapidly, and the changes were taking place in a metropolitan area that, relative to many other large US cities, was still quite young. This youth is frequently cited as an explanatory factor for different aspects of social, political and economic life in Miami. The city was not incorporated until July of 1896, which, according to some, explains why the Miami of the 1950s lacked a cohesive and well-organized power elite.

Prior to 1960, Miami was an American city but not a typical one. It was newer, less traditional than other urban centers. It was neither fully southern nor northern. It had a large transient population and a large proportion of inhabitants who were first generation migrants. As a result, it lacked a consolidated socio-political structure and a coherent elite. (Stepick et al. 1990, 34)

Political scientist Edward Sofen, writing about the Miami milieu of the late 1950s, stated "Miami is almost wholly devoid of strongly organized political factions and of strongly organized labor or minority groups. It is generally lacking in organized and consistent community leadership" (1961, 20). In addition to the city's youth, the absence of any perceived threat from minority

groups, labor, or political machines apparently created an environment in which the power holders had little reason to mobilize their political or economic strength openly (Sofen 1961).

Despite the amorphous nature of power in Miami, it was wielded almost exclusively by White men. Observers frequently call attention to the role played by Blacks in the founding of the city in 1896. Of the 367 men, 162 were Black. Indeed, the first name that appears on the city charter is that of a Black man. These same observers are also quick to point out, however, that this event marked both the beginning and the end of any meaningful participation by Blacks in Miami's political system for many years to come (Dunn Forthcoming; Stack and Warren 1992).

Ironically, these various factors--youth, inexperience and the disenfranchisement of minority groups--did not prevent Greater Miami from being the first to establish one of the most progressive forms of metropolitan government in the nation. On May 21, 1957, Dade County voters approved a Home Rule Charter that established a metropolitan form of county government and ushered in certain revolutionary changes in the daily operation and structure of local government. Miami's metropolitan experience, since known as "Metro," remained in place until the 1990s, outlasting similar government structures in metropolitan areas around the US.⁴

Prior to the 1960s, there was no obvious power struggle taking place among Whites and Blacks in the political realm, nor any indication that minorities were prepared to pose a veritable challenge to the existing social or political structures in Miami. The city was not, however, without its share of racial strife, nor had it been for many years. Racial hatred and occasionally extreme incidents of White terrorism against Blacks occurred repeatedly throughout the city's history (George 1979; Porter and Dunn 1984).

In 1940, 1950 and 1960, Miami had the highest degree of residential segregation by race of one hundred large cities throughout the US (Taeuber and Taeuber 1965, 40). As racial patterns in certain neighborhoods began to change, Miami became the site of frequent protest marches by Whites, cross-burnings by the Ku Klux Klan, and dynamiting of apartments rented to Blacks in formerly all-White complexes. The Ku Klux Klan officially arrived in Miami in 1921 and, according to historian Raymond Mohl, "acted with impunity throughout the depression decade and remained dangerously active well into the 1950s" (Mohl 1991, 129). Certainly this was due, in part, to tacit approval by local law enforcement officials. Various sources indicate that Blacks in Miami suffered decades of unjust treatment at the hands of local police officers. By the late 1950s, relations between the two groups had reached a dangerous level of mutual distrust (George 1979; Porter and Dunn 1984).

Despite great resistance from Whites, persistent terrorism on the part of the Klan, and what amounted to a "ubiquitous pattern of police harassment of Blacks," by mid-century Blacks in Dade County had achieved several significant civil rights gains. During the 1940s, Miami swore in the first Black judge in the South since Reconstruction and the first permanent Black police officers in the South. The protest by Black soldiers who waded defiantly into the water at an all-White beach in Miami marked a significant and early beginning to the civil rights demonstrations that would sweep the nation in subsequent years. Miami also became, in 1959, the site of the first racially integrated public school in Florida (Buchanan 1977).

Accompanied by debilitating setbacks in other arenas, many of these gains proved to be only superficial in nature. Some of the same programs that were intended to improve the situation of Blacks had the opposite consequence. Federal housing reform launched during the New Deal era

became a tool with which the local elite in Miami could clear the downtown area for further expansion of the business district and relocate Blacks to a distant housing project six miles from the city core. This area eventually grew into the sprawling Black ghetto now known as Liberty City (Mohl 1991, 124). Similarly, highway urban renewal programs of the 1950s and '60s helped to fund the construction of interstate highways that sliced through the Black neighborhoods of downtown and destroyed the homes of thousands of Overtown families (Mohl 1988, 220; Chapman 1991, 41).

As the 1950s came to a close, not only did Blacks have ample reason to question the "magic" of Miami, but so too did many of its other residents. The tourism industry was in decline as jet service to the Caribbean forced Miami to compete for much-needed tourist dollars. The construction boom had begun to taper off, and the once-thriving middle-class section of town along Flagler and Southwest Eighth Street was becoming a depressed area cluttered by vacant shops (Boswell and Curtis 1991, 146). The former president of Florida International University referred to Miami at the end of the decade as "essentially a deteriorating city" (Levine 1985, 60).

The Cuban Influx: Economic Miracle or Mayhem?

The 1960s ushered in a decade of social and political turbulence throughout the US, but in addition to the urban race riots that plagued cities across the nation, Miami was also to feel the effects of an equally turbulent set of events taking place ninety miles south, on the island of Cuba. According to one group of knowledgeable observers:

The history of Miami since the 1960s has been affected thoroughly by one particular phenomenon, immigration. In a sense, much that has happened in Dade County since the waves of immigration started to arrive has been in reaction to or a result of immigration (Stepick et al. 1990, 21).

Although few would deny the very real influence immigration has had on Miami, the precise nature of its impact is debated. Claims that emerged in Miami during the late 1960s and 1970s lay the foundation for two competing discourses that would characterize public debate in Miami for years to come. One interpretation saw the arrival of the Cuban refugees in Miami as an economic miracle bestowed upon a city in decline. The other characterized the immigrant influx as an unwelcome invasion, the cause of great social, political and economic disruption.

By the late 1950s, long-time dictator Fulgencio Batista had clearly lost the support of the Cuban people, as well as that of the US. With the exception of a few loyalists, and those that had benefitted from an increasingly corrupt regime, his overthrow by Fidel Castro in December of 1959 was a welcome relief. Sensing turmoil, many of the Cuban elite had transferred their wealth, and in some cases themselves and their families, to Miami before the revolution. They were soon followed by a trickle of disgruntled Cuban compatriots who became disenchanted with the new government in Cuba. By 1965, that trickle had become a steady flows as thousands of Cubans were being airlifted twice-daily from the island and flown to Miami aboard "freedom flights" (Boswell and Curtis 1984).

About 20,000 Cubans resided in Miami prior to the 1959 Revolution. Over the next two decades, more than 500,000 additional Cubans arrived in Miami. Despite efforts of the federal government to resettle these "entrants" throughout the US, a remarkable number returned to Miami within a matter of years. One survey, conducted in 1978, found that 40 percent of Dade County's Cubans had returned to the area from living in another US city (Boswell and Curtis 1984, 66). Studies have shown that this concentration of Cubans presented an interesting exception to the general pattern of geographic

dispersion exemplified by other Hispanic nationality groups (McHugh 1989, 429).

The dramatic shift in Dade County's population during the 1960s and '70s was not only the result of Cuban immigration. Other Hispanic immigrant groups continued to arrive in Miami, as did Black immigrants from Caribbean nations such as Haiti and Jamaica. As these groups came, others left (see Figure 2-1). The percentage of White Americans in Dade County relative to other groups began to decline in 1960; and has decreased in absolute numbers since 1970. Dade County also experienced, in addition to the out-migration of Non-Latin Whites, some degree of "Non-Latin Black flight". The numbers were not as great, however, and the loss of Black population was largely off-set by net international immigration from the Caribbean. It was in 1965, for example, the first boatload of Haitians began to arrive in South Florida, followed by a second in December of 1972, and a steadier flow thereafter (Boswell and Curtis 1991, 141-145).

It is highly unlikely that any city, state or nation, for that matter, could have absorbed such a massive influx of immigrants without experiencing some degree of social, political or economic dislocation. This was certainly a concern expressed by Dade County residents and local officials alike when the first Cuban refugees began arriving in the early 1960s. Black leaders immediately feared that the refugee crisis would threaten the very fragile political gains recently accrued to Blacks as a result of the civil rights movement. Miami residents in general, both Black and White, employed and unemployed, were dismayed that the already depressed Dade County economy would now be forced to support an additional burden.⁵

In response to this local outcry, and to a situation that had significant implications for US foreign policy at the time, the federal government pumped




FIGURE 2-1
ETHNIC PROFILE OF DADE COUNTY:
NUMBERS OF WHITES, BLACKS AND HISPANICS FROM 1950 - 1990

generous sums of money into Miami to assist with the processing, settlement, and, in some cases, relocation of the newcomers (Pedraza-Bailey 1985). In this regard, US policy toward the Cuban refugees both reflected and reinforced a national consensus that these immigrants were the victims of a brutal communist dictatorship, and as such deserved not only our sincerest sympathy, but also our most generous support.

Despite these efforts, certain individuals and groups in Miami continued, throughout the 1970s, to voice discontent with the immigrant presence. Parallel to those concerns was the emergence of a compelling discourse that reflected the fact that Miami's economy, rather than sinking deeper into depression, had actually improved and was faring better than many other cities throughout the US. In fact, a series of developments during the 1970s are said to be responsible for transforming a "honky-tonk tourist town, akin to Las Vegas and Atlantic City, into a cultural and commercial hub of the Americas" (Levine 1985, 47). It was at the end of this decade that Miami officially earned its title: "Capital of Latin America".⁶

The popular phrase 'Latin Connection' referred not only to the entry through Miami of Latin products and people into the US, but also the expansion southward from Miami of US commercial and financial interests seeking to exploit the vast markets of Latin America and the Caribbean. Cuban immigrants are credited with bringing this international trade and finance to Miami. Not only did the relationships between Cuban exiles in the US and those that had settled elsewhere in Central and South America facilitate transnational business networks, but the Cuban presence in Miami had also created a Hispanic flavor that made the city increasingly attractive to Latin businesses and travellers. By the early 1970s, Miami's fledgling tourist industry had been resuscitated by an influx of foreign visitors. Noting the

great change brought on by the Hispanicization of Miami's image, one observer remarked: "Of course, tourists still come to Miami, but most of them now speak Spanish and fly *north* to get there" (Levine 1985, 47).

The Cuban emigres clearly facilitated Miami's link with the international economy, but their residence in the Miami area also helped rejuvenate the city itself. The refugees initially settled in a concentrated area located to the southwest of the city's central business district. Within a short period of time, they began to open small family businesses in the vacated shops along Flagler and Southwest Eighth Street. In December of 1971, the newly formed Latin Chamber of Commerce had a membership list of 678 organizations; by July of 1972, that number exceeded 1,000. (Stevenson 1973, 8) This is the area that developed into the bustling center of Latin social, political and economic life in Miami, now widely known as "Little Havana".

In some respects, the 1970s fulfilled its promise as a "Decade of Progress". In addition to Miami's new status as a center of international trade and finance, the city passed a very ambitious bond issue, Florida International University opened its doors in 1972, the arts flourished, and Miami's new professional football team--the Miami Dolphins--won two consecutive Super Bowls (Chapman 1991, 41).

Just as the "magic" of Miami was not universal in the 1940s and '50s, neither did the "progress" of the 1970s equally benefit all groups living in Dade County. Relative to the extraordinary success of the Cuban exiles, Blacks in Miami continued to suffer economic deprivation. The Black unemployment rate was twice that of Whites, and through the 1970s, Blacks comprised a disproportionately high percentage of those individuals in Dade County living below the poverty line (Stepick et al. 1990, 43).

With regard to the relative deprivation of Blacks, some analysts have pointed out that emphasis must be placed on the "relative". For example, certain measures indicate that although the economic status of Blacks in Miami did not match that of Hispanics during the 1970s, they fared better than Blacks in other parts of Florida and the United States. Similarly, both in terms of employment in professional and administrative occupations, and median income, Black growth outpaced that of both Hispanics and Non-Latin Whites (Stepick et al. 1990, 39).

Blacks in Miami made some significant political gains by the 1970s as well. The first Black was elected to the Miami city commission in 1967. In the decade that followed, her seat was filled by two Black clergymen--both of whom were active in the civil rights movement (Mohl 1991, 131). Dade County also selected its first Black Superintendent of Schools during the 1970s.⁷

Hispanics also became a potent political force in Miami by the mid-1970s. In June of 1972, a massive voter registration drive registered Cuban Americans. On July 6, 1972, the first Cuban exile was appointed to the Miami City Commission. A very large number of eligible Hispanics began to exercise both their right to register and their right to vote. The election of Puerto Rican Maurice Ferre as Mayor of Miami in 1973 was viewed as evidence of this new Latin political clout (Buchanan 1977).

Despite these gains by both Blacks and Hispanics, power in Miami continued to be held by the civic-business elite; and that elite continued to be predominantly Non-Latin White. The leadership in Miami that in 1960 had been characterized as a "relatively narrow and ineffective traditional elite, akin to an old-boy network", had reached its zenith by the 1970s as a "still narrowly-based but effective, organized, corporate, modern elite" (Stepick et al. 1990, 59).

This transformation was partly evinced by the formation of the evocatively-named Non-Group--an informal leadership group established in 1971 by the leaders of big business in Dade County. Perhaps the most influential member of this group, and a key figure in civic leadership in Miami for many years, was Alvah Chapman. Chapman's position as CEO of Knight-Ridder, the parent corporation of the *Miami Herald*, also solidified the position of the media as an important power broker in Miami politics. The Non Group and a reorganized Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce were extremely influential in bringing about major infrastructural development in Miami during the 1970s--including the construction of Metrorail (Stepick et al., 1990, 57). Although this leadership group was clearly made up of an Anglo elite, the very fact that they represented the predominant business interests in Dade County laid the foundations for a potential alliance with an emerging Cuban entrepreneurial class.

As was suggested earlier, some resentment toward the Cuban influx was evident from the beginning of their arrival; but for the most part, ethnic relations in Miami remained calm throughout the 1970s. Black, Whites and Hispanics tended to exist in separate worlds. And as one observer noted: "Nothing of substance in Miami's race relations changed during the 1970s" (Mohl 1991, 133). The world of Miami Blacks was a deprived one, though, and the lack of substantive change meant that the deprivation persisted. Sour relations with the police deteriorated. In 1968, two White police officers arrested a Black youth for carrying a concealed weapon. On their way to the police station they stopped to dangle him naked from an expressway some one hundred feet above the Miami River. When the incident became public, it was also revealed that Chief of Police Walter Headly had dismissed as "silly" the

request that one of the officers involved be transferred due to anti-Black conduct (Porter and Dunn 1984, 14).

Evidence of mounting discontent among Miami's Black community surfaced in Liberty City on August 7, 1968, as riots erupted while the Republican party held its national convention just across Biscayne Bay in Miami Beach. No direct connection was drawn between the convention and the Liberty City disturbances, but some analysts have noted that several Black leaders and influential political groups viewed the convention and surrounding media attention as an opportunity to organize rallies in the Black community. One of those rallies got out of hand. When a White man with a "George Wallace for President" bumper sticker drove by in a pickup truck, Miami's first urban race riot was officially under way (Porter and Dunn 1984, 15).

The 1968 riot was followed by another in June of 1970, known as the "rotten meat riot". This upheaval began as a Black protest against the sale of spoiled meat by a local White grocer. It was evident, however, that the bitter hostility displayed by Blacks during that hot week in June had its origins in something more complex than rotten food. Newsweek suggested a deeper cause:

...dating all the way back to the lofty promises made to Miami Negroes to placate them after a riot during the 1968 Republican Convention. Jobs, garbage collection, and equitable housing codes were all pledged by the city fathers and all went unredeemed (Newsweek June 29, 1970).

Between the "rotten meat riot" in 1970, and January of 1979, Dade County experienced thirteen outbursts of racial violence (Didion 1987, 44). In each case the precipitating factors were distinct. But common to each incident was a strong sense of despair among Blacks with regard to their social and economic plight, and a complete lack of trust in a political and legal system

unwilling or unable to curb the persistent injustice. It is important to point out that prior to the 1980s, these racial disturbances were rarely discussed in connection with the Cuban immigrants--not by Blacks who lived the despair, or by Whites who hoped that by ignoring the problems they might go away.

The complaints from Blacks were consistent--lack of jobs, poor housing, low pay and high rent. When interviewed after the riots, one Liberty City resident explained:

We've got a lot of problems. What you people don't realize is that this is a deep problem within each of us. What happened today is merely a culmination of a lot of little wrongs that we have suffered at the hands of the white man (Wyche 1968, 1A).

The response from the White community in Miami varied from making promises that seldom were kept, to blaming the social upheaval on "outside agitators". After the 1968 riot, Mayor Steve Clark claimed to have "conclusive evidence" that the rebellion was a result of outside agitation. Chief of Police Walter Headly echoed the claim:

Fifteen people were imported into this area to start this thing in Liberty City. They did, and after they got it going, they immediately left and went to St. Petersburg. I don't know who paid their way. We know they were an out-of-town group and we're still working trying to identify them ("Chief Headly" 1968, 1G).

A Dade County Grand Jury eventually concluded that there was no evidence to support this claim (Kennedy 1968).

As Liberty City periodically smoldered from the sparks of Black rebellion, Miami's Cuban community, just miles away, was engaged in a battle all its own. Throughout the 1970s, the Cuban immigrants remained intently focused on the liberation of their homeland from the grip of Castro's communist regime. To this end, a multitude of paramilitary exile organizations spent long hours in the Everglades training diligently to invade the island.

The struggle, or "la lucha" was not solely against Castro, but also "against his allies, and his agents, and all those who could conceivably be believed to have aided or encouraged him" (Didion 1987, 18). This anti-Castro furor brought "la lucha" to the streets of Miami--not to mention Washington and New York--in an explosive way.⁸

Bombings and assassinations became common place in Miami during the 1970s as anti-Castro terrorists attempted to silence anyone who advocated anything resembling dialogue with Castro . During one twelve month period terrorists bombed more than twenty "targets" in Miami (Allman 1987, 331). Journalist Luciano Nives, who had suggested that Castro might be brought down "politically" was assassinated in February of 1975. In 1976, after criticizing the bombings and assassinations that were taking place within Miami's exile community, radio broadcaster Emilio Milan had both his legs blown off by a car bomb. Violence and the threat of violence also forced various publishing offices and radio stations to close their doors and relocate elsewhere (Americas Watch 1992; Didion 1987, 99-107).

As one observer pointed out: "No Cubans in Havana were endangered by these antics, but Cubans in Miami were not so fortunate. Periodically the city would be swept by terrorism as local "freedom fighters" turned on local "Communists" (Allman 1987, 331). Certainly not all Cuban exiles were consumed with "la lucha" to a point of engaging in acts of terrorism. In fact, the violence that did occur was largely a reflection of disagreements among the Cuban exiles over how to best deal with Fidel. These disagreements eventually spawned a variety of different exile organizations, each with a distinct outlook on appropriate policy approaches toward Castro's Cuba. In spite of this division, the majority of the Cuban community in Miami, throughout the 1970s, remained united by their common exile experience, and

the hope that their stay in the US was a temporary one (Allman 1987, 383; Stevenson 1975, 43).

Neither the agony nor the inconvenience of exile prevented the Cubans from excelling economically. It was in this arena that Anglo and Hispanic interests tended, at least initially, to coincide. As a result, relations between these two groups were relatively smooth throughout the 1970s. Some level of resentment did remain, and perhaps even deepened among certain elements of the Anglo population. By the 1970s, for example, the Non-Latin White flight from Miami was well under way. This trend is frequently viewed as evidence of the growing frustration among Anglos over the "latinization" of Miami.

During this period, the predominant discourse was not one of resentment, but rather one of praise. The pragmatic marriage of 'Latin hustle and Anglo muscle' was credited with lifting Miami out of its economic doldrums. Then in 1973, either as an act of appreciation or merely as a recognition of reality, the county commission passed a resolution officially declaring Dade County to be bilingual and bicultural (Castro 1992). This dramatically symbolized the clout of Miami's Latin community, and eventually served to mobilize the simmering pockets of nativist resentment throughout the county.

Miamians' attitudes toward the refugee influx varied throughout the 1970s from that of the bank president who proclaimed: "Send us a thousand more" (*Fortune* 1966, 45); to the angry Anglo employed by the marriage license bureau who complained:

The Cubans here are really a pain. They can't speak English, and we've had to hire people who speak Spanish just to deal with them. I plan to leave Miami just because of them (cited in Stevenson 1975, 106).

In retrospect, elements of social tension obviously present in Miami during the 1970s could have been interpreted as warning signs. But, relations between the various ethnic groups were not blatantly explosive; and few anticipated the turmoil to come.

Paradise Lost: Miami in the 1980s

A variety of factors converged in 1980 to earn that year, and the entire decade of the 1980s, the reputation as Miami's "darkest days" (Parks 1981). Long-term demographic, economic and political trends collided in an explosive fashion with several contemporary and unanticipated social upheavals. One result was that the city's all-important image took a severe beating. The once "Magic City" became better known nationally and internationally as "Paradise Lost".

In 1980, Miami's image changed, and not for the better when it was struck by a triple disaster that might have crippled a less resilient place. First, Liberty City and many of its other black neighborhoods exploded into some of the most frenzied civil disorders ever seen in this country. Then Miami fell prey to a veritable foreign invasion as more than 100,000 people fleeing Castro's Cuba poured into the city. Finally, scores of Haitian boat people drowned in its waters off south Florida, and in full view of visiting tourists, their bodies washed ashore on the beaches (Allman 1987, 10).

As author T.D. Allman suggests, such a series of events might have permanently disabled many cities, but Miami did survive the 1980s and better, in some regards, than other metropolitan areas throughout the US.

The 1980 Census counted 581,030 Hispanics in Dade County (US Census 1980). This total was calculated just prior to the Mariel Boatlift, and did not include the 125,000 additional Cuban refugees who arrived in Miami during April 1980. The Census figures were also unable to accurately reflect the number of immigrants residing illegally in the Metropolitan Miami area. When Congress passed the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act with an

amnesty provision for those undocumented aliens who could show proof of having been in the US since before 1980, close to 3,000 persons in Miami filed for legalization (US Department of Justice 1990).

Accepting that the Census estimates are probably conservative, the 1980 data still indicate dramatic shifts in the demographic characteristics of Dade County. In 1950, 10 percent of the Dade County population was classified as foreign-born; by 1980 that figure had reached 35.5 percent for the county, and 54 percent for the city of Miami. This percentage was twice that of Los Angeles, and more than double that of New York, qualifying Miami as the most immigrant-intensive city in the US. (Mohl 1986, 52). By 1980, Miami had also become one of only sixteen metropolitan areas in the nation with a Black population larger than 300,000. Blacks comprised 17.3 percent of Dade County's population in 1980, up from 15 percent in 1970. Since the 1950s the rate of increase of the Black population in Miami has surpassed that of the county as a whole, and between 1970 and 1980 was exceeded only by that of Atlanta (Stepick et al. 1990, 27).

The arrival of Haitians in very large numbers during the 1970s and 1980s attributed to both the relative and absolute growth of Dade County's Black population. The Haitian "Boat People" began to settle near downtown Miami; and, "by mid 1978, it was becoming increasingly clear that Miami had a problem--a very serious problem. Hundreds and eventually thousands of undocumented Haitians were slipping illegally into the country and into Miami's Little Haiti" (Stepick et al. 1990, 26). The flow of Haitians into Miami reached a peak between 1978 and 1981. As was the case with illegal Hispanic immigrants, an accurate count of the number of Haitians in Dade County was difficult to come by. One report estimated that approximately seventy

thousand Haitians were living in the Greater Miami area by the mid-eighties (Stepick et al. 1990, 25).

Meanwhile, the Non-Latin White population in Miami continued to decline, dropping by almost a third between 1980 and 1990. Most of this reduction was due to "Non-Hispanic White flight" to other parts of the United States (Boswell and Curtis 1991, 145). In 1983, there were 74,000 fewer Non-Latin White students in Dade County public schools than in 1969 ("Non-Latin White" 1983).

Miami's transition toward an international city that began in the 1970s, intensified during the 1980s. Hundreds of multinational corporations, employing thousands of personnel, established regional headquarters in Miami. Citicorp and Chase Manhattan along with over fifty new foreign banks opened branches in Miami. International trade and finance attracted these businesses; and, passing through the Port of Miami, Miami International Airport, and other terminals was an estimated \$7.5 billion worth of Latin exports and imports. This international commerce provided employment for over 70,000 people in the Greater Miami area; and particularly indicative of the economic restructuring taking place in Miami was the fact that tourism now generated only 10 percent of the city's jobs (Levine 1985, 61).

Latin investors and visitors poured billions of dollars each year into the Miami economy. At one point during 1980, one half of all property sold in the Miami area was sold to foreigners. The disadvantage of such close ties with Latin America was that when countries throughout that region experienced severe economic downturns in the early 1980s, Miami also suffered. Tourism declined, real estate purchases by foreigners dropped, and several corporations were forced to close down. "When the debt crisis exploded and the countries plunged into recession, South Florida was hard hit," said Miami

Economist Manuel Lasaga, Managing Director of International Management Assistance Corporation. "We will look at the '80s as a lost decade." (Bussey 1992)

The economic recession of the early 1980s was global in scope, and its impact reverberated throughout Latin America, the United States and the world. Despite this, Miami's economy weathered the crisis well. The unemployment rate for Dade County remained lower than the national average, and the rise of the Cuban enclave economy was considered partially responsible. One analysts, drawing a comparison between the economic crisis of the 1980s and the killer hurricane of 1926, concluded:

Although it swept away a few *tiendas* and several corporate offices, the recession of the early 1980s left Miami's modern assets virtually intact. The city's geographic locale, its financial markets and service industries, its bicultural ambience, its lively cadre of Cuban traders - all of these remain (Levine 1985, 67).

Dade County's economy appeared to remain stable, but there was some indication that the social and political structures were less resilient. The 1980s saw the Anglo elite in Miami challenged on a variety of fronts as Cubans began to extend their economic success into the political realm. "The 1980s," according to a Ford Foundation report, "was a period of transition, as the mainstream elite encountered the existence of other centers of power and resistance from new players. The response was to selectively incorporate players from the newcomer Cuban community, as well as a smaller number from the resident black minority" (Stepick et al. 1990, 59).

The political empowerment of the Cuban community was evident in a variety of arenas. By the end of 1980, Cuban Americans held mayoral posts in five area municipalities, including the two largest cities in Dade County-- Miami and Hialeah. The managers of the City of Miami and Dade County were both Cuban Americans, as was the president of Florida International University. Cuban Americans also occupied the presidencies of the Greater

Miami Chamber of Commerce, the United Way, and the Dade County AFL-CIO. An often-cited reputational study by the *Miami Herald* in 1987 identified the 18 "most powerful private citizens who shape today's Miami"--eight were Cuban-Americans ("Miami's Most Powerful" 1988, 1B).

In 1988, Hispanics comprised 34 percent of all registered voters in Dade County and constituted a powerful and effective voting block. Several formal and informal political contests during the 1980s attested to the growing strength of the Latin community, and to the increasing concern among Anglos as to the potential challenge this immigrant group now posed. One of the most visible political struggles between these two groups involved a special election in 1989 to replace veteran US Representative Claude Pepper. The election boiled down to a contest between a Cuban American Republican woman and a Jewish American Democratic male. The final victory went to Republican Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, who won with 98% of the Hispanic vote. The campaign, like many during the 1980s, was an ethnically divisive one, and voting closely followed ethnic lines (Stack and Warren 1992).

The Anglo elite in Dade County recognized the political and economic ascendance of the Latin community and began limited attempts to incorporate key minority figures into the established power structure. By 1989, in addition to selecting a Cuban American president of the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce, the Non Group had added six Cuban Americans to its membership list. Similarly, one of the largest Anglo-owned banks in Metropolitan Miami had appointed a Cuban American as Vice-Chairman (Stepick et al. 1990, 62).

The changing nature of relations between the *Miami Herald* and the Cuban community during this time period is also significant, because in Dade County the *Herald* is considered to be a primary component of the local power structure. Several of the individuals interviewed for this study offered

unsolicited commentary on the role of the local media, and emphasized the need to view Miami politics as the politics of a "one paper town". When asked to name the biggest problem now facing Miami, one Black leader and veteran Miami politician emphasized that: "We have one daily newspaper deciding the fate of the community. It [the *Miami Herald*] is so blatant and so one-sided (Interview, October 22, 1992).

Whether a recognition and acceptance of the Latin presence in Dade County, or simply a marketing necessity, the Herald added a Spanish language version to its daily publication in 1976. In 1987, *El Herald* was again reorganized and renamed *El Nuevo Herald* in an attempt to grant greater autonomy to the Spanish counterpart. The company had also invited a specialist from Florida International University to enlighten *Herald* staff members on Cuban culture, and sent a staff member to the FIU's seminar on "Cuban Miami: A Guide for Non-Cubans" (Didion 1987, 55; Interview, September 17, 1992). In spite of what may have been a genuine attempt on behalf of the *Herald* and Knight-Ridder to reach out to the Latin community, also at stake was the business success of the corporation itself. The *Miami Herald's* readership had begun to decline, and pointing to the fact that Miami's economic base had become dependent upon Spanish-speakers, one group of analysts concluded:

As far as we can tell, this is the only time in US history that a majority group, dominant newspaper has been forced to publish another language edition in order to recapture their market. (Stepick et al. 1990, 87).

If the *Herald* was reaching out, the gestures were perceived as purely token by Miami's Latin community. Throughout the 1980s, the relationship between the two worsened, as Cuban-Americans increasingly began to hold the newspaper responsible for fostering an anti-immigrant/anti-Cuban

mentality in Dade County. The *Miami Herald's* aggressive campaign against the Mariel boatlift was viewed as badly tarnishing the image of these newest refugees, and the Cuban community as a whole; but even prior to Mariel, Cuban-Americans had accused the *Herald* of castigating the exile community:

All our achievements have been accomplished with a national press coverage that has often portrayed us as extremists. This has been the most unfair and prejudiced perception we have experienced in America ...The *Miami Herald* bears tremendous responsibility for this injustice ... The *Miami Herald* is aggressive in its ignorance of our people (quoted in Portes and Stepick Forthcoming).

The 1980s brought another significant challenge to the established elite in Miami, in the form of a political alliance between Blacks and Hispanics who were displeased with the structure of local government. In 1986, several prominent leaders within both the Black and the Hispanic community filed suit against Dade County for violation of the Federal Voting Rights Act. The plaintiffs charged that the county's at-large voting system diluted the voting strength of local minorities. Former Mayor Maurice Ferre, one of the plaintiffs who brought the law suit, charged: "For thirty years Metro-Dade has been irresponsible in dealing with minorities. This [the suit] is the result" (Filkins 1992c, 1B).

Despite dramatic shifts in the ethnic composition of Dade County's population, the County Commission continued to be dominated by Non-Latin Whites. Because of the nature of Dade's metropolitan government, this governing body maintained substantial control over a variety of decisions affecting Miami and the 27 other municipalities in the county's jurisdiction. A similar situation existed with the Dade County School Board--also considered to be a very influential decision-making body, and also comprised primarily of non-Latin white members. Despite what the plaintiffs argued was substantial voter turnout in favor of particular minority candidates, both Blacks and

Hispanics alleged that the at-large system prevented them from electing their preferred candidate⁹.

Sorting through the various dimensions and shifting character of power and politics in Miami during the 1980s requires some caution. The apparent alliance between Blacks and Hispanics as plaintiffs in the Voting Rights Act law suit eventually fell apart when the two groups determined that their interests in this matter did not necessarily coincide. (Interview, Miami, September 24, 1992). The Cuban community in Miami was clearly a growing force, but the extent to which they posed a threat to the hegemony of the established Non-Latin White power brokers remained questionable. Also questionable was the extent to which the Anglo elite were actually incorporating the newcomers, or coopting a significant few. Irrespective of subtle maneuvering and negotiation in the political realm, social relations in Miami during the 1980s took a severe turn for the worse. The decade was characterized not by these subtle questions, but by various blatant displays of resistance and counter-resistance among different social groups.

The furor that overtook Liberty City on May 18, 1980, foreshadowed, in a dramatic way, the dynamics that would dominate social relations in Miami throughout the 1980s. Miami experienced three major race riots during the 1980s, and each was precipitated by the death of Black men at the hands of White police officers. On December 17, 1979, Arthur McDuffie, a Black insurance agent was beaten by a group of at least six White police officers after a high-speed motorcycle chase. He died days later from severe head injuries. On May 17, 1980, an all White jury in Tampa, Florida found each of the defendants not guilty. The Liberty City riots began that evening (Porter and Dunn 1984).

Two years later, on December 28, 1982, a twenty year old Black male was shot and killed while playing a video game near downtown Miami by a Hispanic police officer . Overtown erupted immediately into a full scale riot. In 1984, an all White jury found the officer, Luis Alvarez, not guilty. In January of 1989, violence again spread throughout Overtown, Liberty City and Coconut Grove after a Hispanic police officer fired a single shot at a motorcycle speeding in his direction. The driver died from the bullet, and his passenger from the subsequent crash--both were Black men. On December 7, 1989, a jury of two Blacks, one Hispanic and three non-Latin Whites found Officer William Lozano to be guilty (Dunn *Forthcoming*).

What had changed during the 1980s was not police-community relations. These had never been good. Instead, what the decade brought was more immediate, violent and widespread outrage among Blacks in response to incidents perceived as severely unjust. The 1980s also brought an increasing tendency to portray social conflict in Miami in ethnic terms. Police officers in Dade County had been accused of brutality against Blacks for decades, but as time passed, observers were quick to note that: "This time the policeman doing the shooting was a Cuban" (Rieff 1987, 178). Similarly, all White juries had been returning dubious verdicts for many years, but as the ethnic composition of jury pools diversified, so did the politics of jury selection. Blacks in Dade County had also rioted on several occasions since the 1960s; but in the 1980s, reports on the causes and consequences of civil disturbances in the Black community focused less on jobs, housing or inequality, and more on the immigrant influx and relations among the various ethnic groups now residing in Miami.

Although the Anglo community in Miami did not riot in the streets during the 1980s, they did express a growing dissatisfaction with many of the

changes sweeping through their communities. In 1980, a group of disgruntled Non-Latin White residents organized a petition drive to place on the ballot a referendum that would prohibit "the expenditure of any county funds for the purpose of utilizing any language other than English or any culture other than that of the United States" (see Appendix D). The "anti-bilingualism ordinance" passed with 71 percent of the Non-Latin White vote, and 44 percent of the Black vote. This marked, according to some, "the first shot in the 'language wars' of the 1980s that would be fought in a number of states in addition to Florida" (Boswell and Curtis 1991, 156).

In 1988, this same group of residents--"the Citizens of Dade United"--worked diligently in state-wide effort to declare English the official language in Florida. If the widespread support for these measures left any doubt as to the local mood, a public opinion survey did not. In a 1980 survey of public opinion in Miami, 61 percent of the Non-Latin whites and 58 percent of Blacks disagreed with the statement that: "the Latin influence has helped this country's economy and made it a more enjoyable place to live" ("Public Opinion" 1980, 11A). Three years later, another public opinion survey in Dade County reported that 42 percent of Non-Latin Whites surveyed, and 49 percent of Blacks agreed that: "There are too many Cuban-Americans in Dade County." Interestingly, however, 42 percent of Cuban Americans also agreed with the statement ("Local Attitudes" 1983, 23A).

Various issues and events converged during the 1980s to place the Cuban community in Miami on the defensive. Explanations for the riots frequently focused on the economic hardships that Blacks in Miami had allegedly suffered as a result of Hispanic immigration. The language issue was indicative of an increasingly aggressive posture among Dade County's Anglo community, as were bumper stickers such as that which read: "Will the Last

American Leaving Miami Please Bring the Flag!" The Mariel boatlift further aggravated tensions, and the negative publicity focused on this group of refugees threaten to stigmatize Miami's Cuban community as a whole.

Cuban American leaders reacted quickly, drawing on their acquired social, political and economic capital to mobilize what they viewed as a necessary counter-offensive. It was during the 1980s that the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) was formed to act as a powerful lobbying group for the Cuban American community; and Facts About Cuban Exiles (FACE) was organized to combat anti-Cuban stereotypes. Similarly, the anti-bilingual referendum served to renew the activism of the Spanish American League Against Discrimination (SALAD), which initially organized in 1974 to study discrimination in the public school system. As prominent SALAD member and former County Manager Sergio Pereira stated:

We think we've been taken in because our English is flawless, because we dress nice. Well the ordinance proved that we [Cubans] have not really been accepted yet, that there is still a lot of work for us to do. Like I tell my friends in Key Biscayne--just because you belong to the yacht club doesn't mean you belong to the system (Balmaseda 1981, 1C).

The Cubans in Miami were not the only ones struggling to protect their image during the 1980s. Miami's reputation as an American Riviera--a reputation which had served the city well--appeared forever changed.

Suddenly, so far as many people in other parts of the country were concerned, and for many people in south Florida, too, it was clear what Miami was--the place where the American dream had turned into a nightmare (Allman 1987, 11).

City of the Future: Miami in the 1990s

Leaders from each of the city's ethnic group are anxious to dispel the myth of Miami as a dangerous city, prone to persistent social chaos. They

prefer instead to portray Miami as a young and vibrant city that has confronted and survived numerous problems with which the rest of the country is only beginning to grapple. T.D. Allman's (1987) depiction of Miami as the "City of the Future" is echoed frequently in discussions with the city's elite. One very active Cuban-American community leader explained that instead of "Paradise Lost" he preferred to view the 1980s as a "decade of awareness, cultural awareness."

What Miami experienced during the 1980s were growing pains. The natives complain about things like crime and crowds. You have cities in the US with these same problems, but without an influx of Hispanics. People confuse growing pains with ethnic tension" (Interview, September 30, 1992).

Similarly, when Herald publisher David Lawrence invited Ross Perot to hold his convention in Miami, he wrote:

Dear Mr. Perot: If you're looking for something different and something significant, Mr. Perot, come to Greater Miami. Come see the face of the future of America ... What is happening here today previews our nation entering the next century. The challenges that the next president will face nationwide - economic stagnation, immigration, an increasingly diverse population, racial unrest, health care, the homeless, the quality of education - all are faced here today. If we in Greater Miami can meet our challenges, and we can, then we could serve as an example for the rest of this country (Lawrence 1992a, 3C).

The extent to which Miami constitutes a bellweather of social, political and economic trends nationwide still remains to be seen--as does the extent to which the city has successfully overcome its many challenges. Meanwhile, with the exception of a major race riot, the actors, events and issues which characterized life in Miami during the 1980s persisted into the following decade.

The Non-Latin White population in Dade County continued to decline, and comprised only 30 percent of the county's total population in 1990. The

percentage of Blacks in Dade County was 19 percent, and the Hispanic population had grown to comprise 49 percent of Dade County's population (US Bureau of the Census 1990).

Not only did the population of foreign-born residents in Dade County increase, but it also diversified. The percentage of Dade County's Hispanics who were of Cuban origin had declined from 83 percent in 1970 to 66 percent in 1990. Nicaraguans, an estimated 150,000 of whom arrived in Miami during the 1980s, had become Dade's second largest Hispanic nationality group by 1990 (Boswell and Curtis 1991, 148). Large numbers of other Hispanic immigrants continued to arrive from countries throughout South America, and the political and economic situations in both Cuba and Haiti during the early 1990s seemed to guarantee that the flow of refugees from both countries would not soon cease. The US Coast Guard picked up 2,203 Cuban rafters attempting to cross the Florida Straits in 1991; and by October of 1992, the number of Cubans rescued had already passed the previous year's record. (Weston 1992) By the end of 1992, media headlines warned of the hundreds of boats being built in Haiti, as Haitians readied themselves for a mass exodus following President Clinton's inauguration¹⁰.

Economically, the effects of the 1980 recession continued to ripple through Miami in the 1990s; but, so too did the benefits of globalization. In 1992, Ricardo Petrella, Director of the Forecasting and Assessment of Science and Technology Division of the European Community, listed Miami as one of twenty metropolitan areas that form a "high-tech archipelago of affluent, hyper developed city-regions" in the world system. (Petrella 1992, 1C) Foreign trade in Miami increased 13 percent in 1991 to \$21.6 billion. This far outpaced the nation's growth in trade, with exports from South Florida rising

three times faster than overall US exports in 1991. (Bussey 1992; Lamensdorf 1992)

At the same time, however, the closure of Pan Am World Airways, Eastern Airlines, SouthEast Bank and Jordan Marsh had a devastating impact on employment in Dade County. The City of Miami was also reported to have the fourth highest poverty rate of large cities in the US, and one the worst homeless problems in the nation (Goldfarb 1992; Kirby 1992).

On the political front, the 1990s saw the Non Group, still primarily representative of Anglo business interests in Dade County, joined by both a Black and a Latin counterpart--Miami's New Group and La Mesa Rotunda. The New Group, formed in 1991 to improve the political and economic footing of Dade's Blacks, and was described as "much like the old-guard Non Group that New Miami Group fashioned its name after." (Due 1992, 1J). Similarly, La Mesa Rotunda, or Round Table, represented Latin business and civic interests. Whether either of the two latter groups represented the same level of influence or power as did the first is questionable, but the traditional distribution of power and prestige in Miami was changing. Those challenging the status quo scored what was considered to be a significant victory when federal court judge Graham ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in the *Meeks vs. Dade County Voting Rights* case.

On August 14, 1992, Dade County's thirty year old metropolitan form of government was declared unconstitutional, and aspiring leaders from various groups readied themselves for a new era in Miami politics. Through the early 1990s, the County Commission continued to be dominated by Dade's shrinking White population. Blacks and Hispanics made up 70 percent of the population, but hold only one seat each on the Commission. Under a new system of single member districts, Hispanics are expected to constitute a majority in as many as

five districts, and Blacks in two. One Black activist triumphantly declared: "In South Florida as in South Africa, minority rule is over" (Filkins 1992a, 1A).¹¹

Relations between the Cuban community in Miami and the *Miami Herald*--still widely perceived to be an organ of the Anglo establishment--had worsened. The Cuban American National Foundation and other exile organizations continued to accuse the Herald of "unjust harassment", "distortions" and "disinformation", and in January of 1991, launched a bitter campaign against the newspaper which included prominent advertisements on city busses which read, in Spanish, "I don't believe The Herald". (Rohter 1991)

By 1993, four years had passed since Miami's last major riot, but few were willing to state that ethnic relations had improved. When asked whether ethnic hostility in Miami had increased, decreased, or stayed the same since the early 1980s, only nine of the sixty people interviewed for this study believed that tensions among Dade County's various ethnic and racial groups had decreased (see Figure 2-2).

In spite of what appeared to be relative calm in the streets, the incident that sparked the last upheaval had yet to be settled. A Dade County jury found Officer William Lozano guilty of manslaughter in December of 1989. In June of 1991 an appellate court ordered a new trial based on evidence that the jury's was unable to render a fair verdict due to the fear of inciting a riot. The location of the trial has since been moved three times as other cities in Florida attempt to avoid the type of controversy that recently led to violent explosion in Los Angeles, and had wreaked havoc in Miami on several occasions.¹² (Hamalludin 1992; Steinback 1992)

When asked about the potential for violence in Miami should Lozano be acquitted, one high ranking Black Miami police officer responded: "There are




FIGURE 2-2
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO INTERVIEW QUESTION #3:
SINCE 1980, HAS ETHNIC HOSTILITY IN MIAMI INCREASED, DECREASED, OR STAYED THE SAME?

people stock-piling weapons as we speak" (Interview, September 28, 1992). Similarly, after hearing UCLA Professor James Johnson speak on: "Los Angeles: The Implications for Miami," Florida International University Professor, and prominent African American community leader Marvin Dunn responded: "I feel saddened by this discussion. You could substitute Miami for L.A. and Cubans for Koreans." He went on to predict that, in Miami, "We will have yet another trial by fire" (Hancock 1992a, 2B).¹³

Despite the warnings sounded by certain individuals regarding the potential for further violence in Dade County, other leaders, particularly within the Black community, insisted that the pattern of Black protest in Miami had changed. Reverend J.C. Wise of the African American Council of Christian Clergy stated:

Miami has matured. We have come to realize that rioting does not solve our problems. Neither does looting, nor burning our homes, nor people losing their lives. We have demonstrated that there is a better way and that is the silent riot. (St. Paul 1992, 1A)

Reverend Wise is referring to the on-going Black boycott of Miami's tourism industry, or the "Quiet Riot," organized in response to the official snubbing of South African leader Nelson Mandela during his visit to Miami in June of 1990. The Cuban community was in an outrage over Mandela's friendly association with the Castro regime. When elected officials in Dade County, many of whom are Cuban American, refused to formally welcome the South African leader, Blacks in Miami responded with equal rage.

The snub of Mandela and the subsequent boycott were widely perceived as another in a long line of confrontations that pitted Latin immigrants against Miami's disenfranchised Black community. However accurate this perception may be at one level, it also overlooks other significant social and political dimensions of the conflict. Cuban-Americans insisted, for example,

that the issue was not one of race, but ideology--they respected Mandela as the leader of an important struggle for human rights, but were strongly opposed to his association with Castro and the communist regime in Cuba. With regard to the city's decision to rescind a proclamation welcoming Mandela, Miami City Commissioner Victor De Yurre explained:

We support every person who is fighting for liberty and rights, but when persons are so wrong in their stances, as is Mandela when he say he supports the ideas of Fidel Castro ... for our own self respect we have to withdraw our support. ("Mandela Remarks" 1990, 1A)

To view the Mandela controversy purely in terms of Black vs. Hispanic also obscures the extent to which the subsequent Black tourism boycott quickly developed into a potent political tool for Miami's Black community. To the initial demand for an apology to Mandela, was quickly added: the call for an investigation into a recent incident of police brutality against Haitian immigrants, a review of US immigration, and substantial reforms in Dade's tourism industry to allow increased employment and business opportunities for Blacks (Rowe 1990, 12)

Not only do these demands indicate a shift in the nature of Black protest, but they also reveal an expansion of Black ethnic discourse to include issues and concerns not traditionally considered part of the agenda--specifically those concerning Haitians. After a decade of tense relations between African-Americans and Haitian immigrants in Dade County, the 1990s brought to the forefront of Miami politics various issues around which the two groups could unite. The snubbing of Mandela was one such issue; the US government's policy toward Haitian refugees was another.

In the past, Black Americans in Miami had joined Whites in expressing resentment toward the Haitian influx. By the early 1990s, however, the inherent contradictions and racist implications of US immigration policy grew

quite pronounced. The number of both Cubans and Haitians crossing the Florida Strait had increased; but while the Cubans were being granted immediate political refugee status and all the benefits it bestows, the Haitians were being repatriated without a hearing (Marquis 1992). The demands of the Boycott Miami Now committee reveal an attempt by African-Americans to forge greater solidarity with the Haitian community in Miami, as does the increased activism of Black leaders in Dade County with regard to federal immigration policy toward Haiti.¹⁴

The Tri-Ethnic Fallacy

Despite the numerous intricacies and complexities of this and related controversies, the tendency to view social reality in ethnic terms has become nearly universal in Miami and the tri-ethnic approach to social, political and economic analyses of Miami predominates. It has become clear by the 1990s, however, that the "tri-ethnic" framework is a gross over-simplification of very diverse and heterogeneous social groupings. A variety of issues and events demonstrate that the categories Black, White and Hispanic can themselves be meaningless in terms of understanding or predicting human behavior. As Dr. Marvin Dunn (Forthcoming) explained with regard to Miami's Black "community":

There are many shades of black in Miami. There are ethnic, economic, religious, political and regional shades of black. Given this diversity among Blacks in South Florida, there is really no such thing as "the Black Community" of Dade County. Indeed, except for the commonality of skin color, Blacks in Dade County may be as different among themselves as they are from the Whites and Browns who have enveloped them.

In addition to cultural or even economic differences, Blacks in Miami are also divided on significant local political issues. The Black leaders who filed suit against the county's at-large electoral system did so on behalf of the

Black community as a whole. There were, however, voices of dissent among other Black leaders who did not support the change to single member districts. One Black community leader and former County Commissioner felt that the proposed changes would "make the community more divided." "Miami is unique. It will only cause more problems if you do this in Miami--more war-like politics. The Cubans will take everything for their communities, and the Anglos will too. There will be nothing left for Blacks" (Interview, July 27, 1992). Another Black community activist and business person opposed to the law suit explained: "It will backfire. Blacks are individualistic, more open-minded, and will listen to candidates Black or White. Latins will only vote for you if there is not another Latin running" (Interview, June 19, 1992).

The boycott had widespread support among Blacks in Miami, and elsewhere, but there were also many who disagreed with the approach and the principle upon which it was founded. One African American business owner and local activist explained: "I have not had a lot of involvement in the boycott, it may have had some impact, but should have been handled differently. They should have said "Buy Black" instead of "Boycott Miami." In a statement that reflected the potential for additional cleavages along gender lines, this same respondent, a Black female, also remarked: "I am not a feminist, but men have tremendous egos, and the boycott is being run by men. It is not very representative" (Interview, June 19, 1992).

Similar divisions exist among Hispanics. Not only does the Hispanic population in Miami contain an array of different national origin groups, socioeconomic classes, races and religions--many of whom shared little cultural commonality beyond language--but even the Cuban community itself is very fragmented. There are old Cubans in Miami and young Cubans -- Cubans who fought in the Sierra Maestra, and Cubans who have never been to

Cuba. There are black Cubans, and white Cubans in Dade County, as well as Catholic Cubans, over 12,000 Jewish Cubans, and an estimated 5,000 Chinese Cubans.¹⁴ The potential social and political implications of this diversity became particularly obvious in the wake of the Mariel boatlift. As one high-ranking Cuban American county official explained:

Tensions got worse in Miami after Mariel. Even within the Cuban community we did not see eye to eye. When that whole thing first started, I was proud to see how we [Cubans] all worked together--the support among families and neighbors; but when we realized what Castro had done, what he had sent us, it all fell apart. (Interview, September 24, 1992)

The established Cubans in Miami became some of the harshest critics of the new arrivals, fearing that the "Marielitos" would tarnish their hard-earned reputation as productive members of American society. One Cuban American business-man stated:

Mariel destroyed the image of Cubans in the United States and, in passing, destroyed the image of Miami itself for tourism. The marielitos are mostly black and mulattoes of a color that I never saw or believed existed in Cuba. They don't have social networks; they roam the streets desperate to return to Cuba. There will be two hundred more plane kidnappings. (quoted in Portes and Stepick Forthcoming)

The Cuban refugees that arrived in 1980 were different, in some respects, than earlier groups. They tended to come from slightly lower socioeconomic and educational backgrounds, and 40 percent, or approximately 50,000 of these Cuban immigrants were black (Dixon 1982). Despite its pervasiveness, however, the image of this group as mental patients, hardened criminals, homosexuals and "scum" was false. Although many had served time in Cuban jails, and a small number did end up in US prisons, the majority quickly and quietly adjusted to their new surroundings. By the 1990s, the stigma of Mariel was fading rapidly. (Boswell and Curtis 1991, 155)

The terrorism perpetrated on fellow Cuban-Americans by militant organizations such as Alpha 66 or Omega 7 provides further evidence of the ideological fragmentation among Cuban exiles. Incidents of terrorism and intimidation continued into the 1990s, prompting Americas Watch, a division of an international human rights monitoring organization, to issue the report: "Dangerous Dialogue: Attacks on Freedom of Expression in Miami's Cuban Exile Community". One of the points discussed in the report is the variety of exile organizations operating in Miami, and their differing postures with regard to dialogue or interaction with Cuba (Americas Watch 1992).

Castro remains a primary focal point, but the social and political agenda of Cuban-Americans has expanded beyond issues of exile. This transcendence and the political heterogeneity of the Cuban community in Miami became clear during the 1992 Congressional elections in Dade County. A Cuban-American Democrat ran against the extremely popular Republican Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen in what Miami political strategist Armando Villareal said, "politically", was "the first serious challenge the exile community has had." (Defede 1992, 26).

Although Democrat Magda Montiel-Davis lost the election, the race was, as Clifford Krauss of the New York Times explained, "historically and culturally important."

To have a Cuban American who is offering a different way to bring democracy to Cuba and who is bringing up other issues like abortion--and to have her heard--shows a new maturity for the community (Defede 1992, 20).

Because the heterogeneity of the Non-Latin White population in Miami is widely accepted, the tendency to assume shared cultural or political norms and behaviors among this group is much less pronounced. The President of the local B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League made an interesting point,

however, when after cautioning that "the tri-ethnic formula is totally useless," went on to illustrate the potential irony of ethnic categorization by asking: "Where but in Miami can a guy with a name like Teitelbaum be classified as an Anglo?" (Interview, July 6, 1992).¹⁶

Concluding Remarks

Whether one accepts the validity of the metaphors "Magic City" or "Paradise Lost", or the categories of Black, White and Hispanic, the Miami of the 1990s was, without question, different than the Miami of the 1950s. Massive waves of immigration had transformed Dade from a County with a population that was only 4 percent Latin in 1950, to one in which, by 1990, 57 percent of the residents spoke a language other than English in the home (US Census 1990). Similarly, Dade's economy grew from one that depended primarily on seasonal tourism to a bustling center of international trade and commerce. The political system also changed gradually, and by the 1990s there was evidence of significant gain by groups outside the traditional power elite.

Simultaneous changes were also taking place within individual groups. Cubans in Miami evolved from an exile community focused on returning home, to a immigrant group intent on adapting to its new surroundings, and then to a substantial player in the social, political and economic establishment. Blacks in Miami, who were described as apathetic prior to the 1960s, appeared to be anything but apathetic during the riots, and had by the 1990s effectively mobilized a peaceful campaign against the city which was forcing local leaders to respond. The percentage of Black registered voters in Dade County had increased steadily since the late 1960s, as did Black voter turnout. By 1990, Blacks comprised 18.6 percent of registered voters in Dade County, and the 1992 elections witnessed a record turnout of Black voters. Analysts theorized that

redistricting had been a motivating factor, and predicted an end to political apathy in the Black community (St. Paul 1992).

Dade County's Non-Latin White community has, in many respects, gone from a majority voice to a minority one. Some have reluctantly accepted the change, or left peacefully, others have waged a fierce battle against what they perceive as an unwelcome invasion, and still others have openly embraced the advantages that come with living in a multicultural, high-tech global city.

Miami's recovery from a "Paradise Lost" is still not complete. Economic woes persist, few local leaders express great optimism about the level of ethnic tension. If Miami is indeed the "City of the Future", much of that future remains uncertain.

This uncertainty was amplified after August of 1992, when Dade County became the site of the what was termed the worst natural disaster in US history. Hurricane Andrew ripped through southern Dade, causing an estimated \$20 billion in damages (*Miami Herald* 1992). Immediately, forecasters began to predict the length and likelihood of economic recovery in Dade County; and demographers recalculated estimated population trends. Again, among professional analysts and observers alike, the tri-ethnic framework was predominate. Would the hurricane increase the rate of White flight from Dade County, how would the ethnic composition of neighboring Broward County be affected as hurricane victims from all ethnic groups migrated north, and in what ways did the level of destruction and recovery response vary by the ethnic and racial composition of neighborhoods.

As experts debated these questions, the newspapers were filled with both heart-warming stories about neighbors helping neighbors regardless of color or creed, as well as unsettling headlines such as that which appeared in the Miami Times on September 10, 1992: "Hurricane Andrew Did Not Blow Away

the Racists In Our Midst". The article was written by Attorney H.T. Smith who claimed that, "Hurricane Andrew destroyed thousands of homes but it didn't put a dent in the pervasive housing discrimination in Greater Miami". Complaints of racial and ethnic discrimination had become so widespread that the US Justice Department sent attorneys from Washington to field grievances from minorities seeking rental housing. (Smith 1992b, 1A)

The role of power and politics does not diminish in times of crisis, and may even become more pronounced. Speaking before crowds in Liberty City just days after the storm, Jesse Jackson urged Blacks to fight for their share of federal relief funds, and cautioned that: "Those who have the power get their power turned on first." (Martin 1992, 16A) Similarly, the on-going power struggle between Miami's Non-Latin White civic-business elite and the ascendent minority leadership manifest itself in the formation of a committee to oversee Dade County's rebuilding effort. President Bush appointed Alvah Chapman, former CEO of Knight-Ridder and founding member of the Non Group, to head an organization called "We Will Rebuild". Not long after Chapman had assembled his team, local elected officials began to complain. Arthur Teele, the only Black member of the Dade County Commission, stated: "It seems to me the leadership comes from one narrow organization - the Non Group. I see that as almost sinister." (Tanfani and May 1992, 1B)

The nature of power and politics in Miami has changed, but ethnic divisions persist. Despite dramatic shifts in the population, the economic base, and the political environment, ethnicity as a form of individual and group identity has not diminished, and is, perhaps, becoming more prominent. The apparent resilience of what is often believed to be a primitive or "premodern" form of social existence in "postmodern" Miami invites further inquiry. What must be examined, however, is how ethnic ties and ethnic

tension in Miami are the product, as well as part of the process of social, political and economic change.

Notes

1. The designations: Miami, Metropolitan Miami, Greater Miami and Dade County are used interchangeably. A specific reference to one of Dade County's twenty seven municipalities, such as the City of Miami, will be noted accordingly; as will any reference to the county structure as a whole.

2. "Marielito" has been used to refer to the Cuban refugees that arrived in Miami in 1980 from the port of Mariel in Cuba. The controversy surrounding the 1980 boatlift severely tainted the image of these arrivals and some Cubans in the US consider the term "Marielito" to be a derogatory one.

3. Prior to desegregation, Black entertainers who performed in nightclubs, hotels and restaurants on Miami Beach returned to Overtown after their shows. Nightlife in Overtown flourished with after hours entertainment by Nat King Cole, Cab Calloway, Harry Belafonte and others (Hampton and Frayer 1990, 650).

4. The following changes resulted from the adoption of the Dade County Home Rule Charter in 1957: (1) a broad pattern of home rule for the county and its municipalities, (2) a council-manager form of government for the county, and (3) a new type of federal integration between the county and cities (Sofen 1961, 18).

5. Specific claims from Miami leaders and residents concerning the immigrant "invasion" are detailed in Chapter Three.

6. In 1979, the President of Ecuador Jaime Roldos dubbed Miami the "Capitol of Latin America", although similar references appeared in periodical literature throughout the decade (Levine 1985, 48).

7. Athalie Range was the first Black elected to the Miami City Commission, followed by activist clergymen Edward T. Graham and Theodore Gibson. Johnnie Jones was the first Black Superintendent of Schools for Dade County.

8. Anti-Castro terrorists were responsible for several bombing in New York and Washington throughout the 1970s (Americas Watch 1992).

9. This information was gathered during a personal interview with the Assistant County Attorney assigned to this case, and through review of the depositions of several key witnesses called by the defendants in *Meek et al. vs. Metropolitan Dade County* (Field Interview, Miami, Florida. September 24, 1992).

10. During his campaign, Clinton expressed disagreement with President Bush's decision to return, without a hearing, Haitians refugees rescued at sea. Just weeks after the election, media reports began to warn of an impending exodus from Haiti. The concern stemmed from Mariel Coast Guard photograph

showing 700 completed or partially completed boats along the Haitian coast (Marguis 1992). Subsequent reports indicated that there were, in fact, "few indications of an impending Haitian exodus" (Alvarez 1992).

11. The new Dade County Commission, elected in April 1993, has six Hispanic members, four Blacks, and three Non-Latin Whites.

12. Lozano's retrial was scheduled to be held in Orlando. After the Los Angeles riots, Circuit Judge Thomas Spencer moved the trial to Tallahassee in hopes that the city's racial composition would facilitate the seating of a more diverse jury than that which presided over the Rodney King trial. Tallahassee protested the move, and others contested the legality of Spenser's unilateral decision to relocate the trial. It has since been moved back to Orlando (Hamalludin 1992; Steinback 1992).

13. On May 28, 1993, a tri-ethnic jury in Orlando, Florida, found William Lozano 'not guilty'. In order to allow the Miami Police Department and the Florida National Guard to prepare for the possibility of civil disorder in Dade County, announcement of the verdict was postponed for four hours after the jury reached its final decision. Except for scattered incidents of street violence, Miami remained calm. Rather than interpret this as proof of improved ethnic relations in Miami, the absence of major upheaval more likely reflects the city's well-honed policies and preparedness in the area of riot prevention and control.

14. During the early 1990s, Johnnie McMillan, President of the local NAACP, was one of the Black leaders in Miami who became an outspoken critic of US policy. She made trips to Haiti, organized protest marches, and wrote a series of editorials in the Miami Times callings on African Americans not to turn their backs on the Haitian refugees (McMillan 1992).

15. On black Cubans see Dixon (1982); Marks (1991) discusses the Jewish Cuban community; and in 1982, the Miami News did a story on Chinese Cubans in Dade County (January 25, 1982, 3C).

16. Despite having acknowledged the inaccuracy of the labels used to identify individuals and groups in Miami, this analysis is forced, to a large extent, to use many of the same terms. "Hispanic," "Black," and Non-Latin White" or "Anglo" are used in general discussion. More specific distinctions such as: "Cuban," African-American," or "Jewish" are employed where necessary.

CHAPTER 3
THE DISCOURSE OF DISPLACEMENT:
CONSTRUCTING THE THREAT OF AN IMMIGRANT TAKEOVER

In Miami, for the first time in American history, a foreign culture and a foreign language have come to dominate a major American city. The Miami Hispanics do not intend to join the English-speaking American culture. On the contrary, they have every intention of widening and expanding their sphere of influence in Dade County and South Florida.

John Ney (1989)
Miami Today--The U.S. Tomorrow

The United States is one of few countries in the modern world that has not experienced an armed invasion of foreign troops on national soil. At several points in history, however, the threat of invasion has figured prominently into US public discourse. Most commonly feared by Americans is not an invasion of armored tanks, but one of human refugees--individuals and groups who come not to overthrow the US, but to avail themselves of what they perceive as a level of economic, political or social freedom superior to that of the country from which they come.

Despite the symbolic invitation extended by the open arms of the statue of liberty, US citizens--the overwhelming majority of whom are immigrants or descendents of immigrants -- have a long history of viewing the world's tired, hungry and poor as a burden at best, or, at worst, as a veritable invasion that threatens the moral fabric of US society. A statement issued in 1958, by the son of Irish Catholic immigrants, illustrates the point well:

The cold hard truth ... is that today, as never before, untold millions are storming our gates for admission. Those gates are

cracking under the strain. The cold, hard fact is, too ... that this nation is the last hope of Western Civilization, and if this oasis of the world shall be overrun, perverted, contaminated, or destroyed, then the last flickering light of humanity will be extinguished (Bilderback 1989, 223).

Nativist concerns have varied from a loss of jobs to immigrant workers, to potential strain on an already overburdened social welfare system, to the penetration of cultural practices, including language, that may challenge the hegemony of the status quo. Neither the threat, nor the enemy to which it is attributed, has remained constant. In the late 1800s, immigrants were accused of subverting American [i.e., protestant] religious values. In the 1920s, immigration, according to some Americans, posed a threat of irreparable genetic damage through the infusion of inferior genes. Today's restrictionist arguments center on economic concerns and the inability of the US to absorb any more newcomers (Bilderback 1989, 226).

In addition to shifts in the nature of the perceived threat posed by immigration, the status and impact of particular immigrant groups is often reinterpreted over time. As Loy Bilderback (1989, 223) points out:

In American history, immigrants past are paragons,
immigrants present are greenhorns who will just never fit in,
and immigrants future may well be a menace to all we hold dear.

An overview of the historical construction and reconstruction of immigration to the US reveals a variety of problems, crises, enemies and threats. Not only does the specific content of the public discourse on immigration fluctuate, but the claims that provide that content are seldom supported by sound empirical evidence. Their fluidity or shaky empirical grounding notwithstanding, this configuration of problems and threats constitutes a powerful arsenal in the public resistance against an immigrant takeover.

This chapter examines the social and political construction of the immigrant threat in Miami, Florida. Some analysts have called attention to the role that perception plays in the tense relations among different ethnic groups in Miami, but little attempt has been made to unravel those processes that translate private perceptions into public problems. As the most 'immigrant-intensive' city in the US, Miami provides an ideal laboratory in which to explore these issues. Aside from the xenophobic alarm sounded in John Ney's essay "Miami Today--The U.S. Tomorrow," he may well be correct in portraying Miami as a bellwether of future social relations throughout the United States and the world (Ney 1989).

Miami did not become a primary point of entry for foreign immigrants into the US until the Cuban refugees began to arrive in large numbers during the early 1960s. Talk of an 'invasion' surfaced almost immediately, and has, to one degree or another, been an element of public discourse in Miami ever since. This discourse defines a social reality in which Cuban immigrants, as well as other newcomers from throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, are held responsible for a variety of Miami's social, political and economic ills. The threat of a takeover in Miami relies heavily upon the claim that Hispanic immigrants have displaced native workers, and particularly African-Americans, in Miami's labor market. Labor market analyses, however, do not support the job displacement thesis, and competing claims suggest that the net economic impact of immigration on Miami has been positive.

Rather than attempt to definitively settle the job displacement debate, this chapter addresses how the emergence of claims, such as job displacement, become widely accepted independently of their basis in fact.¹ This approach builds on the theoretical and methodological insights of a body of literature that focuses not on the objective makeup of problems themselves, but on the

role of individual leaders, local officials, politicians and the media in constructing problems, crises, enemies and threats. The various functions fulfilled by this "claims-making activity" will also be explored -- including the creation and maintenance of a public discourse that serves to perpetuate the existing configuration of social, political and economic power in Miami. The chapter begins with an overview of the claims, concerns and grievances that have been expressed in and about Miami over the last thirty years. This overview is followed by a brief examination of the labor market data for Metropolitan Miami. The concluding section analyzes why the issue of a Hispanic job takeover achieved prominence on the public agenda in Miami, and how it was perpetuated over time. In other words, what factors and processes made job displacement an "idea whose time had come" (Kingdon 1984).

Claims-Making Activity in Miami: 1960 to 1990

A Weary Welcome

Concern over the Cuban "invasion" surfaced among Miami residents as soon as the first refugees began to arrive. On December 2, 1960, the *Miami Herald* published a story headlined: "Jobless Citizens Resent Cuban Hiring But Officials Claim No Competition." The head of the commercial division of the Florida State Employment Service, D'Arcy O'Meara, claimed to have received vague reports about refugees replacing American workers in factories that were becoming sweatshops. According to O'Meara, "This kind of talk is causing a lot of resentment, but I know of no such instances." The article also reported that the Cuban Refugee Employment Center had received angry telephone

calls and letters from many of the 20,500 American citizens seeking jobs in an already depressed Greater Miami economy ("Jobless Citizens 1960, 4B).

In October of 1961, in an interview with the *Miami Herald*, Black labor leader Charles Lockhart stated that job displacement by Cubans had been considerable. He admitted having no official statistics, but claimed that unemployment among tenants in the area's largest Negro-housing agency had risen 15 to 20 percent. He claimed that: "This is a real problem, not just an emotional thing with Negroes. It is a fact that Negro workers are being displaced by Cubans" ("Negroes Resent" 1961:1B).

A television documentary, "Crisis Amigo," aired the same year, and Miami news commentator Wayne Farris stated: "The huge Cuban labor supply has sharply reduced the job opportunities of Dade's 122,000 Negroes, 70 percent of whom are unskilled. Twenty percent are unemployed and seeking relief" (Hearings 1962, 183).

Media reports indicate that Miamians did experience some initial excitement at being a shore of freedom for asylum-seeking Cubans, but that excitement quickly dwindled. In 1962 one article reported that: "Prejudices are developing despite the Cubans' effort to adjust ... and the community relations experts say Miami is a powder keg with an exposed fuse" (*Kiwanis* 1962, 12). Signs which read: "Aqui Se Habla Ingles" [English is spoken here] indicated a growing resentment among local residents; as did quotes such as that which appeared in the May 1962 issue of *Kiwanis Magazine*: "They [Cubans] leer at girls, spit in the streets, and work for slave wages that depress Miami's already shaky wage scale" (*Kiwanis* 1962, 12).

In 1963, *Ebony Magazine* published an article entitled: "Miami's Cuban Refugee Crisis: Invasion of 100,000 exiles creates grave problems for hard pressed Negro laborers." The article detailed a variety of hardships suffered

by Blacks as a result of the Cuban influx. Those hardships included: (1) widespread loss of formerly "Negro" jobs; (2) loss of some homes by Negroes; (3) eviction from homes and apartments of Negro tenants; (4) a sharp increase in crime among Miami's Negroes; (5) a marked increase in gambling by Negroes; (6) a noticeable reduction in receipts of Negro-owned businesses (Morrison 1963, 98).

Union manager Robert Gladnick was quoted in reference to the dress goods industry:

Since the industry expanded, between 1,000 and 1,500 new jobs were created and they all went to Cubans. The arrival of the Cubans definitely stopped the progress of the Negroes in the industry. The Negroes were about to make a breakthrough as sewers when the Cubans came in (Morrison 1963, 98).

In spite of emphasizing that "over 12,000 Negroes in the county have lost jobs since the Cuban migration began, and that "anti-Cuban feeling has been rising noticeably during the last twelve months," the article pointed to "a surprising lack of bitterness" among Blacks, and stated that "few Negroes can be found who will state categorically that they were displaced from jobs by refugees" (Morrison 1963, 98).

Next to quotes by some African American leaders such as newspaperman and local politician C. Gaylord Rolle who proclaimed that: "The coming of the Cubans has accentuated the crisis of Miami's Negro population," were statements by others such as that of Father Theodore Gibson, president of the Miami NAACP, who claimed that:

Cubans have helped the Negroes of Miami by coming here. There are places where Negroes can now go where they couldn't go before. Cubans have opened certain avenues and opportunities for Negroes (Morrison 1963, 97).

Cubans were not the only refugees portrayed as "invading" Miami in the early 1960s. In September of 1963, a boatload of 25 Haitians landed on South Florida's shore only to endure a lengthy and unsuccessful campaign for political asylum. The jobs problem was cited frequently by those opposed to admitting the Haitian refugees. Edward Kerr of the Florida State Employment Service explained that there are thousands of unemployed, unskilled workers in the area and that admission of the Haitians in large numbers would make the situation even more critical. Kerr claimed to have no available figures on the number of unemployed unskilled workers, but believed that it was considerable and included a large proportion of Negroes. The *Miami News* also reported that: "Negroes of the Miami area have already complained bitterly that the huge Cuban refugee influx has cost them jobs" ("Jobs Problem" 1963, 6A).

In 1965, widespread concern again resurfaced as Miami prepared for another large Cuban influx that would bring an estimated 5,000 refugees per month. The *Miami Herald* ran several articles dealing with the anticipated arrival, and reported that the most outspoken concerns were voiced by labor leaders and Negro civil rights leaders. Edward Stephenson, president of the Dade County Federation of Labor, asked: "What will be the impact on employment here? Will our working citizens again find that their jobs are being taken by outsiders willing to work at cut rate wages?" (Greene 1965a, 1A). Dr. J.O. Brown, coordinator of the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE), explained: "We just don't have the facilities here to absorb the new refugees. And we don't want to see happen again what happened before - the displacement of our own native citizens in jobs" (Greene 1965a, 1A).

Local NAACP president, Donald Wheeler Jones, expressed similar concerns when he stated that: "It is a fair assumption that the greater influx

will result in greater economic pressures on the largely unskilled Negro community. This could lead to some difficulties" (Greene 1965a, 1A). Both Brown and Jones acknowledged, however, that they had observed no tension between the Black and Cuban communities, nor did they expect to in the future. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare, which administered the refugee program, also reported that unemployment in Greater Miami had actually gone down despite the large Cuban population (Greene 1965a, 1A).

During the same week the above article appeared in the *Miami Herald*, the *Miami News* reported:

More Cubans are about to enter our town and, as we experienced in the first influx, there are fears; fears of lost jobs, fears of dropping real estate values ... Miamians' fears of the Cuban 'invasion' have been expressed in letters to the editor; and in phone calls to the *Miami News* ("More Cubans Expected" 1965, 1A).

One shop operator and native Miamian exclaimed: "What happens when a Cuban refugee gets off the boat? He asks where the welfare office is, that's what. You don't hear them ask where the employment office is" ("Feeling Grows" 1965, 33A). An Anglo motel operator in Miami also complained: "We've already got racial trouble enough. The Cubans can only make it worse. When they do go to work, they take over many jobs the Negroes would have. This builds up the pressure" ("Feeling Grows" 1965, 33A).

Much of the tension that was brewing between the newcomers and established residents in Miami could be witnessed in the Dade County School System. By September of 1962, 18,260 children of Cuban refugees were enrolled in Dade's schools. In October of 1965, the county confronted the possible enrollment of several thousand more Cuban school children in the months to come. Just prior to local elections in November 1965, school officials reported receiving numerous angry letters and telephone calls from voters

who intended to oppose a requested millage because they did not want to spend local money educating Cuban children ("Why School Chief" 1965, 1B).

The first planeload of Cuban refugees arriving under the federally arranged airlift program landed in Miami in early December of 1965. That same week, the *Miami Herald* began a series of articles examining the effect of this influx on the city's economy, its people, and its customs. The articles covered various points of potential conflict between the refugees and the native population, but focused most specifically on the issue of jobs and welfare. The concerns and complaints of local residents were detailed, as well as the demands by local leaders, government agencies and church groups that the federal government share the fiscal and administrative burden being placed on Miami as a result of the refugee influx. *Herald* staff writer, Juanita Greene, also pointed out, however, that "Miami is dealing with a situation in which feelings are as important as facts":

It is generally acknowledged that many Cubans are now working at jobs that would be held by Americans if the refugees had stayed home. But nobody can say how many. Nor is it known how many new jobs the Cuban influx has generated, or how many of the presently unemployed or underemployed Miamians could have qualified for Cuban-held jobs (Greene 1965b, 4H).

The year 1965 marked a peak in the number of Cuban refugees arriving on Miami's shores. It also marked an apparent peak in the outcry among disgruntled residents. As *Fortune* reported (October 1966, 146):

Ripples of dread passed through Miami as each of the successive waves of refugees hit town ... loud, anguished cries came from the Negro community and some labor organizations because Cubans were going to work for half the prevailing wages.

A variety of individuals and groups worked diligently to ease the tension among residents and newcomers. The Dade County Community

Relations Board secured an additional \$60,000 for its budget after Chairman and Episcopal Bishop James Duncan warned of "very deep tensions" which "pose a threat of imminent disaster to our community" (Einstein 1965, 1A).

Throughout the remainder of the decade, complaints concerning the Cuban influx continued to surface, but the complexities of the displacement debate grew more pronounced. Critics of the airlift maintained that Miami's economy was not strong enough to withstand a new "assault", but some prominent Miami businessmen and bankers began to argue otherwise. Tully Dunlap of Riverside Bank stated flatly: "It's time the other side of the story is told. The Cuban is industrious, aggressive and honest. He definitely is an economic asset to Miami" (Birger 1965, 1A). William Pallot, President of International Bank also explained:

Frankly, I've not understood the complaints. If the refugees weren't here, there'd be an overabundance of vacant stores and apartments. Miami would probably be suffering economically if not for them (Birger 1965, 1A).

In a 1965 study of Cubans in the US, Reverend William Weedman of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary concluded that:

Some of the ill feelings of Miami Negroes toward Cubans about jobs has subsided, but there's still some underlying resentment left ... The main difference between the two groups is that Cubans have ambition, drive, and hope. The Negro many times feels hopeless and lacks ambition and drive ("Reverend Studies" 1966, 1B).

In November 1966, he vice president of Florida's AFL-CIO, Art Hallgren, stated that although the AFL-CIO was "very concerned" when the refugees began arriving in Miami, "the Cubans have adjusted very well." He also believed that an exodus of Cubans back to Cuba could have a strongly adverse effect on the local economy (*National Observer* 1966).

'Lest Washington Forget'

Many of the claims that have comprised Miami's public discourse about immigration over the last thirty years have been directed at Washington. As early as December of 1961, several local leaders from Dade County went to Washington to testify before a US Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees. During the testimony, Dade County Commissioner Arthur Patten warned of rising resentment among Blacks because of displacement by Cubans: "The reason they [Blacks] are out of work is because the Cubans have their jobs. And as these people begin to mingle together, I am afraid there will be trouble in the not too distant future" (Hearings 1962, 54).

H. Daniel Lang, also a Dade County Commissioner, cautioned that it was difficult to measure the impact of the refugee influx on native workers, but went on to predict that: "Unless the supply of jobs increases in the Miami area, since they are already in short supply, the Cuban refugees will displace even more workers because of the skills they have to offer if they continue to flow into the community" (Hearings 1962, 133).

In March of 1963, Congressmen Dante Fascell and Claude Pepper held a series of hearings in Miami to address local concerns over the "Cuban problem" in South Florida. A large and vocal crowd of Miamians attended the hearing. They reportedly clapped approvingly when State Attorney Richard Gerstein stated that a "great percentage of traffic offenses are caused by Spanish-speaking people," and that the refugees have had "an impact on the crime situation." Similar reactions poured forth when County Manager Irving McNayr reported that Cubans are crowding "our own citizens" out of public parks and have cost the county almost half a million dollars in direct expenses at Jackson Memorial Hospital, and when Metro Commission Chairman Joe Boyd

asked with a sense of extreme urgency: "How many more refugees are going to come?" (Greene 1963, 1A).

Speaking on behalf of the Black population in Miami, community leader Luther L. Brooks stated that between 12,000 and 15,000 African-Americans had left Dade County because of the depressed economic situation; and James Whitehead of the Greater Miami Urban League urged the Congressmen to collect authentic figures on "the number of Cubans here, the number working, and the number of Negro workers displaced by Cubans" (Greene 1963, 1A).

The fears and concerns expressed in Miami during the "second wave" of Cuban immigration were also being debated in Washington. In a passionate speech before the House of Representatives, Congressman Dante Fascell demanded Congressional hearings on the Cuban crisis in Miami, a limit on the number of Cuban refugees, and adequate screenings. He argued that: "There is a limit to how many refugees Miami can take to its heart and absorb into its economic life" ("Fascell Demands" 1965, 1B).

In the months that followed, Fascell worked diligently to secure Congressional approval for a federal program aimed at easing unemployment among Blacks and low-income Whites displaced by Cuban refugees. He assured his constituents in South Florida that: "It will do much to correct the inequities and loss of job opportunities caused by the influx of Cuban refugees". Representative H.R. Gross echoed Fascell's concerns that the new influx would "compound poverty and compound unemployment". He also encouraged the House Foreign Affairs Committee to "find out why Castro is interested in getting rid of these people" ("Federal Program Aimed" 1965, 1A).

Despite the recognition of various benefits bestowed upon Miami as a result of the Cuban influx, Dade County officials continued to complain that

Washington was not doing its part to assist South Florida with the absorption of the refugees. In 1967, County Manger Porter Homer explained that:

When the first waves of refugees diminished, federal support of health services dwindled. When the new wave began, the federal support continued to shrink. [The result] is a snowballing displacement of native Americans from the preventative health service intended for them to the point that a major downtown clinic is now 94 percent Cuban everyday ("Metro Asks Health" 1967, 1B).

A *Miami Herald* editorial entitled "Lest Washington Forget About Our Refugees" reminded readers that the Cuban refugees continued to arrive, 900 per week, and that:

The plus signs of the Cuban influx do not balance out the squeeze that the refugees have put on Dade's schools and welfare facilities. This is a continuing problem and Washington should be constantly reminded of its obligation to pay the bills ("Lest Washington Forget" 1967, 16A).

Shortly after the federal report was released, the *Miami Herald* forcefully called upon Washington to end the airlift from Cuba. The editorial charged that the freedom flights actually served to recruit refugees, and challenged readers to "Consider these facts" ("It's Time To Ground" 1969, 6A):

CUBAN refugees get greater care than underprivileged US citizens.

IN TRANSPORTATION alone, the airlift costs nearly one million dollars a year.

THE RECENT study commissioned by the President to determine causes of last August's riot here cited Negro resentment of special treatment for refugees as a contributing factor.

This expensive program goes on at a time when the needs of American cities are critical ... The question is one of priorities. The airlift and Cuban Refugees Program should not stand ahead of the pressing needs of American citizens.

Miami was again consumed with the threat of invasion a decade later when a series of events culminated in the Mariel boatlift of 1980.² Many of the grievances that emerged in connection with this influx were directed at the federal government. On April 29, 1980, the *Miami Herald* stated forcefully:

Carter administration officials seem afraid to anger Cuban-American voters by demanding an end to the influx, but they don't want to legitimize it by mobilizing Federal assistance ... Local resources--particularly housing--already are exhausted, and a potentially ugly backlash is building among non-Hispanics.

On June 27, 1980, a *Miami Herald* editorial strongly criticized Carter's handling of the crisis:

The President consciously let the threat of mob reaction intimidate him into ignoring the law and allowing his own policies to be trampled. When the President finally ordered the boatlift halted on May 15, he did so because the Cuban-American community itself had become unhappy over the mental patients and criminals that Fidel Castro had included among the Mariel refugees.

In November of 1984, the Immigration and Naturalization Service announced that more than 120,000 Mariel refugees without criminal records could begin applying for legal residency in the US. This was part of a US - Cuban agreement under which 3,000 Mariel criminals and mental patients would be returned to Cuba, but those who remained would become US citizens with the unrestricted right to send for husbands, wives, parents and children still on the island. Not only did many south Florida residents adamantly reject the plan, but local officials again turned to Washington with concerns over "Who will pay?" R. Ray Goode, a major Miami developer and former county manager, explained that more than "the lunatic fringe" is concerned.

The Federal government must recognize that this is by no means a local problem. It came about as the result of federal policies - or nonpolicies - and they [Washington] must subsidize the cost (*Business Week* 1985, 87).

Agreeing with Goode, Governor Bob Graham complained that he was not consulted on the decision to legalize the Marielitos, and that Washington still owes Florida governments more than \$150 million for local services provided during the boatlift. Graham declared: "Immigration policy is a federal responsibility. Washington must pay the cost" (*Business Week* 1985, 87).

Refugees and Riots

Miami experienced its first major race riot in the summer of 1968, another in 1970, and thirteen more, although arguably less destructive disturbances, prior to 1979. Immediately following the first civil upheaval, few statements were made directly linking the riots to the Cuban refugee influx. By the 1980s, immigration was cited as a key factor in most every analysis of the rioting and social tension in Miami.

The riot of 1968 received a great deal of local media attention, as well as prompted the President of the United States to commission a study to determine the causes of the riot. That report was published in early 1969 and concluded that the disturbances in Liberty City originated out of the accumulated deprivations, discriminations, and frustrations of the Black community. The report emphasized that these concerns and conditions in Liberty City were similar to those of urban Black communities throughout the US, but were exacerbated by "special local circumstances" in Miami--specifically "the loss of local jobs by blacks over prior several years to Cuban refugees" ("Federal Report" 1969, 1A).

The riot of 1968 demonstrated the level of anger and frustration among Blacks in Miami, but the focus of that discontent was less clear. The Federal Riot Report called attention to the loss of black jobs to Cuban refugees, but when asked about the causes and consequences of the riot, many Blacks

responded differently. One Liberty City resident interviewed by the *Miami News* explained: "Well, I don't know about that 'loss of local jobs'. There weren't all that many jobs to start with" ("Federal Report" 1969, 1A).

Some Black leaders in Miami were more willing to accept the job takeover explanation, but did so cautiously. Robert Simms, executive director of the Community Relations Board in Dade County, explained:

There has been no clash between Negro 'groups' and Cuban 'groups'. But there certainly has been some real concern among individuals who have been replaced, for one reason or another, by Cubans. I know of a Negro man who was a foreman. When the Cubans began coming in, he was given the job of training one of them. The man he trained was then given his job ... that man went back on a street corner and told other Negroes what had happened. And bad news travels very fast ("Federal Report" 1969, 1A).

What was revealed by the various reports and analyses that appeared in the months and years following the 1968 riot was that the Black community in Miami was suffering many of the same social, political and economic ills that plagued urban areas throughout the US, and that little had changed since the riot. Miami's Blacks lived in sub-standard housing, could not depend on adequate public services such as garbage collection, and were the bitter victims of "urban renewal" and a variety of other broken promises. *New South Magazine* published a report in January of 1969 entitled "Violence in Miami: One More Warning." The article painted a dismal picture of the social conditions in Miami's ghettos, and quoted one affluent and influential black agency executive who stated flatly:

Nothing has happened since the riot; we're right back where we started. It's certain to happen again. Next time I'm going to put down my attache case and pick up a brick ("One More Warning" 1969, 1A).

The *Miami Herald* invited a group called the "Black Brothers for Progress"--formed during the 1968 riot in order to present demands for

change to White government and business leaders--to discuss what precipitated the riot. The consensus that emerged during that discussion was that the problems which caused Liberty City to explode had not been solved, and had gotten worse. Police harassment, according to the participants, had increased, while opportunities and services had not. They complained of overcrowded housing, filth, lack of jobs and recreational facilities, and lack of concern by public officials. At the top of their list of complaints immediately following the riot, as well as six months later, was harassment of young Blacks by Miami police officers ("Black Brothers" 1969, 1A).

Race relations in Miami received minimal media attention throughout the 1970s, and the most prominent public discourse with regard to immigration was one that sang the praises of Cuban immigrants as an amazingly entrepreneurial and industrious immigrant group. In 1980, however, when Liberty City exploded in one of the most hostile social rebellions in US history, an enormous amount of attention was again focused on Miami's 'melting pot', or what came to be more frequently referred to as "a boiling pot" (Mohl 1986, 51).

The McDuffie riots of 1980 occurred only weeks after the last of 125,000 Mariel refugees landed on Florida's shores. The riot was quickly labeled as one of the most violent and destructive race riots in US history; and most of the explanations that surfaced to account for the upheaval drew explicit connections between the riots and the large number of refugees that continued to flow into Dade County. Joan Didion, for example, called attention to the fact that while Liberty City burned, 57,000 newly arrived refugees from the Cuban port of Mariel camped under bleachers at the Orange Bowl (Didion 1987, 42).

Governor Robert Graham immediately created the Governor's Dade County Citizens Committee to explore the causes of the riot and make necessary recommendations. The Committee's findings were published on October 30, 1980; and listed first, as a leading cause of the upheaval: poverty, unemployment and underemployment. In the explanation that followed, the Committee discussed the "shock waves" that have impacted upon the community with each new arrival of immigrants (1980, 14):

As many blacks see it, the recent influx of Cuban refugees into the Miami area has exacerbated the jobs problem. Not only has ability to speak Spanish become a primary qualification for a vast number of jobs, but also it has resulted in the replacement of Blacks by Cubans, Haitians and other Latins in a wide variety of unskilled jobs. This new wave of refugees consequently places additional pressures on an already fragile job market. As a result, the different racial and ethnic groups are pitted against each other in a scramble for the most marginal jobs in our economy.

In a photographic essay in *Ebony Magazine* entitled, "Miami: Roots of Rage," one caption under a particularly dismal photograph read: "The burned out buildings of Overtown are symbolic of the destroyed dreams of many Black youth unable to find employment, often because jobs for unskilled workers have gone to immigrants from Latin American countries" (Sleet 1980, 138).

Just months after the 1980 riots, in an article titled, "The Welcome Wears Thin," *Time Magazine* claimed:

Dade County's blacks fear that Cuban and Haitian refugees will crowd them out of jobs. That resentment helped touch off the riots that rocked Miami in May, killing 18 and causing \$100 million worth of damage, although there were no documented attacks against the new Cuban refugees (*Time* 1980, 9).

In 1981, in a story which officially earned Miami the title "Paradise Lost," *Time Magazine* again wrote:

The blacks are upset by both kinds of Cubans. Stuck on the bottom rung of South Florida's economic ladder, they have always

resented the more prosperous Cuban minority. With the arrival of the Marielitos, blacks feared that they would lose out in the scramble for the few low-skill jobs available in the region. Even in Liberty City, where 18 people died in last year's riot, the Latin influence is apparent (*Time* 1981, 31).

Two years after the McDuffie riots, the *Economist* reported that little had changed in the lives of Miami Blacks, "since resentment at their predicament exploded into three days of rage in 1980." According to the *Economist*:

Miami is not a good city in which to be black ... Miami has no black business class ... Miami has no black political establishment ... And, unlike blacks in almost every other American city, they cannot even count on a monopoly of the low-paid, low-grade jobs: Miami's blacks always live in danger of losing their jobs to the latest wave of immigrants off the islands prepared to work for peanuts (*Economist* 1982, 22).

Miami continued to experience civil disturbances throughout the 1980s. In analyses of the riots and unrest, authors, politicians, journalists, civic leaders and academicians all continued to call attention to the impact of immigration on Miami, and particularly the economic impact of immigration on the African-American community. In her historical discussion of the racial inequalities facing Miami's blacks, Didion (1987, 47) explains:

This had been a familiar enough pattern through out the South, but something else had happened here. Desegregation had not just come hard and late to South Florida, but it had also coincided, as it had not in other parts of the South, with another disruption of the local status quo, the major Cuban influx, which meant that jobs and services which might have helped awaken an inchoate black community went instead to Cubans.

In the words of Professor Jan Luytjes of Florida International University: "Prior to the 1960s you had blacks in all the traditional businesses, just like in any other southern city. But here, just as they were ready to come out, the Cubans arrived and exerted a downward pressure on the blacks" (Porter and Dunn 1984, 195).

Bruce Porter and Marvin Dunn, authors of the well-known book, *The Miami Riot of 1980: Crossing The Bounds*, cover relevant background, discuss the 1980 riot in detail, and conclude with a final chapter, "Some Reasons Why." One of those reasons, covered in a section titled "The Cubans," discusses the devastating job takeover experienced by Blacks. Porter and Dunn (1984, 195) explain:

Many of them middle-class and looking as white as the Anglo population, the new arrivals were considered to be members of a minority group by virtue only of their foreign language. Given this status, however, they succeeded not only in diverting attention from Miami blacks during the crucial integration period, but also, by virtue of their greater social acceptability and entrepreneurial skills, in winning the lion's share of public and private money available for minority economic development.

David Rieff, author of *Going to Miami* (1987) cited evidence from Porter and Dunn's research on the 1980 riot, and proclaimed (1987, 177): "Indeed, the riot was without question as anti-Cuban as it was anti-Anglo. Cubans had not only replaced blacks in the jobs they had formerly occupied, they were seen as having unfairly been allowed to take over small businesses in Miami as well." Rieff points to a decrease in Black ownership of gas stations in Miami from 1960 to 1979, and an increase in Cuban ownership during that same period. A higher percentage of small business loans to the Hispanic community was offered as a partial explanation (1987, 177).

In his analysis of the 1989 riots, Raymond Mohl (1990, 38) called attention to the "200 Nicaraguans pouring into Miami everyday," and the "estimated 100,000 additional Nicaraguans predicted to arrive within the next year." He wrote: "It was hard to escape the contradictions: the blacks were burning down their neighborhoods in despair, but the thousands of newly arrived

Nicaraguan refugees pinned their hopes for the future on a new life in Miami" (Mohl 1990, 38).

The 'Takeover' Is Complete

Well, it is finally over! Roberto Suarez's becoming president of the Miami Herald publishing company kills - once and for all - any chance of Miami's ever returning to its former status as an English-speaking American city located in the US! Shortly, it will be time to begin a death watch over the Herald's English editions. To get a letter printed you'll have to say nice things such as how very enjoyable it is to listen to the 120 - decibel level of casual Cuban conversation. Well, I don't need a big pile of El Nuevo Herald's to fall on me - it's time to move on. Maybe I'll go back to the US. I still remember some English. I'll get by (Resnick 1990, 10A).

During the 1980s, resentment toward the "latinization" of Miami grew particularly pronounced. The complaints being heard were not just about jobs, nor were they being voiced solely by Blacks or labor leaders. The above letter to the *Miami Herald* from Miami Beach resident Bob Resnick exemplifies much of the resentment expressed by Non-Latin Whites: through an increase in White flight out of Dade County, in the form of popular bumper stickers that read: "Will the last American leaving Miami please bring the flag;" or, "I'm a Native - An Endangered Species"; and in overwhelming support for both anti-bilingual and English-only proposals.

The Citizens of Dade United, the group which spearheaded the anti-bilingual campaign in 1980, also campaigned diligently to make English the official language in Florida in 1988.³ The language issue continued to be a point of tension throughout the 1980s, and did not appear to diminish in the 1990s. In 1992, Anti-Defamation League President Arthur Teitelbaum referred to the language debate as: "a continuing poison in the bloodstream of the

community" (Interview, July 6, 1992). An insightful quote by Joan Didion aptly sums up an apparent peculiarity of the language debate in Dade County:

This question of language was curious. The sound of spoken Spanish was common in Miami, but it was also common in Los Angeles, and Houston. . . What was unusual about Spanish in Miami was not that it was so often spoken, but that it was so often heard: in, say, Los Angeles, Spanish remained a language only barely registered by the Anglo population, the language spoken by the people who worked in the car wash and came to trim the trees and cleared the tables in the restaurants. In Miami Spanish was spoken by the people who ate in the restaurants, and the people who owned the cars and trees (1987, 63).

Increased complaints about spoken Spanish were also accompanied by derogatory allegations about other aspects of Cuban culture, and the Cuban-American community in Miami. This was particularly true during the Mariel crisis when Castro's portrayal of these refugees as the "scum" of society was picked up and perpetuated by many in Miami.⁴ The image of Mariel refugees as criminals, mentally insane, homosexuals and drug addicts did dissipate during the 1980s; but as recently as October 1992, one prominent Non-Latin White local official in Dade County referred to the Mariel boatlift as the time when "Castro flushed his toilets on us" (Interview, October 9, 1992).

In 1981, *Newsweek* did a story on the public outcry in Miami surrounding the practice of Santeria - a Cuban cult religion brought to the island by Yoruba slaves. The magazine reported that: "As poor immigrants from Haiti and Cuba have settled in Miami, animal sacrifices associated with several Caribbean religious cults have flourished - raising tensions between the immigrants and natives" (Reese and Coppola 1981, 44). And a retired Miami detective who lives on a sailboat on the Miami river complained: "Not a day goes by without chickens or doves, with their heads cut off and feathers on, floating by" (Reese and Coppola 1981, 44).

Writing for the *New Yorker*, David Rieff explained:

...Santeria, the cult religion of Cuba, was cause for lamentations over the coming of the barbarians to Dade County. "You find goat heads in the Cubans' refrigerators," complained a secretary I met at a party (Rieff 1987b, 70).

A Non-Latin White county employee, and native Miamian complained:

My daughter doesn't even like to shop at malls in Miami anymore because it's all Latin designs ... At our Publix, the one we've shopped at for years, they are now selling those little Cuban statues (Interview, June 16, 1992).

Various claims were also put forth linking the Hispanic population in Miami to practices of crime and corruption. This was exemplified by the December 20, 1990 *Miami Times* headline which read: "Miami Run By A Cuban Mafia". Similarly, in field interviews conducted during 1992, the integrity of the Latin community was called into question on several occasions. One Non-Latin White elected official repeated the lament of a colleague who found it increasingly difficult to conduct business in Miami without doing it the "Cuban way". The "Cuban way" was a reference to widespread bribery and corruption. The respondent agreed that: "These Hispanics do operate differently. If they support you, they expect something in return" (Interview, July 27, 1992).

In a statement about the relative ease with which the Latin community "made it" in Miami, a prominent Black civic leader emphasized that the Latin community has never suffered from a lack of financial capital. The respondent then said, with a tone of suspicion: "Wherever that money may be coming from, I don't know, and I don't make it my business to know" (Interview, October 22, 1992).

As the refugee influx continued throughout the 1980s, it was clear that Miamians were not only upset by the potential burden to be placed on the city by the most recent and allegedly less resourceful Marielitos, but were also

resentful of those immigrants that had done well in Miami. Monsignor Bryan Walsh, prominent community leader and long-time resident of Miami asked: "I wonder who really upsets whites the most, the poor Cuban on welfare or the rich Cuban with three Cadillacs and a Mercedes out buying the county" (*Time* 1981, 31).

The Job Displacement Debate

The Rhetoric

A variety of different grievances were voiced by individuals and groups in Miami over the last thirty years. The claim that Hispanic immigrants displaced Blacks in Miami labor market was a particularly prominent concern. This claim persisted over time, and did so on the basis of very limited empirical support. The curious discrepancy between rhetoric and reality in Miami mirrors what is occurring more generally throughout the US. Labor economists are increasingly finding that immigrants are not 'taking a bigger piece of the pie,' but may instead be 'making the pie bigger'. Yet, as the population of immigrants continues to expand, particularly in urban areas such as Miami, the optimism of this literature in no way reflects the ethnic and racial tensions which embroil the daily lives of the local residents. Regardless of the empirical data, opinion polls report that an increasing number of Americans feel that immigration is a problem that should be more strictly controlled, that too many immigrants are now entering the U.S. from Latin America, and that immigrants take jobs from U.S. workers (Federation for American Immigration Reform 1990, 1).

Nativist resentment toward immigrants is not new. And as one analyst points out: "Sentiment for restricting immigration, like immigration itself, has come in waves, although these waves are not perfectly synchronized with the waves of immigrants" (Bilderback 1989, 225). Nativism among US residents does not

directly correlate with the influx of immigrants, but according to an interesting study by Wayne Cornelius at the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, American public opinion toward immigration does relate to the rise and fall of US unemployment rates (Cornelius 1982).

This ambivalence toward immigrants is both reflected in and reinforced by US immigration policy. A close examination of the history of immigration policy reveals an element of schizophrenia in US national consciousness. Not only has US policy alternately encouraged and discouraged the influx of immigrants, but seemingly contradictory goals are advanced simultaneously within the context of a given policy. The most recent battle over immigration policy came to a temporary close with the passage of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). One key component of IRCA emphasized increased enforcement of immigration law through tighter control over US borders, and the imposition of sanctions on employers who hire illegal aliens. The other key component is an amnesty provision which legalized all those immigrants that came to the US illegally prior to 1982. The INS is thus charged with guarding against the influx of "bad foreigners", while protecting and assisting with the transition of "good foreigners" into the mainstream of American society (Bilderback 1989, 227).

The debate surrounding the passage of IRCA not only reveals ambiguities in the US approach toward immigration policy, but also illuminates the constructive capacity of the public debate itself. A number of hearings took place during the early 1980s on the topic of immigration. And, as one analyst stated: "It is impossible to now recapture the spirit of recklessness that characterized the allegations of danger to the Republic and general evil said to accompany the illegal immigration and the rapidly growing 'hidden population' it was said to feed" (Bilderback 1989, 232). Members of Congress

used phrases such as a "hemorrhage of people", and referred to the US-Mexico border as a Maginot line. Governor Lamm (1985) of Colorado warned of the "Immigration Time Bomb," and former CIA director William Colby claimed that immigration posed "a greater threat than the Soviet Union" (Ehrlich et al. 1979, 190).

During the course of the debates that led up to the passage of IRCA, the purported number of illegal aliens residing in the US crept progressively upward from the Social Security Administration's 3.9 million average estimate, to the INS's "12 million or more" (Keely 1977). Certainly the tone of the entire discussion was profoundly influenced by the appointment of a former Marine commander to head the INS. Through a number of speaking engagements, press conferences and numerous public pronouncements, General Chapman instilled fear in the American public and Congress with a well-honed message: 'A hitherto unknown menace has arisen and now threatens each one of us individually, as well as the American Way of life' (Bilderback 1989, 227).

The 'Reality'

On October 5, 1978, Congress addressed the immigration controversy through the establishment of a Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. The Commission issued its final report in 1981. With regard to the impact of immigration on the US, the report identified four issues of primary concern: social services, job displacement, wage depression, and the effects on American law and society. The discussion of American law and society was the most conducive to rhetorical ramblings, but concern over the impact of immigration on social services was disposed of relatively quickly. The Commission's Final Report read: "Interpretations ... vary, although most

studies indicate that undocumented/illegal aliens do not place a substantial burden on social services" (Select Commission 1981, 38).

The issues of job displacement and wage depression posed greater difficulty for the Commission. Very reputable and prestigious economists offered very conflicting testimony. Some stated that illegal immigrants were causing unemployment among the legal population of workers (Briggs 1984; North and Houston 1976). Others argued that illegal immigrants actually created more jobs (Piore 1979; Simon 1989).

As the Commission's final report indicates, a definitive response to the question of job displacement remains elusive, but the most recent and comprehensive research suggests that immigrants do not have a pronounced effect on the earnings or employment of the native born population. In fact, there is apparent agreement that the overall economic contributions of immigration exceed its economic liabilities (USDOL 1989, 180). In the *Economic Consequences of Immigration* (1989), Julian Simon documents extensively the net positive benefits of immigration. He is joined by economist George Borjas who contends, in *Friends or Strangers: The Impact of Immigrants on the US Economy* (1990), that even with a 10 percent increase in immigrant labor, overall employment rates are not affected. Ben Wattenberg and Karl Zinsmeister of the American Enterprise Institute have recently advocated an increase in the number of immigrants, emphasizing the education, skills and even investment capability of immigrants which help enrich the US (*Congressional Record* June 26, 1990).

Econometric research has attempted to estimate the impact of immigration on native workers wages, and concluded that the aggregate effect of an increase in the supply of immigrants on earnings of native workers is small (Greenwood and McDowell 1988). Borjas (1982) specifically concluded that male immigrants do not

affect Black male earnings, but do have a small negative effect on the earnings of White men. In a later article, Borjas analyzed the extent of labor market competition among Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites in the U.S. He concluded that Black workers and Hispanic workers are complements, but Black and White workers may be substitutes (1983). Similar research on illegal Mexican workers found that they had no significant effect on Black workers, and were complements to other workers (Bean, Lowell and Taylor 1988). Grossman (1982) found immigration to cause only marginal job displacement of domestic workers. In line with the call for higher levels of immigration, several studies have emphasized the way in which immigrants stimulate employment demand through human capital, or increased demand for infrastructural development; and Muth (1971) concluded that one additional migrant results in about one additional job.

The Department of Labor acknowledges that the bulk of this literature warrants an important caveat. Many of the findings are averaged across multiple labor markets, and are often based on 1970 and 1980 decennial census data which do not capture changes in immigrant composition nor the dynamics of a changing economy. Borjas and Tienda (1987) also argue that the tendency of the foreign born to concentrate in selected areas, and the diversity of the industrial mix in those regions, may mean that immigration has a disproportionate effect in certain areas. The DOL report suggests that further disaggregation along various ethnic, racial, industry, and age groups is in order.

The Miami Case

Related research on Miami is limited, and has primarily examined the existence and impact of a Cuban enclave economy (Wilson and Portes 1980; Portes and Bach 1985). Enclave theory gained popularity in the 1980s as an alternative to both the assimilationist theory and segmented labor markets approach, and has

been used frequently to explain the unusual entrepreneurial success of the Cuban community in Miami (Feagin 1989). Wilson and Martin employed the ethnic enclave concept in a comparative analysis of Cuban and Black businesses in Miami. They found that businesses in the more advantaged Cuban enclave were characterized by high interdependence, and low dependence on majority industry. The Black enclave was weakly interdependent and more dependent on majority industry. Wilson and Martin (1982, 156) also conclude that economic success in the Cuban community has not occurred through taking over or driving out Black competition, but rather that the:

Cuban community has obtained its success primarily from production of ethnic goods, textiles, cigars, and food, and from the Latin connection, the development of which coincides with the growth phase of the Cuban enclave.

In an attempt to quantify the impact of the Cuban influx on less-skilled workers in Miami, Harvard Economist David Card uses Current Population Survey data from 1979 to 1985 to examine the effect of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami labor market. He concludes that "The Mariel influx appears to have had virtually no effect on the wages or unemployment rates of less-skilled workers" (1990, 245).

Robert Cruz (1991) uses Miami as a case study for examining the empirical link between the growth of production in a central city and the distribution of income among its residents. Cruz finds that although employment within the city of Miami grew from 1970 to 1980, the per capita income of city residents declined, and Black families were the most severely injured by this trend. Cruz cautions, however, that despite the widespread perception that Hispanic immigrants had taken jobs from Black residents (1991, 6):

No objective evidence of this conclusion has been put forward...Indeed, ... significant gains in the number and proportion of blacks employed in higher paying "white collar" jobs occurred between 1970 and 1980. Hence, the reasons for the lack of participation of blacks in the City's economic progress

may lie more with occupational distribution rather than with a loss of jobs to immigrant groups" .

A close examination of the data on ethnic employment by industry in Miami reveals that although the Cuban presence expanded rapidly in various segments of the labor market, this took place primarily at the expense of native Whites (Portes and Stepick Forthcoming). There is certainly no denying that the Cuban influx had a powerful impact on the local economy in Dade County; however, as Portes and Stepick (Forthcoming) point out:

There was no one-to-one substitution of Blacks by Cubans in the labor market, nor a direct exploitation of one minority by the other. There was, however, a new urban economy in which the immigrants raced past other groups, leaving the native minority behind.

Not only do existing labor market analyses indicate a discontinuity between the rhetoric and the reality, but many of the claims put forth also reveal the confusion and ambiguity that characterize the job displacement debate. In their discussion of possible explanations for the 1980 riots, Porter and Dunn (1984) refer to the Cuban influx and the devastating job takeover experienced by Blacks. They point out that from 1972 to 1977 Hispanic businesses in Miami rose by 70 percent while the number of Black businesses increased by only 40 percent. Additional data is provided to demonstrate the disparity in loans by the U.S. Small Business Administration. Between 1968 and 1979, Hispanics received 47 percent of the total loan money in Miami; Whites received 46.5 percent; and Blacks received only 6.4 percent. This information, while indicative of the disadvantaged status of Blacks in Miami, is not proof of a Hispanic job takeover.

It is important to note that in the same discussion of job displacement, the authors acknowledge (1984, 196): "The surge of Cuban economic activity should not be surprising ... the working class element that joined in the exodus tended

to share the historic willingness of other immigrant groups to take on the lower order of jobs--the jobs that were often spurned by Black Americans who felt they deserved something better". Clearly, if Cuban immigrants took jobs spurned by Black Americans, there was no "job takeover".

One analyst succinctly captured the conflicting images and inherent contradictions that surround the immigration debate: "Aliens were lazy, bloated welfare bums who worked so hard and for such modest wages that they crowded upstanding red-blooded Americans out of the workplace" (Bilderback 1989, 227).

The lack of empirical evidence to support the claim that Hispanic immigrants have displaced Blacks in the Dade County labor market suggests that the rise of the job displacement issue on to the public agenda in Miami was not due to the intrinsic gravity of the problem itself. Nor is job displacement the only commonly held perception in and about Miami that is not well grounded in empirical 'reality'. Even before the first Mariel refugee set foot in Miami, it was widely believed that this group of Cubans was very different from those who came before them. Harsh and vocal outcries came from residents, local officials, politicians and the media who believed these refugees to be criminals, mental patients, homosexuals, AIDS victims, and in Castro's own words--the "scum" of Cuban society.

In reality, only 15 percent of those Cuban refugees that arrived during the Mariel boatlift had actually served time in a Cuban prison; and it bears keeping in mind that a prison sentence in Cuba may result from an offense as relatively minor as speaking critically of the Castro regime. This group of refugees did differ from earlier arrivals in that they reportedly came from lower socio-economic backgrounds, and a larger number were classified by INS officials as "Black". It has taken years for the tarnished image of Mariel to

reside, but studies indicate that this group of Cubans has adjusted to life in Miami much the same way as did their predecessors (Portes and Clark 1987).

An Idea Whose Time Had Come

Some perceptions in Miami are perpetuated by claims with little basis in empirical fact. Other grievances voiced by certain individuals and groups go unnoticed, or fail to gain widespread attention from the public at large. Leaders within the African-American community in Miami did express concern over the massive influx of Cuban refugees. They also complained, however, of poor housing conditions, inadequate public services, police brutality, and a general neglect by city and county government. Why then did the issue of a Hispanic job takeover achieve prominence on the public agenda in Miami; and how has it been perpetuated over time?

The work of various political scientists, policy analysts and social problem theorists provides important insights into how and why some issues or problems become the focus of concern within a given polity while others do not. In his path-breaking work on *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*, John Kingdon (1984) examines the factors underlying the common phrase, "It was an idea whose time had come." He asks instead "How does an idea's time come?" An examination of how an idea's time comes takes into consideration the *context* in which a particular issue emerges, the role of various *actors* in shaping and defining the issue or idea, and the *biases* inherent in any political system that either facilitate or obstruct the emergence of certain ideas. This and other works move beyond the assumption that issues or problems are rooted in an objective reality. The focus instead is on how a perceived reality is socially and politically constructed, and how that

construction determines why some concerns become public problems and others do not.

Rising Expectations, Relative Deprivations and Riots

The emergence and legitimation of the job displacement claim must be viewed in the context of a changing social, political and economic environment in Miami over the last thirty years. When the job displacement claim initially surfaced in the early 1960s, it was put forth, in many instances, by leaders of the Black community in Miami. The concern expressed by these individuals seemed to reflect an insecurity with regard to what was still, as a result of the Civil Rights Movement, only a small and fragile improvement in the status of Blacks in Miami. The hard-won victories in the long struggle for civil rights increased the expectations of Blacks in Dade County and throughout the US. The possibility that Cuban immigration would threaten these fragile advancements, detract much needed attention from a still desperate plight, or in any way impede the future social, political or economic progress of African-Americans in Dade County was viewed as a major threat. Many of the grievances issued during the 1960s by various leaders from Martin Luther King Jr. to local union organizers were as much in anticipation of problems that might arise, as in reference to hardship that had already been incurred as a result of the Cuban influx.

The plight of African-Americans in Miami remained bleak throughout the 1970s and Blacks consistently comprised a disproportionate share of Dade County's poor. Other measures indicate, however, that the economic situation of many Blacks in the Metropolitan Miami area actually improved even as the Cuban immigrants continued to arrive. But while Blacks in Miami did fare well compared to other metropolitan areas, Cubans fared better. And as scholars of

relative deprivation suggest, people often tend to measure their success relatively, not absolutely (Hochschild 1981, 81).

Not only did Blacks in Miami perceive that Hispanics had achieved superior economic success, but they also perceived that Hispanic success was due, in part, to favorable treatment by both government and business officials, locally as well as nationally. Claims put forth by various respondents also indicate that some Blacks viewed the very influx of Cuban immigrants as a political strategy calculated and controlled by the Non-Latin White power structure. One African-American activist and head of prominent civic organization in Dade County spoke at length about the "divide and conquer" strategy of the "White supremacist power elite" in Miami. "After acquitting McDuffie," he explained, "they [White power elite] brought in 150,000 more Cubans" (Interview, June 18, 1992). In a similar discussion about the disenfranchisement of the Black community in Dade County, a prominent Black business person in Miami explained that: "They [the Anglo establishment] destroyed Overtown. They scattered people all around then brought all the Cubans in" (Interview, July 8, 1992).

By 1980, the environment in Miami had changed dramatically. The Cuban refugee population had not only doubled in size, but had evolved from an exile community into an powerful social, political and economic force locally as well as nationally. The native population in Dade County, Non-Latin White and Black, experienced the *latinization* of Miami at the same time that they experienced the effects of a nation-wide recession. The influx of Cubans continued, but these poorer and darker *Marielitos* were also joined by large numbers of immigrants from Haiti and other islands in the Caribbean.

Agenda-setting theorist John Kingdon has argued that: "Problems are often not self evident ..., but may need a little push to get the attention of the

public" (1984, 100). This "push" is provided, in part, by "triggering devices" or "focusing events"--unforeseen or unanticipated events, such as natural catastrophes, spontaneous human riots, technological and ecological change, which influence the shape and content of issues (Cobb and Elder 1972; Kingdon 1984). With regard to the notion of problems needing "a little push", the combination of events taking place in Miami during the 1980s would legitimately constitute a "shove". Both the Mariel boatlift and the Liberty City riots occurred within a period of a few weeks. These events also coincided, or collided, with an increase in Haitian immigration; and with a growing mood of nativism among local residents in Dade County. This was the context in which job displacement and the immigrant takeover became an accepted definition of social reality in Miami.

Issue Creation

In addition to focusing events, various actors or "initiators" also play an important role in pushing issues on to the public agenda. The convergence of events in 1980 attracted a great deal of local, national and international attention, and the severity of the events demanded a response. That response poured forth from public officials at all levels of government, politicians, the media, academicians, and authors of popular literature. As social tensions appeared to worsen throughout the decade, these individuals and groups continued to offer explanations.

In many instances the individual or organization making the claim explicitly acknowledged the conjectural nature of the statement. *Ebony Magazine* explained, for example, that: "Few Negroes can be found who will state categorically that they were displaced from jobs by refugees. . . ." (Morrisson 1963, 98). This caveat certainly does not diminish the level of

frustration that may have been present among local residents, but it does point to the need for understanding the processes that translate private concerns into public issues. According to social problem theorists, Spector and Kitsuse (1987, 145), for example:

A condition may be experienced in a vague and undefined way by some groups. They may even voice complaints about it, but not effectively. Then the trouble may be picked up and seen as a classic instance of exploitation, discrimination, or corruption by a political party, labor union, professional radical, or service organization. Such groups may give coherence or a rationale to the complaint.

The argument advanced here is that the process of providing coherence or rationale for a complaint is an inherently political process. In any polity, individuals and groups are engaged in a constant struggle to advance their particular grievances and concerns on to the public agenda. An important part of this struggle often entails attempts to expand the scope and visibility of a particular issue in order to reach a wider public (Cobb and Elder 1972). Political leaders, public officials, and the media are all involved in defining, redefining, and expanding issues or problems and may have any number of reasons for doing so. Political figures play an instrumental role in fomenting concern with certain problems and putting a damper on concern with others. Ross and Staines (1971) point out that by raising a public issue, officials can show rivals taking an unpopular position, or can take a popular position themselves. They may also use particular public issues to distract attention from other embarrassing issues. Public officials are also believed to have a political interest in personal, rather than systemic attribution for problems because they must justify and maintain their positions of authority. Problems, therefore, tend not to be interpreted as the fault of authorities, or the responsibility of the system, but rather as the result of aberrant behavior on the part of some members of society (Ross and Staines 1971, 22).

Much has also been written about the pivotal role played by the media in defining problems and expanding issues. Edelman, for example, refers to the blurring or absence of any realistic detail in the news that might weaken or question the symbolic meanings people read into it:

It is no accident of history or culture that our newspapers and T.V. present little news, overdramatize ... and that most citizens have only a foggy knowledge of public affairs though often an intensely felt one. The public wants symbols, not news (1964, 9).

Molotch and Lester (1971) define news reporting as an activity that not only reacts to events, but creates them as well. The media can, for example, influence the legitimacy of an issue through pointed inclusion or exclusion of critical pieces of factual information (Molotch and Lester 1974). Cobb and Elder also attribute an important degree of influence to the media when they acknowledge that: "Once the media take an interest in a controversy they will often play an important role in reinforcing or altering the prevailing definition of the conflict" (1972, 143).

Finally, as Murray Edelman explains, political opinions have various functions for an individual's personality, functions which need not meet the check of reality and may, in fact, be best served by ignoring reality. One of those functions is "externalization". As an example, Edelman contends that during a time of depression or anxiety, a large group may come to believe that Jewish, or Communist, or Catholic conspiracies in the government explain their business failures or their inability to realize other ambitions. These opinions will continue to be held and even strengthened so long as they work, and whether or not they are consistent with what is happening in the world (Edelman 1964, 8).

Many of the complaints about job displacement in Miami during the early 1960s were issued by local government employees, politicians and civic

leaders in Dade County. These officials complained forcefully that Miami was being swamped with refugees, and that Washington was not shouldering its share of the burden. The claim of potential civil unrest as a result of the Cuban influx was a tool with which local officials pressured the federal government to provide greater financial and administrative assistance with the refugee crisis. To lend credence to the threat, claimants emphasized the competition between Blacks and Cubans and the fears of an immigrant takeover.

Civil unrest did occur in Miami. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, Miami's Black ghettos erupted in fury on several occasions. There is little indication, however, that this frustration was directed at Cuban immigrants, or that those involved in the unrest considered immigration to be the cause of their plight. Nor is there much evidence that local officials or the media publicly drew a direct connection between the riots and the refugees prior to 1980. During the 1980s, however, talk of a foreign invasion resurfaced with a vengeance. With it came the claim that immigrants were taking jobs from US workers.

In the 1980s, as was the case in the 1960s, Black leaders were among those expressing grievances about the impact of immigration on Dade County. Although a variety of other concerns were also expressed, emphasis on the Hispanic job takeover served to provide coherence to a diffuse but powerful sense of dissatisfaction among Blacks in Miami. The focus on immigration and a takeover of jobs also became, during the 1980s, a means by which Black leaders could attach their grievances to more general concerns of the public at large --or "expand" the scope of their problems to a wider audience (Cobb and Elder 1972). Of all the grievances discussed in connection with the riots, the Cuban takeover was clearly the most visible issue with the greatest

capacity to gain the attention of large numbers of people--Black and White--in the Metropolitan Miami area.

Although the media printed headlines about a foreign invasion, and many public figures warned of brewing tensions as a result of the devastating job takeover, other voices within the Black community were consistently more moderate in their appeal. In 1962, a member of the Dade County Urban League denied any evidence of job displacement and explained: "Cubans are going after jobs that Negroes never had in the first place, so how can we claim they're taking employment away from our people?" (*Business Week* 1962, 92).

During interviews conducted from May to November of 1992, with various members of Miami's Black community, there were several individuals who claimed that Cubans had displaced Blacks in the local labor market. There were, however, also many who stated otherwise. Johnnie McMillian, President of the local NAACP, pointed out that: "Blacks never had the jobs anyway, because if we'd had them, I doubt they could have taken them" (Interview, September 3, 1992).

When asked about the Cuban job takeover, one high-ranking, Black city official responded: "I hate to fault a group of people for our lacking ... a lot of them have been employed, and you have to admire them for that" (Interview, July 9, 1992). Another civic leader within the Black community explained the situation as follows:

Right when the Cubans came, Blacks had decided they didn't want those waiter jobs, or jobs as hotel maids. The Cubans would do anything for very little money. Blacks thought they [Cubans] took jobs (Interview, September 10, 1992)

Black leaders in Miami were by no means the only ones voicing concerns about the impact of immigration on Dade County. The Non-Latin White leadership in Miami--local officials, politicians, scholars, citizens

groups and the media--all engaged in claims-making activity which defined a particular social reality in Miami. In the aftermath of one of the "most violent and destructive race riots in US history," Miami's reputation as the 'American Riviera' quickly degenerated into that of 'Paradise Lost'; and image conscious officials in Dade County struggled to shift responsibility for the social upheaval away from systemic factors.

The recognition and perpetuation of the job displacement claim also allowed the predominantly Non-Latin White leadership in Miami to deflect to an outside group much of the anger and frustration of the Black community which had historically been directed at a social, political and economic system dominated by an Anglo power-elite. For various elected officials and public figures, it was more politically feasible to emphasize the impact of immigration on the city, rather than to address the long-standing grievances of an extremely disenfranchised Black community--grievances which include, but are in no way limited to, labor market competition from immigrants.

Various politicians in Miami seized the opportunity to manipulate the immigrant presence and the threat of a takeover for their own personal political gain. Maurice Ferre's 1985 mayoral campaign popularized reference to a "Cuban Takeover" ("Ads Exploited" 1985, 3B); and, in 1989, Gerald Richmond proclaimed the 18th Congressional district to be an "American seat" (Moreno and Rae 1991). Many Dade County residents vented their frustration toward the 'ungrateful immigrants' through claims that portrayed the Cubans in Miami as not 'playing by the rules'. These opinions and perceptions may, in Edelman's words, have allowed both Blacks and Whites in Miami to "externalize" anxiety regarding their own personal hardships. Finally, many analysts and interview respondents emphasized the very critical role the media, and particularly the *Miami Herald*, has played in dramatizing events,

manipulating symbols, and creating or perpetuating perceptions that foster divisiveness among different racial and ethnic groups in the metropolitan Miami area.

Mobilization of Bias

The creation and redefinition of the issues that comprise public discourse in Miami is not arbitrary, but closely reflects the tug and pull of vested interests and community politics. As stated in the introduction, Gusfield's (1981, 8) discussion of the role of power and influence in the social construction of reality emphasizes that: "The public arena is not a field on which all can play on equal terms; some have greater access than others and greater power and ability to shape the definition of public issues". Cobb and Elder concur, pointing out that the public agenda is formed through the normal struggle of social forces; and, "at any point in time, it will reflect the existing balance of those forces, or the mobilization of bias within a community" (1972, 161).

Numerous factors serve to sustain and perpetuate this bias, but of particular relevance are the constraints imposed by 'systems of limited participation'. A system of limited participation, or "stable unrepresentation," is one in which large numbers of citizens remain outside the political arena (Gamson 1968, 19). Although the study of politics in the United States has been dominated by scholars such as Robert Dahl who describe the American political system as one in which: "All the active and legitimate groups in the population can make themselves heard at some crucial stage in the process of decision making" (1956, 137), many scholars have forcefully challenged the assumptions of Dahl and other pluralists, pointing out that the problem lies precisely in what is implied by "active" and "legitimate". As Charles Jones

suggests, 'active' implicitly assumes some level of structure, leadership, support and resources; while 'legitimate' implies consistency with some particular standards of social acceptability (Jones 1984, 61). In *The Semi-Sovereign People*, Schattschneider similarly rejected the notion of the American system as a mosaic of politically active interests groups. He argued instead that the limited range of organized groups that does exist clearly has "an upper-class bias" (1960, 140).

The biased nature of the political system in Miami was forcefully and successfully challenged in a six year legal battle over the county's at-large voting structure. In 1992, a federal judge ruled in favor of a group of Black and Hispanic plaintiffs who charged that the county's at-large system violated the Voting Rights Act by diluting minority voting strength. The plaintiffs' frustration appears well-justified in light of the fact that Blacks and Hispanics continue to hold one seat each on a nine-member commission, while collectively comprising seventy percent of the county's population.⁵ In an insightful and related analysis of the local government system in Miami, and its unresponsiveness to Blacks, John Stack identifies what he calls the "Miami Syndrome". The label is meant to convey: "high levels of black frustration in a stagnant political system combined with a crisis of rising expectations that is often expressed in rioting and other acts of non-traditional political protest" (Stack and Warren 1992, 293).

The mobilization of bias--and the bias of mobilization--is sustained not only by limiting the number of individuals or groups that play an "active" or "legitimate" role in the political system, but also by restricting the range of issues and alternatives that can gain access to the public agenda. Bachrach and Baratz refer to this as the process of "non-decision making"--a means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and

privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are even voiced (1970, 44). Miami has a long history of racial tension that far antedates the influx of Cuban immigrants. Blacks have complained for many years, sometimes violently, about numerous injustices they perceive to have been perpetuated against them by the White majority. These grievances have largely been ignored. The immigration "problem", on the other hand, has received a great deal of attention. By focusing on the Hispanic takeover, the power structure in Miami avoids acknowledging charges of racism, widespread discrimination, police brutality, poor housing conditions, inadequate public services, and a lack of political representation that continue to be advanced by the Black community.

What is particularly interesting about the problem of job displacement and the immigrant takeover in Miami is that not only does it gain prominence over other claims, but is also a definition of reality which pits two minority groups in competition with each other--discouraging a potential alliance between the disenfranchised African American population in Dade County and the Hispanic newcomers. On several occasions both Black and Hispanic interviewees in Dade County eluded to subtle but conscious attempts by the Non-Latin White leadership in Miami to 'divide and conquer' these two minority groups. Some respondents offered specific examples such as the 'tendency of Anglos to pander to the Cubans, while ignoring Blacks' (Interview, July 7, 1992). One very prominent Cuban-American civic leader and community activist explained:

I have Black leaders, friends of mine, who tell me they go to meetings with Anglos who say 'Hey, look we're getting pressure from these Cubans'. Then they [Anglos] say to us 'Hey, if those Blacks would just work as hard as you Hispanics do...' (Interview, September 30, 1992).

When asked: "Between which two ethnic groups in Miami is the level of hostility the greatest?"; one African-American leader and former elected officials answered: "Blacks and Hispanics, but you know Whites would just stand back and watch everything burn" (Interview, October 22, 1992). Another African-American and local director of a prominent civil rights organization responded as follows:

The worst relations are between Whites and Blacks, the tension with Hispanics is about them getting more resources than us. Hispanics don't really have the power, and Black people recognize that ... This White power structure better wake up (Interview, September 3, 1992).

It is difficult to empirically validate or invalidate the 'divide and conquer' claim, but the history of the emergence and legitimation of the job displacement 'problem' in Miami provides some support for this thesis. It is also interesting to note that of those respondents in Dade County who agreed with the statement that Hispanic immigrants had taken jobs from Blacks in the Miami labor market, 65 percent were Non-Latin Whites (see Figure 3-1).

Concluding Remarks

Miami ... is the clearest example of cultural aggression and takeover, which are the most disturbing longrange threats implicit in heavy immigration from Latin America and Asia. Miami is now notorious as the drug-importing capitol of the United States, with most of the kingpins having come to this country illegally from South America; and also for the highest crime rate in the country, a statistic directly traceable to the drug runners and to the criminals sent from Cuba in the Mariel boatlift. But these problems, while superficially more dramatic and terrifying, are not as significant for the future as the cultural threat (Ney 1989, 17).

It is widely perceived that Miami has fallen prey to a foreign invasion, and that this invasion severely threatens the very fabric of the city, and




FIGURE 3-1
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO INTERVIEW QUESTION #8:
HAVE HISPANIC IMMIGRANTS TAKEN JOBS FROM BLACKS IN DADE COUNTY?

perhaps the future of the country. This threat can be seen in the large number of grievances expressed by different individuals and groups in Miami over the last thirty years. Complaints refer to the loss of jobs, the prevalence of spoken Spanish, the encroachment of a corrupt and undemocratic civic culture, and the practice of bizarre religious rituals. Drawing on--and at the same time reinforcing--these concerns, public officials, local leaders and the media have defined and redefined a series of problems, crises, enemies and threats.

This definitional process does not take place in a vacuum, but occurs within a given social, political and economic context that is itself not static. It is this context that provides the raw material with which public discourse is constructed. The claims-making activity of leaders, politicians, journalists, and scholars, the redefinition and expansion of issues, and the manipulation of potent symbols formed the public discourse on displacement and constructed the threat of an immigrant takeover. This social definition of reality, although not well grounded in empirical data, has served the political purposes of various individuals and groups. Local officials have emphasized the immigrant threat in order to secure support and cooperation from the federal government. Civil rights leaders have lobbied so as not to have the immigrant influx detract attention from the plight of African-Americans. When the 1980s earned Miami its reputation as "Paradise Lost", image conscious city officials were quick to hold immigration responsible for the city's demise. The media and other observers capitalized on the drama, offering simplified and often distorted portrayals of very complex issues. And various politicians used the immigrant presence and the threat of a takeover for their own personal political gain.

It is important to emphasize that Blacks in Miami have and continue to express discontent about a number of perceived injustices with which they cope daily. Few of these concerns have, however, become issues of importance to the community at large. The Hispanic takeover, on the other hand, has risen from a myriad of crises, concerns, and issues, to a place of prominence on Miami's public agenda. This phenomenon supports Cobb and Elder's thesis that: "Through the manipulation of bias and prevailing values, status quo powers may stifle, reinterpret, or otherwise diffuse an issue, and thus prevent it from gaining agenda status" (Cobb and Elder 1972, 12).

This phenomenon also illustrates how a system of limited participation, and processes of non-decision making, serve to mobilize biases inherent in a given social, political and economic system. The job displacement thesis and the threat of an immigrant takeover are social constructions that serve the interests of both Blacks and Anglos in Dade County, place these long-time foes in a tacit alliance against the Hispanic newcomers, and discourage the potential for a potent political alliance between Blacks and Hispanics in Dade County. Immigrants thus become a convenient scapegoat for a variety of issues that may be only marginally related to their influx.

By the 1990s, there is some indication that the prevailing public discourse about immigrants and immigration may be shifting. As large numbers of Non-Latin Whites continue to move out of Dade County, many that remain increasingly engage in a public discourse that portrays immigration and the immigrants as a benefit to Miami rather than a curse.⁶ This discourse expresses more than just an appreciation for the infusion of human and financial capital that was so welcome by Miami's business elite during the 1960s. Editorials such as the one that appeared in the Miami Herald on March 24, 1991 extolling Americans to "Get on the ball ... learn another language"

represent a growing acceptance of cultural diversity in Dade County, and an attempt to portray Miami as a 'city of the future' (Lawrence 1991, 2C). Whether this is genuine, or an attempt on behalf of the Anglo-elite to maintain its position of dominance by co-opting potential opposition, remains to be seen.⁷

Blacks in Miami continue to voice complaints about the Hispanic presence, as well as other aspects of social, political and economic life in Miami. The outlook of many Blacks in Miami is, however, a positive one--both in terms of the Hispanic presence and the future of the city. One African-American business official spoke of future relations between Blacks and Hispanics in Dade County: "There are lots of prospects for Blacks and Hispanics. We get along better than with Whites. We share more cultural traits" (Interview, July 8, 1992).

Speaking about Miami's future, another Black businessman and former county employee explained: "Blacks are patient, observant. We've waited many years and watched--it's about to pay off. It's fine with us if all Anglos go to Boca, we have a great opportunity here in Miami" (Interview, July 7, 1992).

Finally, any alteration in the public discourse on immigration in Miami must be viewed in light of a very powerful and persuasive counter-discourse on the part of Hispanics in Miami, and particularly the Cuban-American community. Chapter Four details the social and political construction of a discourse that portrays Cuban immigrants as asset to Miami and to the U.S. as a whole. Taken together, chapters three and four indicate that constructed definitions of perceived reality in Miami both reflect and legitimize the prevailing balance of power among various groups. The definitions are not only socially constructed, but politically contested as well; and as the balance of social and political forces in a community shift, so too do the public discourses through which that balance is sustained.

Notes

1. My conceptualization of this issue in no way discounts the importance of quantitative analyses of the labor force. Further empirical work in this regard is a priority. But the point is that the alternative I propose here addresses a critically important aspect of the problem, and one that has not been fully explored.
2. For thorough analyses of the events and circumstances surrounding the Mariel exodus, see: Robert Bach (1985), "Socialist Construction and Cuban Emigration: Explanations Into Mariel;" and Juan Clark, J. Lasaga and R. Reque (1981), "The 1980 Mariel Exodus: An Assessment and Prospects."
3. The group, *Citizens of Dade United*, claims over 10,000 members nationwide -- most, but not all of whom are Non-Latin White -- and continues to be very politically active in the Dade County area. See Appendix 5 for a copy of the group's goals and membership application.
4. On May 1, 1980, during a May Day celebration speech in Havana, Fidel Castro issued the following statement: "Those that are leaving from Mariel are the scum of the country. Anti-socials, homosexuals, drug addicts, and gamblers who are welcome to leave Cba if any country would have them."
5. An extensive literature exists on the topic of at-large versus single member districts. See, especially, Susan Welch and Timothy Bledsoe (1988), *Urban Reform and its Consequences*. Also see Chandler Davidson and G. Korbel (1981), "At Large Elections and Minority Group Representation;" and Lorn Foster (1983), "The Voting Rights Act: Black Voting and the New Southern Politics."
6. Max Castro (1991, 99) uses the term "enlightened assimilation" to refer to an evolving accommodation on the part of the Anglo elite to the new cultural and linguistic reality in Miami.
7. On numerous occasions, interview respondents -- Blacks and Hispanics -- suggested that what may appear to be an embrace of cultural diversity by Anglos is more likely driven by a purely political or economic rationale.

CHAPTER 4
THE SUCCESS OF THE CUBAN SUCCESS STORY:
THE POLITICS OF ETHNIC IDENTITY IN MIAMI

Only twenty-odd years ago, most of you in the audience who are Cubans were struggling with the difficult and urgent problems that daily confront those who escape tyrants and pursue freedom, who are compelled to settle in a foreign land. The Cubans who came here solved those pressing problems of survival, and more, instead of remaining a burden on the communities in which they settled, Cuban refugees who have come to the United States have made major, indeed extraordinary contributions to the vitality and the growth, not only of Miami, not only of Florida, but of the United States, and indeed of the Americas. Cubans, as everyone knows, are a great American success story.

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
October 22, 1982 ¹

United Nations Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick's (1982, 4) speech before the Cuban American National Foundation in Miami is just one example of countless public pronouncements, articles, editorials and books throughout the last thirty years that have bestowed praise on Cuban immigrants in the United States. Federal government officials have complemented the Cuban emigres on their loyalty to the cherished principles of freedom and democracy. Business people in Dade County have applauded the entrepreneurial spirit and drive of the Cuban community in Miami. And Cuban Americans themselves continue to speak proudly of the many obstacles they have overcome in the process of adapting to a new and occasionally hostile environment.

Academicians and scholars from diverse backgrounds have been equally fascinated by the unusual achievements of these relatively recent arrivals. Analyses of Cuban immigrants have given rise to a number of theories and concepts that attempt to explain this community's political, economic and social adaptation in the US. Alejandro Portes and others have focused considerable attention on the role of the Cuban enclave as an explanation for the economic success of Cubans in Miami (Portes and Jensen 1989; Portes and Manning 1986; Wilson and Portes 1980). Percz (1986) has examined the role of Cuban family structure and economic cooperation within the household. Arguelles (1982), and Pedraza-Bailey (1985) addressed the involvement of the federal government in assisting and resettling the refugees. Numerous works also consider the Cuban contribution to economic growth and development in Miami (Jorge and Moncarz 1987); and many others compare the achievements of Cubans in the US with similar success or lack of success among other ethnic groups (Pedraza-Bailey 1985; Portes and Bach 1985; Wilson and Martin 1982).

One outcome of the public discourse on Cuban immigration to the US is an image of Cuban Americans as an economically powerful, politically united and socially homogeneous ethnic group. This image is not well-grounded in empirical fact. Many of the works mentioned above have generated interesting debates about particular aspects of the Cuban experience in the US, and some have challenged widely held perceptions of Cuban success, but few studies have explored the configuration of social, cultural, political and economic forces that constructed an image of Cubans in Miami as an extraordinarily successful ethnic group.

Without empirically validating or invalidating the purported achievements by Cubans in the US, this chapter will examine the factors that

made the Cuban success "story" a success. The story is not without empirical referents. A multitude of claims about Cuban immigration coalesce around several broad themes. These themes, or narratives, provide content to the success story, but are also deeply intertwined with the exercise of power and politics. The Cubans emigres engage in a discourse focused on the threat of communism and the agony of exile that serves their social, political and economic interests as an immigrant group in Dade County. Government officials, the media, and business people in Miami also portray the Cuban influx in a positive light when it serves their own interests to do so. Not only do these local narratives complement one and other, but they also resonate well with the Cold War rhetoric of the US federal government, and with a variety of other themes deeply embedded in the American psyche.

The first section of this chapter documents the various claims that constitute the Cuban success story. Secondly, this chapter explores some of the myths that surround Cuban immigration to the US, and how this 'myth-making' relates to Cuban American ethnic identity. The final section discusses the political, economic and social implications of the Cuban success story.

The Success Story

The history of Cuban immigration to the US is frequently discussed in terms of distinct waves of refugee groups. Variation exists among authors as to the precise demarcation of the various stages, but there is some general agreement that the influx of Cubans into the US can be divided into five phases. During the initial wave, from January 1959 to October 1962, an estimated 215,000 Cubans arrived in the US. Batista and his supporters were the first to depart but were quickly followed by an increasing number of landowners, industrialists, managers and professionals. A second phase, from

November of 1962 to November of 1965, saw approximately 74,000 Cubans leave the island. The reduced number of refugees resulted from the cessation of all direct flights between the island and the US as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis. In 1965, however, Castro did permit 5000 relatives of Cuban exiles living in the US to leave through the port of Camarioca. Thirdly, from December 1965 to April 1973, more than 340,000 Cubans--close to one half the total influx--arrived in the US. This was the result of an agreement between Cuba and the US that launched twice daily airlifts of Cubans from Varadero Beach to Miami. From May 1973 to April 1980 the number of emigres dwindled to fewer than 3000 as a result of the unilateral decision by the Cuban government to terminate the airlift. Then, from May to September of 1980, an estimated 125,000 Cubans arrived in Miami from the port of Mariel (see Figure 4-1). This influx, which brought more refugees in one month than the total number that arrived during all of 1962, resulted from Castro's decision to allow the departure of thousands of Cubans who were crowded into the Peruvian embassy demanding to leave the country. Castro also used this opportunity to deport hundreds of other Cubans he deemed "undesirables" (Jorge and Moncarz 1987; Portes and Bach 1985; Fradd 1983).

Victims of Tyranny

An enormous amount of attention has been focused on the phenomenon of Cuban immigration over the past thirty years, but one prominent theme is that which portrays the emigres as victims of a tyrannical communist dictatorship. By the time the US broke diplomatic ties with Cuba in 1961, a large number of Cubans had already arrived in Miami. The plight of these emigres had not yet, however, received an enormous amount of national attention. As relations between the governments of the US and Cuba worsened,




FIGURE 4-1
FIVE WAVES OF CUBAN IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES

SOURCE: PORTES, ALEJANDRO AND ROBERT BACH. *LATIN JOURNEY*, 1985, P.85.

the focus on the Cuban refugees also grew more intense. In January of 1961, Tracy Voorhees, President Eisenhower's personal representative on the exile issue, pointed out that the breaking of US diplomatic relations with Cuba could help solve Miami's refugee problem: "This should set off a wave of sympathy all over the US for the refugees. Up to now, the people outside Miami have never heard of them" ("Rift With Cuba" 1961, 1B).

The US government played an active role in promoting a sympathetic response to the Cuban refugee situation in Miami. In January of 1961, South Florida Congressman Dante Fascell wrote a letter to Secretary of State Christian Herter recommending that the incoming Kennedy Administration employ Cuban refugees to administer the country's Foreign Aid Program in Latin America. Fascell emphasized that the employment of Cubans to represent the US in Latin America "would have a tremendous psychological impact throughout the hemisphere" ("Let Exiles Handle" 1961, 1A).

One federal agency was specifically responsible for overseeing the arrival, processing and resettlement of the Cuban refugees. Established by the Kennedy Administration in 1961, under the auspices of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Cuban Refugee Program administered one of the most ambitious and generous refugee assistance packages in US history. Upon arrival, the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center in Miami provided the exiles with food, clothing, medical care, social services, and assistance with housing, relocation, education, and job placement. In addition to a monthly stipend, special federal loans were made available for Cubans wishing to attend universities or start new businesses (Mohl 1990, 49). The Cuban Refugee Center not only handed out checks, but also printed and widely disseminated information to the American public about the tragic plight of the Cuban refugees (see Appendix F). Still in existence, the Cuban Refugee Program has

become the longest running refugee program in the US, with the estimated total cost exceeding \$2 billion (Arguelles 1982, 30; Pedraza-Bailey 1985).

In public speaking engagements such as the annual Mayors Conference in Miami, Secretary of HEW, Abraham Ribicoff encouraged every citizen "to help your country and to aid the cause of freedom everywhere by supporting the refugees" (*Saturday Evening Post* 1962). Numerous media reports during this time also encouraged a sympathetic response to the Cuban plight. An editorial entitled "Our Refugees From Castroland" which appeared in the June 16, 1962 edition of the *Saturday Evening Post*, was typical of much of the media coverage of US-Cuba relations during the 1960s. After discussing how "Communism's inhumanity to man" was causing an estimated 1,800 refugees to flee Cuba weekly, the editorial stated that (1962, 14):

In a very real sense this is a national rather than a local problem. It is the first time that refugees from Communism have escaped directly into the United States. We bear a special responsibility to help the Cuban people.

Questions and concerns surfaced frequently with regard to the huge sums of money being spent on federal assistance to the refugees, but officials were quick to defend the moral principles upon which the program was established. In 1964, J. Arthur Lazell, Director of the Cuban Emergency Relief Center, explained ("Refugee Program" 1964, 6A):

This is one of the largest and most generous refugee programs any nation has ever organized. There are several reasons for this. One is the fact that the Communists for the first time have established themselves close to our shores and we have been touched by the plight of its victims. We have felt a need to demonstrate the freedom that we profess and opened our hearts to these dispossessed.

In addition to the federally sponsored programs, a variety of private organizations, and particularly the Catholic church, worked diligently to assist the Cuban refugees. In doing so, they emphasized the Cuban plight and the

moral responsibility of all US citizens to respond charitably. In October of 1965, just prior to the start of the twice-daily "freedom flights", Monsignor John J. Fitzpatrick pronounced the church ready to receive the expected influx of refugees:

Our own Centro Hispano Catolico, established almost six years ago by Bishop Carroll to help our Spanish-speaking neighbors, and our parishes will cooperate with other Catholic agencies to provide whatever immediate relief the government cannot ("Bishop Asks Miamians" 1965, 6B).

Bishop Coleman Carroll himself emphasized that: "I am confident that our Catholic people in this area will cooperate in this project with the wholehearted spirit of fraternal charity which has characterized their attitude since our shores became a haven for refugees ("Bishop Asks Miamians" 1965, 6B). And days later, Monsignor Bryan Walsh also stated: "We don't have to be afraid. It's the duty of the people to receive their neighbors who suffered persecution with Christian charity" ("Ignore Anti-Exile" 1965, 1A).

A large number of the claims being put forth about communist tyranny in Cuba were issued by Cubans who had themselves recently fled the island. From most indications, the majority of Cubans in Miami did not consider themselves immigrants who came in search of a higher standard of living, but as exiles who sought only temporary refuge in the US until returning to their homeland.

Various Hispanic periodicals and particularly Spanish-language radio stations in Miami strongly reflected and reinforced the dream of one day returning to the island. They engaged in constant denunciations of Castro, dogmatically preached the evils of communism, and editorialized longingly about Cuba before Castro. In addition to holding mock elections for the next president of Cuba, sponsoring contests to guess when Fidel would fall, and

proudly displaying bumper stickers which proclaimed "El Primero En Regresar" (The First To Return), many Cuban refugees devoted their lives to preparing for, and in many cases actually attempting to overthrow the Castro regime.

The numerous paramilitary organizations that grew up amidst these efforts have operated in South Florida over the last thirty years, and some have done so with generous support from the US government. A link between the Cuban exiles and the CIA was established early on in preparation for the Bay of Pigs invasion, but continued well beyond the failed military maneuver. The CIA and the exiles shared a commitment to overthrow Castro and it was through the activities of both groups that "la causa" (the cause), or "la lucha" (the fight) came to symbolize the struggle against tyranny in Cuba, and to serve as a rallying cry around which to mobilize large numbers of Cubans in the US (Arguelles 1982; Forment 1989).

Issues relating to Castro, communism, and 'the cause,' continued to incite fervor among a substantial proportion of the Cuban American community for many years; and resulted in numerous incidents of vocal political protest by even the most mainstream of the refugee population. During the 1960s the Cuban exiles staged various marches to protest the treatment of anti-Castro leaders accused of terrorist activity. In May 1967, hundreds of Cubans marched on the Dade County jail to demand the release of Felipe Rivero--a Cuban exile charged with conspiring to bomb the Canadian pavilion at Montreal's Expo '67. They held hunger strikes, and, in what became a fairly common form of protest, doused the symbolic John F. Kennedy Torch of Friendship in downtown Miami. Left at the site was a poster which read: "This torch cannot represent freedom while freedom fighters are in prison" (Martinez 1967, 1B).

In 1971, Cubans in Miami organized a huge demonstration to protest Nixon's decision to begin negotiations with China. Large placards read: "Nixon: Cuba Is Not Negotiable" and "No Coexistence ... We Want Liberty" (Stevenson 1975, 48-49). This type of protest continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and whether the controversy was a visit by Jane Fonda, a march on Contra aide, or the war in Angola, Cubans in Miami came out in force to remind Miami, the US and the world of the evils of communism, and the threat of tyranny (Didion 1987; Warren et al. 1986).

Although the 1990s saw the discourse on communist tyranny subside somewhat at the national level, many Cuban exiles remained fervently committed to "la lucha". In 1992, the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) waged a nasty battle against the *Miami Herald*. The Foundation accused the paper of being a tool of the Castro government, and of conducting "a systematic campaign against Cuban Americans, their institutions, values, ethics and ideals" (Lawrence 1992, 3C). The head of the CANF, Jorge Mas Canosa, stated on Spanish-language radio that:

The Miami Herald is the most powerful institution in the state of Florida. And these are unscrupulous people, people who chop off heads, destroy people, families, put people in jail ... create an atmosphere to harm certain people" (Lawrence 1992b, 3C).

While the CANF attacked the *Miami Herald*, other exile organizations continued to attack Cuba. In October of 1992, four men belonging to a Miami-based paramilitary organization, "Commandos L," attacked a tourist beach resort hotel on Cuba's northern shore. There were no casualties, but "Comandos L" leader Tony Cuesta vowed: "These activities will continue until Cuba is liberated" (Chardy 1992, 1A). Another recently formed paramilitary group from Miami had its fishing boat, loaded with weapons and 1,000 rounds of ammunition, seized off the coast of Cuba in February 1993. The group's

leader, Gonzalez Rosquete held a news conference at which he announced: "The Partido Unidad Nacional Democratica and Armas del Pueblo formally declare war on Castro-Communism" (Chardy and Reyes 1993, 2B).

This struggle against Castro's Cuba continued in the Everglades and the Florida Straits, but it was also increasingly waged within the context of the American political system--locally as well as nationally. In July 1992, Cuban American County Commissioner Alex Penelas introduced a resolution that would prohibit Dade County from awarding a contract to any US corporation whose foreign subsidiaries trade with the island nation. Penelas explained: "This will add to the pressure on the communist regime of Fidel Castro . . . if everyone does their part, we will be assisting the downfall of that regime" (Filkins 1992b, 1B). Speaking in support of the Penelas resolution, Fernando Rojas of the CANF stated

There is no reason why Dade County's taxpayers, many of whom are victims of Castro's tyranny, should benefit companies that insist on trading with Castro and providing him the resources to violate the human rights of the Cuban people (Filkins 1992b, 1B).

The Penelas bill was inspired by a federal legislative effort to tighten the embargo against Cuba introduced by US Representative Robert Torricelli. The debate and discussion surrounding the Torricelli bill, or "Cuban Democracy Act," again demonstrated that the discourse on tyranny was still alive and well in the 1990s. Supporters of the bill, both Republicans and Democrats, presidential hopefuls and Congress people, spoke about the need to increase pressure on Castro's dictatorship in order that the Cuban people could benefit from the world culture of democracy that was sweeping the globe (Marquis and Anderson 1992, 1A).

Jose Cardenas, editor of *Cuba Survey*, praised the passage of the Cuban Democracy Act (1992, 5M):

Such a move places the United States on the right side of history, and should demonstrate to the rest of the world - and most definitely the Cuban people - that the United States will not sacrifice its principles and its commitment to a free and democratic Cuba for the sake of whatever short-term economic gains can be wrung out of the dispirited island of Cuba.

For months, the CANF lobbied diligently for passage of the Torricelli bill and the substantial media coverage that surrounded the legislative debate served to highlight CANF leader Jorge Mas Canosa's continued commitment to "la causa". In a letter to the *Miami Herald*, Alfonso Guerra praised the Foundation and its leader (Guerra 1992, 16A):

The reality is that the CANF and Mr. Mas have done more for the cause of Cubans and a free Cuba than any other individual, group, or government has done in more than 30 years. Their vision, commitment, and accomplishments attracted an overwhelming number of Cubans, young and old, to support "the cause." We are the ones who are committed to helping rebuild our once great nation and making it a democratic and economically sound tropical powerhouse.

During 1992, a series of newspaper articles, editorials and television documentaries revealed the extent to which many Cuban Americans remained focused on the ideal of a "free and democratic Cuba," and the political and economic clout they were able to mobilize in pursuit of that goal. In planning Cuba's future, the CANF has drafted a constitution, legal codes, and property rules; compiled a register of Cuban government property; and conducted an economic analysis of the island sector by sector. Once Fidel falls, plans have been made for a CANF chartered boat full of investors, stockbrokers and bankers to sail to into Cuba on what Mas Canosa calls "a ship of hope." An estimated 1,5000 Cuban Americans have also been trained as an independent Peace Corps, and video tapes of Mas Canosa explaining "in detail to the Cuban people what the future can hold for them" are smuggled daily into the island (Slevin 1992, 10A).

In all of these endeavors, Mas Canosa explains that "We are committed to finding pathways to the liberty of Cuba, to bring Cuba out of the mire." He describes Cuban exiles as "simple people who are searching for freedom and happiness for our fatherland;" and emphasizes the shared ideals among Cubans--"a united people divided by one man, Fidel Castro. The future reunification of Cuba will take place, in Mas Canosa's words, "in an environment of harmony, understanding, love and brotherhood among all Cubans" (Slevin 1992, 1A).

"Send Us A 1,000 More"

Public discourse about Cuban immigration to the US has not only emphasized the tyranny from which these refugees fled, but also the benefit they have provided the US upon their arrival. Business people, government officials, and the media have all bestowed praise upon the Cubans, recognizing their entrepreneurial spirit, loyalty to family and community, and commitment to hard work, education and self-advancement. As early as 1962, *Business Week* published an article entitled "To Miami, Refugees Spell Prosperity." The article referred to the Cuban refugees as a "disguised blessing" and stated: "The fact is that the 150,000 Cubans who have fled the Castro regime in the past 34 months - most of them with only the clothes on their backs - have turned upside down the economic and social life of Miami" (*Business Week* 1962, 94).

Business and civic leaders in Miami agreed that the refugees had greatly stimulated commerce in Miami, and speculated about the negative impact their return might have on the local economy. Miami Mayor Robert High concurred that the refugees were "a definite asset to our community. They've saved downtown Miami" (*Business Week* 1962, 94). In October of 1962,

top local business and civic leaders met, "with 100% support of the federal government," to form 'The Industry to Industry Committee'. This committee urged business leaders to assist in locating jobs for qualified refugees by contacting their industry counterparts nationwide ("Nationwide Jobs" 1962, 2A).

Over the years, when fears were expressed about the impact of the refugee influx on Miami's economy, some local officials, such as Monsignor Bryan Walsh, were quick to point out that: "We know from previous experience that [their coming] has had a good effect on the area." Expressing concern about 'anti-exile' sentiment in Miami, Walsh emphasized that: "During the earlier influx of refugees, it was well known to the Chambers of Commerce and city and county officials that the economy of the area has been helped, more apartments rented, jobs created and new businesses set up by the refugees" ("Ignore Anti-Exile" 1965, 1A).

Two local bank presidents in Miami issued similar remarks. William Pallot, president of Miami's Inter National Bank, stated: "Frankly, I've not understood the complaints. If the refugees weren't here, there'd be an overabundance of vacant stores and apartments. Miami would be suffering economically if not for them." The president of Riverside Bank in Miami concurred: "I have the greatest respect for them and I think they've enriched our community beyond measure" (Birger 1965, 18A). Howard Palmatier, Director of the Cuban Refugee Program, exclaimed: "It seems to me remarkable that when you consider that these refugees arrived here with nothing but their skills and abilities, that 83% are fully self-supporting and only 17% require federal assistance" (*Business Week* 1971, 88).

In 1967, the University of Miami's Research Institute for Cuba and the Caribbean published the results of a major study on: "The Cuban Immigration

1959 - 1966 and Its Impact on Miami-Dade County, Florida." The report emphasized that any problems associated with this unprecedented migration "have proved largely transitory" and "have been far outweighed by benefits" (p. xii). The report urged recognition of the exiles as "opportunities" rather than "problems" and essentially confirmed that:

Downtown Miami was saved by the Cuban exodus as well as other sections of the city, which were on the way to becoming blighted areas. Cubans created new businesses and employment. The displacement of Negroes by Cubans and an assumption that Cubans depressed wages ... were not born out by facts (*New York Times* October 2, 1967).

Praises of this sort were common in the national as well as local media. In October of 1966, *FORTUNE* published a story on: "Those Amazing Cuban Emigres - Send Us A 1,000 More." In 1971, *Business Week* reported:

In the 10 years since Cubans began fleeing to the U.S. from Castro, they have made faster progress in their adopted country than has any other group of immigrants in this century. Almost overnight they have emerged from the deprived, refugee state and moved into the middle class, skipping lightly over - or never even touching - the lowest rung of the economic ladder.

During the same year, *Life Magazine* wrote (1971, 37):

It was just ten years ago that the prosperous Cubans ... began flooding to Miami, refugees from Castro's communism. Most arrived penniless, and took any jobs available ... Today many of these same men are bankers, businessmen, manufacturers. At a rate unprecedented among America's major immigrant groups, the 350,000 Cubans in the Miami area have transformed themselves into a thriving, prosperous community.

Similar headlines surfaced throughout the 1970s. In March of 1972, the *Nation's Business* wrote about "Success With a Spanish Accent;" and in July of 1973 *National Geographic* reported that "Cuba's Exile's Bring New Life to Miami." The refugees were not only praised for stimulating the local economy, but also for the ease and willingness with which they adapted to their new

environment. In 1965, the *Miami News* published a report on the rapid and successful *Americanization* of the Cuban exiles. After quoting one exile who claimed: "I can no longer stand the taste of cafe con leche [coffee with milk]," the article went on to explain:

Radios that once blasted into the night are muted, and television is replacing noisy games of dominoes. Lawn, allowed to grow ankle-deep in weeds, "because manana we return," are now proudly kept neatly trimmed ("Exiles Saying Goodbye" 1965, 1A).

A similar report in 1971 explained:

Fortunately, the majority of the half-million Cubans who have fled Fidel Castro's dictatorship have found a new life and love in a foreign land. It is only natural that exiles miss their island, but surprisingly, they have adapted themselves very well to the new environment (Stevenson 1975, 85).

As if to offer evidence of this adaptation, a 1983 study by the Strategic Research Corporation reported that, not only did two-thirds of all Latins in the Miami area use credit cards by 1978, but the average Miami Cuban was also dining out in American style fast-food restaurants 105 times a year. Kentucky Fried Chicken was a particular favorite (Allman 1987, 335).

Although less prevalent in 1980s, the accolades continued. In a 1985 article, author George Gilder recounted the origins of the Cuban success story (Gilder 1985, 70):

They were then unemployed, unpromising, and unsettled, living in accommodations comprehensively in violation of codes, but they were already at work, seething with the spirit of enterprise, figuring out how to transfigure Southwest Eighth Street into Calle Ocho, the main drag of a new Little Havana.

In his 1984 book, *The Spirit of Enterprise*, Gilder devotes an entire chapter to the Cuban success story; and in his 1992 sequel, *Recapturing the Spirit of Enterprise*, Cubans also figure prominently.

From Rags To Riches But Never Racist

As the 1980s arrived, Miami's public image took a turn for the worse. The attention of the media, government officials, civic and business elite was focused not on "those amazing Cuban emigres," but on the high crime rate, drug-trafficking, and civil disturbances that were fast earning Miami its reputation as a "Paradise Lost". The Cuban immigrants, however, continued to portray the US as a land of opportunity; and fortified their emphasis on the Cuban American contribution to Miami.

A 'rags to riches' discourse among Cubans in Miami, one that drew on tales of hardship and personal sacrifice, became particularly prominent in the 1980s; but evidence of individuals emphasizing the Cuban contribution to Miami can be traced to the late 1960s. After a 1969 editorial strongly criticized the Cuban airlift, Carlos Arboleya, a very prominent figure in the exile community, wrote the following in a letter to the *Miami Herald* (Arboleya 1969, 6A):

You talk about the \$69,700,000 federal aid grant towards the Cuban Refugee program; may I mention that the refugees have, as of 1968, paid four times that amount in taxes? Today, when unemployment in our area is at its lowest point, we have to admit that those who do not work perhaps do not want to work and those who are out of work today will probably be unemployed 10 years from now, so the Cuban Influx has not taken jobs from anyone but if anything, it has created jobs for Cubans as well as for Americans.

By 1980, Cuban Americans began to organize themselves in an effort to actively promote a favorable image of the Cuban contribution to Miami, and the US. At a 1984 conference of the Cuban American Planning Council, Luis Botifoll, a prominent Cuban American civic and business leader, and president of Republic National Bank, delivered what has since become a widely

publicized speech on "How Miami's New Image Was Created" (Botifoll 1988, 1).

He opened as follows:

The growth achieved by Miami constitutes a factor which has no precedent in the history of this nation. That growth occurred within what has been called "The Great Cuban Miracle." Because of this, I believe that those who left the island in 1959 and those who only recently arrived with the same faith and hope must feel proud not only of what they have achieved for themselves, but also of what they have accomplished for the entire community.

In depth interviews with Cuban American leaders in Miami showed that most were quick to recount the stories of struggle and success that they and their families had in the US. One Cuban American community leader began the interview by emphasizing the distinct characteristics of Cuban immigration to the US: "You must remember that Cubans are political refugees, not economic. The United States is accustomed to assimilation--to the melting pot. Cubans have a lot of pride, and we have refused to let go of our culture" (Interview, May 20, 1992).

Many Cuban American respondents talked at length about the experience of arriving in the US as small children and struggling to make a new life in a strange land. This type of discussion frequently occurred in response to the question: "Have immigrants taken jobs from Blacks in Miami's labor market?" Of the Cuban Americans interviewed, most strongly disagreed that this sort of displacement had occurred. A typical response was that of a director of the Dade County Office of Latin Affairs who explained (Interview September 24, 1992)

There is an impression that we came to take jobs, to impose our culture, but that's not true. We took parking jobs--my first job was in a sewing factory. Those jobs were there, and if people that had the language didn't take them, how can you say we took their jobs?

Other respondents felt that immigrants may have affected the economic advancement of the Black community in Miami. But most were quick to add that if this was the case, it was the result of a willingness on the part of the Cuban refugees to work extremely hard at whatever jobs were available, and the absence of a similar motivation on the part of Blacks. One Cuban American County official remarked: "When I came to the United States, going on welfare was unheard of. I scrubbed floors ... Some Blacks may have been cut off, lost some opportunities to incoming Cubans, but today they are still the poorest and immigration can't account for all of this" (Interview, June 16, 1992).

An unsolicited, but related theme that surfaced frequently in these interviews was that of racial prejudice. Many respondents were quick to make a distinction between the extreme color consciousness of US society, and the color blind context of social relations in Cuba. Osvaldo Soto, prominent Cuban American businessman and chairman of the Spanish American League Against Discrimination, explained:

I came here for the first time for a visit in 1941, I was ten. I was shocked to see signs in hotels that said "No Dogs or Jews" or "No Dogs and Blacks." I sat in the back of a bus and a lady told me not to sit there it was for niggers. The problems at that time were not only with Blacks, but Jews also. There was much discrimination. We cannot really be the reason. Slavery was here long before we came in the '60s, discrimination had been going on against Blacks for a long time (Interview, July 20, 1992).

A top Cuban American official with the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce volunteered the following: "Remember, in Cuba we did not make our Blacks ride at the back of the bus" (Interview, March 11, 1992). And a former Cuban American County Manager explained: "Cubans are not racist. I'm color blind, and did not become aware of these issues until I came here" (Interview, June 8, 1992).

This discourse on the absence of racial prejudice among Cubans surfaced in other contexts as well. In 1984, *Diario Las Americas*, a widely read Latin newspaper in Miami, published an editorial entitled "Cubanos and Americanos Negros" (Perna 1984, 5A). The author explained that:

When we say Cubans we are including everyone, regardless of color, because that is how it was in Cuba, how it is between us in exile, and how it will always be ... Cubans do not have prejudices, nor do we consider differences, let alone practice discrimination toward Black Americans.

Five years later, during the controversy surrounding the Lozano trial, *Diario Las Americas* published a similar editorial by Raquel Regalado, programming director for a Cuban radio station in Miami--'Radio Mambi'. After arguing that Officer Lozano was a victim of racial tension in Miami, Regalado explains (1990, 1B):

In our countries we do not have the racial problems that confront us now, we do not have experience with this type of situation ... the authorities have always wanted to place Hispanics against Blacks in place of improving racial tension. To me it is not important if my neighbor is black or yellow, but that he be a decent person.

The Cuban success story has experienced some competition from alternative discourses that often conflict with the image of the immigrants as an unqualified blessing for Miami and the US. Yet, Cuban Americans themselves, as well as others continue to express pride in their accomplishments and praise for a political system which affords great opportunity to those willing to strive for the American dream. Armando Codina, the first Cuban American to be chosen chairman of the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce, recently remarked: "America is a land of opportunity. Many native-born Americans take their freedom for granted and find so much fault with the system here that they lose sight of the tremendous advantages. To those of us who came from Cuba, this was - and is - the promised land"

(Russel 1992, 3C). Mr. Codina is also well known for making frequent public references to a luxury boat he proudly christened "What A Country" (Interview, July 7, 1992).

Myth-Making

As T.D. Allman aptly points out: "The Cuban exodus was from the beginning encrusted in legend, romance and myth" (1987, 301). Since the 1959 Cuban Revolution, a number of perceptions, portrayals, images and myths have come to characterize any discussion of Cuban immigration to the US. Myths have emerged with regard to who left, why they left, how they left, and the events and circumstances that shaped their lives upon arrival in the US. Even the island itself has taken on a mythical quality as Cuban Americans in Miami reconstruct the history of a Cuba that fewer and fewer can actually remember, and increasing numbers have never known.

Fantasy Island

The discussion of Cuban immigration in terms of distinct waves indicates that the refugees arriving in the US over the past thirty years are not a homogeneous group. There is a tendency among analysts, casual observers and Cuban immigrants themselves to view the Mariel boatlift as a point of drastic alteration in the composition of the Cuban population in the US. In reality, social, political economic, religious and racial diversity among the emigres existed from the beginning.

Boswell and Curtis (1984, 46) point out that Cubans "emigrated to the US from virtually all regions of the island, stretching from the province of Pinar del Rio in the west to Oriente province in the east; they came from the rural areas, the cities, and the suburbs." The Cuban exodus was not limited to the

rich and educated, but encompassed "the full spectrum of socioeconomic classes and ethnic groups that existed in Cuba prior to the Castro revolution." Even among the earliest arrivals, the 'elite' were outnumbered by laborers, clerks, farmers, fishermen. Doctors, for example, constituted only one percent of arrivals during the initial stages of the influx, and the airlift which began in 1965 further reduced the proportion of immigrants who were classified as managers or professionals (Allman 1987, 306).

The distinct waves of emigration attest to the socio-economic heterogeneity of the Cuban population, but also closely relate to changing phases of the Cuban revolution. The result is that over the past thirty years Cubans leaving the island have come from diverse political backgrounds and ideological persuasions as well. Early emigres were staunch defenders of the Batista regime. They were later joined by former comrades of Fidel Castro. By 1980, Cubans in Cuba who had during the Bay of Pigs invasion defended the island against Cubans in Miami, also departed for South Florida's shores. Despite the fact that Cuban politics are widely perceived as conservative within the US, there is reason to doubt that this was simply a carry-over from the island. As Angeles Torres (1988, 392) points out, "even the 1960s generation of exiles was not uniformly conservative. They ranged from batistianos to disenchanted socialists." Jorge and Moncarz (1987, 30) similarly remark that:

Prior to the Castro regime coming to power in Cuba, conservatism was by no means the hallmark of Cuban domestic politics. In fact, the platform of all Cuban political parties had been markedly progressive following the Revolution of 1933.

Despite the predominant portrayal of Cubans as political refugees fleeing persecution by a Communist regime, the changing content, circumstances and context of Cuban emigration since 1959 suggest that the

reasons for leaving were also varied. During the period from 1965 to 1973, for example, Amaro and Portes (1972, 13) explain that: "Increasingly, the emigration ceases to be a political act and becomes an economic act." Later arrivals are said to more closely resemble "classical immigrants" who were "pulled" by economic opportunity in the US, rather than "pushed" by the Cuban revolution (Amaro and Portes 1972). Boswell and Curtis (1984, 38) also suggest that: "It would be incorrect to assume that all Cubans have come to America strictly to escape ... Castro." They identify "powerful migrational 'pull' forces," such as "the lure of economic opportunity" and "the quest for family reunification" which led many Cubans to leave. And author T.D. Allman (1987, 306) points out that:

Like all American immigrants, the Cubans came here for a mixture of reasons: freedom, there is no doubt about it, is a powerful magnet; but equally irresistible - to downtrodden people all over the world - is the glittering allure of America's wealth.

Not only do Cuban emigres represent different economic backgrounds, different political persuasions, and different reasons for departing, but they also comprised different ethnic and religious backgrounds as well. An estimated 10,000 Jews left Cuba between 1959 and 1970, the majority of whom settled in the US (Stevenson 1975, 76). In addition to this population, commonly known as "Jewbans" in Miami, there are also an estimated 5,000 Chinese Cubans living in Dade County ("Chinese Cubans" 1982, 3C).

One seldom mentioned and perhaps least understood element of diversity among Cubans, and Latin Americans in general, is that of race. Despite claims of color-blindness by Cubans in the US, as well as by the Castro regime, Cuba was and continues to be a society in which race matters. Since Castro took control of the island it has been difficult to gather reliable demographic, political or economic data on Cuba. And many scholars agree that the data

which are available from pre-Castro Cuba vastly underestimate the physical and cultural presence of the "Negro" (Fagen 1969, 21).²

Most analyses of pre-Castro Cuba focus on class as the most salient form of social stratification on the island. Evidence suggests, however, that these class divisions corresponded closely to color--with darker-skinned Cubans disproportionately represented at the lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder. Fagen (1969) contends that, compared to other developing societies during the 1950s, Cuba was relatively free of sociocultural cleavages. But he goes on to acknowledge that: "There was, however, widespread social and economic discrimination based on custom and personal prejudice, and the man of dark skin was in general greatly disadvantaged in pre-revolutionary Cuba (1969, 21).

A seminal work by Maurice Zeitlin (1967) also provides insight into social relations on the island. Zeitlin quotes from a 1962 interview with a Cuban campesino (Zeitlin 1967, 76):

Look, chico, this is many times better than we had before the revolution when our women slept on the floor in the midst of roaches and rats ... Negroes had to go to a different beach, they couldn't even buy refreshments in some places in the same store with white American tourists, who came here only to take pictures of pleasure and not of the misery we were living in. We have no running water yet, or gas, or electricity that we can count on; we still carry our water home in pails, but at least now we are alive.

Despite evidence of discontent among Blacks in Cuba prior to the revolution, and Castro's claims to have eradicated all social distinctions based on race, class and gender, Black Cubans have clearly been represented among those leaving the island during the past thirty years. This was particularly apparent during the Mariel boatlift when an estimated 40 percent of the arrivals were classified as 'Black'. But the exodus of Black Cubans from the island dates back to the early 1960s. In June of 1963, the International

Fraternal Union announced its formation as an association of Cuban Negroes in exile, with the stated goals of war against Castro and equal rights ("Negro Exiles" 1963). In January of 1966, when asked about the estimated number of Blacks among Cubans arriving on the airlift, the director of Catholic Welfare Services, the largest private resettlement agency in Miami, answered: "The first two weeks of the airlift hardly any arrived. But in the last ten days or two weeks, there have been more coming out than we have seen over the past three years"(Bohning 1966, 4B).

The larger presence of Blacks in the most recent waves of Cuban immigration is interpreted by some as an indication of persistent racial prejudice in Cuba (Casal 1980, 20). Others state simply that those leaving Cuba today are from the poorer classes, and that Blacks comprise a large proportion of the Cuban poor (Fox 1971, 21). And, some Cubans living in the US admit that the increased influx of Black Cubans has forcefully challenged their beliefs about the demographic composition of the island. One Cuban American businessman in Miami remarked: "We had invented a Cuba in which everyone white. When the *marielitos* came, we were forcibly reminded that Cuba is not a white island but largely a black one" (Rieff 1987, 66).

Another interesting myth has emerged from the discussion and debate that surrounds Cuban immigration to the US. This entails the portrayal of Cuban emigres as "fleeing" or "escaping" the island. This terminology which dominates much of the discourse on Cuban emigration, conjures up images of millions of refugees risking their lives daily in daring escapes and treacherous journeys toward freedom. Certainly there have been numerous such cases, but as Allman (1987, 302) points out: "In the whole 20 years between 1960 and 1980, only about 16,000 Cubans actually "fled" Cuba, in the

sense of eluding Castro's military patrols and escaping the island, at the risk of their own lives, in small boats or by "other extremely dangerous means."

The reports of refugees leaving Cuba on rickety rafts are very real and very tragic, but they overshadow the much larger numbers of Cubans who were airlifted by the US government, transported by relatives in chartered boats, or spotted by "Brothers to the Rescue"--a group of predominantly Cuban American volunteer pilots who conduct surveillance over the Florida Strait, alert the US Coast Guard of any sightings, and follow up on the safe transport and processing of any Cuban refugees rescued at sea (Weston 1992, 3B).

The Golden Exile

Various myths not only surround the exodus of Cubans from the island, but also their experiences in exile in the US. The notion of a Cuban "community" in Miami is widespread despite the fact that the same divisions that existed among Cubans on the island resurfaced in the US. These divisions did not, however, prevent the reconstruction of a mythical Cuba--a reconstruction in which large numbers of Cubans in the US have and continue to take part. As one Cuban professional living in New York explained: "In Miami, Cubans live, or try to live, in *la Cuba de ayer*--the Cuba of yesterday. It is a mythical country we have fabricated, where nostalgia and myths abound" (Rieff 1987b, 73).

Upon arrival in the US, the Cubans made a concerted effort to recreate their lives much as they had been lived in Cuba. Of the 126 townships that existed in pre-Castro Cuba, 114 are represented by *municipios* in Miami. These *municipios* perform a variety of social and political functions, and essentially constitute a form of municipal government in exile (Levine 1985, 56). A similar situation occurred with regard to social clubs or organizations that

existed in pre-Castro Cuba. In her discussion of the wide variation in social class origin among Cubans in the US, Silvia Pedraza-Bailey (1985, 18) states:

The former social distinctions were perpetrated and reenacted in exile, often with little bearing to their life in America. Those who had belonged to the five most exclusive yacht and country clubs in Havana founded another in Miami, in nostalgia dubbed "The Big Five". Cubans of working-class origin remain outsiders to these attempts to recreate once enviable social positions: a golden past that was not theirs, but which with increased distance in time, seems to grow only more golden.

Evidence of differences and disagreements among the exile population in Miami surfaced almost immediately. As early as December of 1960, the *Miami Herald* did a story on the wide political and economic gaps that divided the Cuban exiles:

The 30,000 or so Cuban refugees who have crowded into Miami over the past two years have only one thing in common; they can't, or don't want to go back to Cuba until Castro is kicked out ... There is no "Cuban refugee community" as such. There are hundreds of separate refugee units and their dislike for each other is exceeded only by their hatred of Castro ("Wide Political Gaps 1960, 1C).

These differences continued to be reflected over the years in conflicts between and among different exile organizations with regard to dealing with Castro in Cuba. In fact, the terrorist activity of some Cuban exile organizations did not remain focused on the island but was eventually perpetrated against Cubans living in the US as well. Any individual or organization that expressed an unpopular opinion toward Castro or Cubans could become the likely target of a violent attack by one of several militant exile groups. Although this type of activity was most prevalent during the 1970s, there is some indication that such extremism persists. As recently as 1988, the Cuban Art Museum in Miami was bombed for exhibiting works of painters who live in Cuba (Americas Watch 1992).

For the most part, controversy among Cuban exiles is now contained within the realm of public discourse and political activity is channelled through more conventional channels. In June of 1990, human rights advocate Gustavo Arcos Bergnes issued a call from Havana for all Cubans, Castro and the exiles included, to engage in dialogue. Similar calls had been issued in years past, but the very suggestion of dialogue was bitterly criticized by even the most mainstream of the exile community. In 1990, however, the Arcos proposal elicited a much broader response. Carlos Perez, Cuban American businessman in Miami and vice president of the Cuban Independence Party, stated: "Exiles must learn that the situation is changing. The strategies must change" ("Dissident's Call" 1990, 1A). He was only one of a range of influential exiles, with unquestionable anti-Castro credentials, who defended Arcos' proposal. But as the *Miami Herald* explained:

Those words have raised to the surface differences that have been bubbling for months - sometimes years - among the members of Miami's exile community. Between moderates and hardliners. Between early opponents of Castro's revolution and those who became disenchanted later on. Between those who believe Castro's rule can only be ended by force and those who believe in political pressure as the most viable route ("Dissident's Call" 1990, 1A).

Some of the fragmentation within the Cuban American community played itself out in the context of various debates that surrounded the passage of the Torricelli bill. Once the bill was signed into law, Jorge mas Canosa who had lobbied hard for its passage exclaimed: "I'm very, very happy. It's a historic day for Cuba. I think the countdown for the end of Castro's days in power has really begun" (Chardy and Corzo 1992, 21A).

Ramon Cernuda, a prominent civic figure in Miami, as well as spokesperson for several well-known Cuban human rights dissidents, had quite a different reaction: "We do not accept the Torricelli bill as a legitimate

law. It seeks to starve the people of Cuba in the name of human rights and democratic values" (Chardy and Corzo 1992, 21A).

Differing opinions and outlooks among Cuban Americans were also evident during the 1992 elections. The very popular Cuban American Congresswoman Ileana Ros Lehtinen was challenged by a Cuban American Democrat, Magda Montiel Davis, whose pro-dialogue and pro-choice platform, although unsuccessful, was viewed by many as a historic turning point in Cuban American politics (Defede 1992, 26).

In addition to Montiel's challenge, 1992 also brought the formation of a Cuban American 'defense league' to counter the weight of the CANF, and the establishment of new Cuban American Political Action Committee. The PAC, headed by legendary rebel and former political prisoner Gutierrez Menoyo, and supported by rebels who took part in the Moncada attack as well as veterans from the Sierra Maestra, was organized to support Presidential candidate Bill Clinton. Claiming to speak for a "silent current," a population "silenced by established interest groups," Menoyo explained: "This mainstream exists and awaits its moment. They are not millionaires. They are the poor and working middle classes" (Balmaseda 1992, 1B).

Popular Cuban American columnist Liz Balmaseda commented on the newly formed PAC's plans to rally for Clinton near Little Havana's Ronald Reagan Avenue:

That would be a fitting culmination to an election season that has seen its share of oddities. In a kind of demographic twilight zone, new voices and messages can be heard all over Cuban Miami ... I believe Cuban Miami will not be the same after this political season, and that's a good thing. There are new players, new movements, new revolutions and old rebels with new causes (Balmaseda 1992, 1B).

The image of Cubans in Miami as a united community is clearly fraught with inconsistencies. So, too, is the story of their economic success. In recent years, several analysts have challenged the accuracy of the Cuban success story, and called attention to the predominantly working class character of the Cuban community in the US. Using survey research, and data from the US Census, economist Raul Moncarz (1978) finds that 76 percent of Cubans living in Florida in 1972 had incomes below the US median family income. His research also indicates that between 1966 and 1974, Cubans in Miami, as a group, experienced no upward occupational mobility. Moncarz concludes that: "The evidence gathered in this study concerning education, geographic, and income mobility seems to indicate that mobility, if any, has been minimal" (1978, 171).

In a "reexamination" of the Cuban success story, Sociologist Lisandro Perez (1986) finds that while success among Cubans in the US is portrayed at the level of the individual, it is more accurately explained at the level of the family or the household. In other words, instead of emphasizing the entrepreneurial drive of individual Cuban immigrants, more attention must be paid to the impact of economic cooperation within families, and particularly to the very high rates of female labor force participation among Cubans in the US. Lourdes Casal (1979, 118) also criticized the Cuban success story, and argued that: "Other information, gleaned from the 1970 Census and the US Budget, documents the darker side of the story. For instance, one out of five metropolitan Cubans lives in an area designated as "low-income" by the Census Bureau."

Antonio Jorge has similarly cautioned that the much heralded establishment of small family-owned businesses that comprise the Cuban enclave economy have not brought unqualified success, and may have limited

long term gains by luring young family members away from the primary labor market and from school (Torres 1988, 393). In an article entitled "Working Against The Miami Myth", Maria de los Angeles Torress (1988) points out that the average family income of Cuban Americans is still well below the US average, and the high school drop out rate among Cuban American students has increased more rapidly than among any other Latino group. She remarks (1988, 393):

The facts show that while many Cubans did make it, many more did not--despite the unprecedented welfare benefits, English-language classes, university and business loans, and covert CIA money that flowed into South Florida.

With regard to those Cubans who have made impressive economic, social and political gains in the US--and there are many--it is interesting to note that emphasis on their individual character traits, and willingness to "pull themselves up by the bootstraps," completely overshadows the unprecedented assistance, financial and otherwise, that they received upon arrival in the US.

Affect or Invention?

Underlying and emerging from these myths are a variety of beliefs about the nature of ethnicity. The widely held assumption of ethnicity as a primordial attachment presupposes, for example, that members of a particular ethnic group exhibit similar attitudes and behavior, and that these attitudes and behaviors are motivated by deeply held cultural, psychological and affective elements of the groups' shared ethnic identity.³ The groups' ethnicity is defined in terms of these cultural, psychological and affective elements, which are believed to be rooted in a common past.

In the case of Cuban Americans in Miami, these assumptions underlie the tendency to characterize Cuban immigrants as a cohesive community, and

to attribute that cohesion to shared ancestry and cultural commonalities rooted in an ancient past. Evidence presented above indicates that both of these characterizations are inaccurate. Cubans in Miami do not comprise a cohesive community, and the lack of cohesion often stems from the fact that all Cubans do not share similar ancestries, experiences or pasts.

The Cuban American case illustrates the tautological fallacies that prevail in much of the discussion and debate about ethnicity and ethnic behavior. Members of an ethnic group, for example, purportedly share similarities because they are of the same ethnic identity. Assumptions such as this leave unanswered questions about what is ethnicity and what, if any, is its explanatory significance. Once it is realized that a shared identity is not inherent among Cubans in Miami, nor are existing similarities in attitude or behavior among Cubans necessarily rooted in a common past, it is necessary to then ask: what does constitute Cuban American ethnic identity, and from where does it come?

Implicit in this line of reasoning is an important qualifier that must be made explicit. There is no single, constant, and all-encompassing Cuban American ethnic identity. What does exist, however, are widely held images or perceptions of Cubans in the United States--images that exist in the minds of Cubans themselves, as well as throughout the larger society. It is these images that provide the content for ethnic identity--images that emerge from as well as reinforce public discourses on Cubans immigration to the US. A particularly prominent Cuban American identity--and the focus of this analysis--is one that defines the group as socially cohesive, politically united, and economically powerful. This cohesion is assumed to result from a common past, the political unity from similar ideology--namely conservative or anti-communist, and the economic achievement from a shared spirit of enterprise.

In other words, much of what purportedly defines the Cuban community in Miami as successful is believed to be a product of their ethnicity.

The Cuban enclave economy in Miami, for example, is believed to have arisen from and been sustained by ethnic solidarity among the Cuban exile community, as well as by certain traits such as hard work and integrity that are used to characterize Cuban Americans as an ethnic group. This explanation overlooks the ways in which the enclave, itself, influenced the ethnic identity of Cubans in Miami, and forged a sense of solidarity among Cuban exiles (Forment 1989). Similarly, to assume that Cubans vote, or engage in any other political activity as a bloc, because of their shared ethnicity fails to specify what their shared interests are and how they came to be perceived as common concerns.

This inability of conventional views on ethnicity to elucidate the complexity of social relations in Miami necessitates an alternative approach. One such approach is provided by analysts who suggest that ethnicity must not be viewed as "ancient, unchanging, or inherent in a group's blood, soul, or misty past" but rather as a "construction" or "invention" accomplished over time (Conzen et al. 1990, 38). This approach to the study of ethnicity has the benefit of recognizing the fluid and contextual nature of ethnic identity and ethnic group solidarity; but also has the advantage of illuminating the ways in which ethnicity is manipulated for political, social and economic ends.

The Politics of Ethnic Identity

One discourse surrounding Cuban immigration to the US describes the Cubans as victims of Communist tyranny. Another portrays an image of the Cubans in the US as making a valuable contribution to the American way of life. A third attributes the achievements of the Cuban population in Miami to

their diligence, devotion, and entrepreneurial drive. These discourses are not merely benign reflections of an established social reality, but must be viewed as closely intertwined with the exercise of power and politics.

Various scholars have contributed to an understanding of the connections between power, discourse and identity. The discursive, according to Charles Forment (1989, 51), or "the circulation of words," both organizes struggles for power, and, as well, is itself a source of power. In other words, power is exercised through discourse, but discourse itself is a form of power. The works of Michel Foucault also deal extensively with the interrelationship of power and knowledge, and emphasize discourses as weapons of attack and defence in the relations of power and knowledge (Foucault 1980; Sarup 1989). Similarly, Murray Edelman (1988, 11) describes the claims, comments, statements, and accounts about issues, problems, crises and threats as a "political spectacle". He cautions that: "The uses of all such terms in specific situations are strategies, deliberate or unrecognized, for strengthening or undermining support for specific courses of action and for particular ideologies".

These authors also address the constructive capacity of discourse. In Foucault's work, for example, one analyst explains that: "Discourses are perhaps best understood as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak" (Sarup 1989, 70). And in his discussion of *political practice*--a concept defined as the interplay of discourse and power--Forment (1989, 50) writes: "The discursive . . . brings together persons occupying multiple and disparate sites in the socio-institutional structure and organizes them with a common vocabulary, a unified set of interests, and a collective identity".

Drawing on the insights of these scholars, this section will reexamine many of the claims, comments, perceptions and images that surrounded Cuban

immigration to Miami. The intent is to explore the political, social and economic implications of the various discourses that manufactured and sustained the Cuban success story, and at the same time provided content for a Cuban American ethnic identity.

Cubans and the Cold War

Many claims about Cuban immigration to the US have been issued by officials, organizations and agencies in or associated with US federal government. For the most part, these claims have been meant to convey sympathy for the plight of the Cuban refugees, as well as to portray the US as a safe and willing haven for those fleeing persecution. Irrespective of the level of sincerity underlying the claims, this discourse has both reflected and reinforced a number of political objectives maintained by the US government over the past thirty years.

Since the early 19th century, the US considered Latin America its sphere of influence, or "backyard," and conducted US foreign policy accordingly. The Cuban Revolution of 1959 was not immediately viewed as a serious threat to US national security, but Castro's decision to expropriate the property of US national, his dealings with the USSR, and eventual declaration of his adherence to Marxist/Leninist ideology quickly and decidedly fueled the perception of threat (Skidmore and Smith 1989, 257-276).

The degree to which Cuba constituted a security concern for the US has been the subject of on-going debate (Schoultz 1987). What is certain, however, is that the Cuban revolution dealt a serious blow to the US in its struggle with the Soviet Union. Much of the Cold War between East and West was fought in the context of Latin America, and Cuba was viewed as a victory for Communism. The exodus of Cubans from the island provided the US with the

raw material for an ideological counter-attack. Widely publicized accounts of Cubans risking their lives to escape tyranny served to discredit the revolution and the ideological principles upon which it was founded. Photographs of those Cubans kneeling to kiss the ground upon arrival in Miami portrayed the US, and the principles for it professed to stand, as a superior option to that of Communism.

In addition to constituting a potent weapon in the Cold War struggle, the discourse on Cubans as victims of tyranny also helped to restore US national honor after suffering a severe loss of prestige in the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. In 1962, John F. Kennedy gave an impassioned speech before a large crowd of Bay of Pigs veterans, their families, friends, and others exiles gathered in the Orange Bowl in Miami. He praised their bravery, loyalty and sacrifice, and reinforced the US commitment to their cause. Holding a flag carried by Brigade 2506 on the failed invasion, Kennedy promised: "I can assure you that this flag will be returned to this Brigade in a free Havana" (Didion 1987, 15). Since that time, "la causa" has continued to be a prominent symbol in the political discourse of the US federal government.

The US government's interest in the Cuban refugees extended well beyond their much publicized escape from tyranny. The claims-making activity that defined the Cubans as political refugees was also accompanied by an unprecedented effort on behalf of the US government to welcome, assist and resettle the Cubans once they arrived in the US. The level of financial and administrative assistance alone contributed to an image of the Cuban immigrants as somehow unique and deserving of special attention. But in addition to dispersing funds, the agencies and individuals associated with Cuban Refugee Program expended a great deal of energy to portray a

favorable image of the Cuban immigrants--nationally as well as internationally.

The United States' interest in securing the successful incorporation of the Cuban arrivals into American society was multifaceted. Cuban American economic success could be used to perpetuate the myth of the American dream; and, at the same time, be contrasted with unkept promises of Castro's communist revolution. But facilitating the success of the success story served other domestic policy objectives as well. The rapid influx of thousands of refugees into South Florida posed numerous hardships on the state and local governments. The refugee influx could have been interpreted as a policy disaster for the administration in Washington. Yet, federal officials appeased local agencies with an infusion of financial assistance, while assuring the broader public that not only were these refugees an asset to American society, but that all US citizens should be proud to take part in a historic effort to aid victims of communist tyranny. In other words, a potential policy failure was reinterpreted as a triumph.

The discourse on tyranny and commitment to the cause also served to appease, and in many cases coopt, the thousands of Cubans that had and would continue to arrive in the US. After the Bay of Pigs debacle, Washington felt compelled to assure the growing population of Cuban refugees of its commitment to restore democracy in Cuba. With time, the commitment itself became an important tool for mobilizing a very politically potent voting bloc. Politicians at the local, state, and national levels quickly learned to manipulate the symbols of Castro and Communism for their own personal political gain.

Cuban Americans and the Civic Culture

Much of the discussion that surrounded Cuban immigration to the US focused on Castro and Communism, but the credentials of the Cuban refugees as productive US citizens was also a common theme. Alongside claims of government officials who portrayed the refugees as political heroes were statements by business and civic leaders who commended the Cuban immigrants for their entrepreneurial genius. These claims told the story of a 'Cuban economic miracle'--a story which shared great affinity with the ideals of hard work and self-sacrifice that comprise the American civic culture.

The Cubans arrived in Miami in the midst of a severe economic downturn. The once-booming construction industry was lagging, and tourists were by-passing Miami on their way to the Caribbean. The immigrants began to settle along the deserted areas of Flagler and Southwest Eighth Street, and to open small family businesses in vacated the shops. Some local leaders began to recognize the potential payoff of the refugee influx. The business elite in Miami who called for "a thousand more" refugees claimed to benefit from the industriousness and integrity of the Cuban community in Miami. It is likely, however, that they were also benefitting from the massive infusion of federal capital, and a ready supply of cheap labor.

The Cuban emigres were portrayed as "amazing" not only because of their business acumen, but also because of their ability to adapt so quickly to their new surroundings. The transition from dominoes and loud radios to trimmed lawns and television was viewed as positive progress toward Americanization, as was the use of credit cards and the consumption of fast food. Implicit in this discourse about the amazing emigres is, first, that Americanization--whether defined as working hard, watching t.v. or eating fried chicken--is good; secondly, because Cuban immigrants were able to achieve success in Miami, so too, can any other group. The Cuban success

story not only perpetuates the myth of the American dream, but reinforces a belief that the reasons for a lack of success lie within certain individuals or groups, rather than systems or structures.

This has particularly relevant implications for the plight of the African American community in Miami. The Cubans arrived in Miami just as Blacks were beginning to make greater demands on the political and economic system. For those who were interested in denying Blacks access to the system, the Cubans may have offered an ideal diversion. The following statement by a White upper-middle class woman, and long time resident of Miami Beach, is perhaps telling in this regard: "The presence of the Cubans has been a good thing. They drive the Negroes off of Flagler Street. It hasn't been good for the lazy Negroes" (Stevenson 1975, 106).

Cuban success was frequently contrasted with a lack of success among Blacks, and many analysts have attempted to account for the variations by comparing certain characteristics of the two groups. What is seldom recognized is that the comparisons of the two groups, irrespective of the reasons offered for their differences, reinforce the image of Cubans as successful and Blacks as not. The images themselves can simultaneously facilitate or hinder the actual achievement of more tangible measures of success. In other words, the economic and political achievements of the Cuban Americans not only gave rise to, but also resulted from, an image of success. In Miami, this image has, and continues to, elude Blacks.

From Exiles to Establishment

Today wealthy middle-aged Cubans - as they relax beside their suburban swimming pools or aboard their boats in Biscayne Bay - like to reminisce about the bad old days when they first reached Miami. The years spent waiting tables or sacking groceries have become to the Cuban success story what the log

cabin and the one-room schoolhouse were to an earlier version of the American Dream (Allman 1987, 318).

Tales of extraordinary achievement by Cuban immigrants were told not only by businessmen, bankers and government officials within the established elite, but also by Cuban American arrivals themselves. This 'rags to riches' discourse fueled, as well as reflected, the transition of Cubans in Miami from exiles to immigrants to members of the 'established elite'. It was also a discourse formulated in reaction to competing claims put forth by native Miamians.

In the years immediately following the Revolution, the attention of Cubans in Miami remained focused almost entirely on the anticipated return to their homeland. Their involvement in the American political system was minimal, and this reflected, in large part, the fact that few Cubans in Miami had become US citizens. In 1971, the *Miami Herald* estimated that only 10 to 20 percent of Cubans in Miami were US citizens, and indicated:

Despite their great numbers here, no Cuban holds political office, not even minor ones. Few are members of Boards, study groups, or citizens commissions. None hold appointive posts. On none of the elected councils or commissions of the 28 units of local governments is there a Cuban. In the race for 31 seats for the State Legislature, there was not one Cuban candidate (Greene 1971, 8G).

By the early 1980s, Cuban refugees had, in a variety of ways begun to more closely resemble a traditional immigrant group. Larger numbers of Cubans became US citizens and exercised the rights and privileges that lie therein. Voter registration and turnout increased among Cuban Americans, and although Castro and communism remained high priorities, the political agenda of Cuban Americans expanded to include issues of general concern to the community at large. Public opinion polls conducted throughout the 1970s

and 1980s also indicated that fewer and fewer Cubans remained committed to returning to the island. (Jorge and Moncarz 1987; Portes 1984).

By 1990, Cuban Americans in Miami had not only entered the mainstream of American life, but had become an integral part of the established power structure in Dade County. The mayor of Miami was Cuban. Three of five city commissioner in Miami were Cuban. The county manager, the chairman of the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce, and several presidents of large bank were also all Cuban.

The transformation of Cubans in Miami from exiles to establishment was both reflected in and fueled by changing political discourse. During the 1960s and 1970s, extreme hatred of Castro and contemplation of the ideal strategy to bring about his demise dominated discussions among Cubans in Miami. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, many Miami Cubans began to articulate social, political and economic concerns that focused on improving their quality of life in the United States. These concerns were articulated through the formation of organizations such as SALAD, the CANF, and the Cuban American Planning Council; as well as by the increased number of Cuban American candidates seeking political office at the local, state and national level, and the increased political mobilization of Cuban American voters that put them there. In a 1981 interview, SALAD director Eduardo Padron stated: "Our concern is not the homeland, but a new land" (Balmaseda 1981, 3C). And Cuban American journalist Liz Balmaseda said this of SALAD (1981, 3C): "They wanted a voice in the establishment. They wanted access to power. Democracy doesn't listen to a lot of exile talk, they thought; it listens to Money, Power, Status, Persistence".

By 1990, most Cuban Americans referred to Miami as home, and expressed pride in the 'City of the Future' they helped build. Bank presidents, for example, were more likely to tell the story of "pulling themselves up by the

bootstraps" in Miami's competitive economy than to boast of their combat experience in Cuba.

The changing nature of discourse among Cubans in Miami mirrored changes in the social, political and economic environment - locally, nationally and internationally. The exile discourse reflected the critical position of the Cubans in an on-going struggle between East and West. The claims, comments and proclamations that defined Cuban emigres as the victims of tyranny never ceased, and were frequently fortified by the Cold War rhetoric of US politicians. During the 1970s, however, the economic boom taking place in Miami gave rise to claims about "those amazing Cuban emigres" and laid the groundwork for an emergent discourse among Cubans in Miami that resembled that of traditional immigrant groups--hard work, patriotism, and an undying commitment to the promises of the American dream.

It was not, however, until various social, political and economic factors in Miami created a less cordial context for Cuban residents that their identity as immigrants intending to stay, rather than exiles waiting to leave, firmly took shape. Worldwide recession gripped cities throughout the US and Latin America. Miami's international economy was doubly pained. The environment in Miami had also become less welcoming as the Anglo population grew bitter toward what they perceived as the latinization of Miami. The Black population remained bitter, but that bitterness was increasingly interpreted as a reaction to the Cuban presence. During the 1990s, Miami continued to fulfill its role as "the capitol of Latin America," and achieved status as one of the "high-tech global cities of the world market." It was this context that both permitted and encouraged many Cuban Americans to recount the wonders of Miami's transition from a southern backwater to a "city of the future", and to emphasize the part they played in that process.

In addition to reflecting a changing configuration of circumstances in Miami, the United States and the world, these various discourses also served a number of political, economic and social functions for the Cubans in the US. Castro, communism and Cuba were powerful symbols which fortified exile sentiment and gave rise to a sense of commonality among Cubans in Miami that had not necessarily existed beforehand. The focus on returning home may have helped ease the psychological burden suffered by many Cubans in their attempt to adapt to a strange and often hostile environment. The manipulation of these symbols by leaders within the community, by the media and particularly by the Spanish-language radio stations, reinforced a bond among the Cubans in Miami and drew heavily on a sense of shared purpose, kinship and common ancestry--real or imagined. It also kept pressure on US government and focus on "la causa".

For the most part, the Cuban community in Miami and the foreign policy apparatus of the US government shared similar concerns with regard to Fidel Castro. This was particularly true in the 1960s, and again in the early 1980s under the Reagan Administration. Twenty years after Kennedy promised a free Havana to those Cubans gathered in the Orange Bowl, Reagan told a Cuban crowd of comparable size gathered in the Dade County Auditorium that: "We will not permit the Soviets and their henchmen in Havana to deprive others of their freedom." He, too, went on to promise that: "Someday, Cuba itself will be free" (Didion 1987, 160). When the political objectives of the Cubans in Miami and the US government did not seem to coincide, the exiles were quick to issue reminders, as they did in the case of the Contras, that "the freedom fighters of the eighties" not be treated by Reagan as the men of the 2506 had been treated by Kennedy (Didion 1987, 16). "The cause" continued to carry great weight with the Cuban American community, even in the case of

issues or debates not directly related to Cuba, Castro or communism.

Politicians, Cuban as well as non-Cuban, learned quickly that an appeal to anti-Castro credentials had great potential to mobilize Cuban American voters. And similarly, that any appearance of being soft on communism constituted a death knell. The potency of these themes persisted among the Cubans in Miami, but, as Stack and Warren (1990) point out, symbolic politics was increasingly intermingled with substantive politics.

This discursive transition from exile to immigrant cannot simply be interpreted as a desire or willingness among Cubans to assimilate into the American mainstream. The transition also reflected a growing realization that neither Castro nor "the exile" were temporary; and that the welcome initially extended by the land of opportunity was growing thin. Portes (1984, 387) demonstrates, for example, that the shift in political struggle from issues of exile to issues of permanent resettlement paralleled a significant increase in perceptions of social distance and discrimination from the host society. One of the more blatant forms of this discrimination by Non Latin Whites in Dade County was the passage of the 1980 Anti-Bilingual Referendum.⁴ Cuban American leaders readily admit that this served to galvanize the Cuban community in Miami (Balmaseda 1981, 1C).

Now that many Cuban Americans are part of the 'establishment', they have a vested interest in singing its praises and avoiding responsibility for its ills. Thus, Cubans in Miami can now frequently be heard fortifying the city's image, emphasizing their contribution, and assuring critics that the problems that do exist in Miami far predate their arrival.

Concluding Remarks

Cuban immigration to Miami has been the subject of much discussion and debate over the past thirty years. The comments, claims, proclamations and suggestions issued by politicians, government officials, the media and Cubans themselves, tell a story of a population of immigrants who heroically escaped the iron-grip of communism to find freedom in a land of great opportunity. Through their hard work and individual sacrifice these refugees are portrayed as not only establishing an impressive existence for themselves in their new surroundings, but greatly enhancing those surroundings in the process.

Whether it be the socioeconomic origins of those that came, how they came, or their subsequent experiences in the US, many of the claims surrounding Cuban immigration to the US are not well grounded in empirical data. Although various attempts have been made to measure the level of success among Cuban emigres and to identify its underlying causes, the convergence of social, political and economic factors that constructed the Cuban success story have not previously been explored.

This chapter approached the Cuban success story as a composite of various public discourses operating at the local, national and international level. These discourses were found to be intricately linked to the exercise of power and politics. The discourse on tyranny, as articulated through the claims of the US media, politicians and federal government agencies, served a number US policy objectives throughout the Cold War. From the perspective of the Cubans in the US, emphasizing their narrow escape from tyrannical oppression was a means by which to ease the psychological burden of exile, create a sense of common purpose around which to mobilize large numbers of

emigres for political, economic and social gain, and keep the attention of the American political system focused on their concerns.

The praises of the business elite in Miami demonstrated the complementary between a sagging economy and the massive infusion of human and financial capital. Large numbers of Cubans willing and eager to pursue the American dream, and federal government programs designed to insure that they achieved it, had very positive implications for the Anglo elite in Miami. This discourse also created an image of success among the Cubans in Miami which not only facilitated tangible economic, social and political gains, but simultaneously reinforced the tenets of an American civic culture based on hard work, self-sacrifice and individual responsibility. Finally, the rags to riches tales told by Cubans in Miami facilitated their incorporation into American society, and now serves to protect their position within that society.

Included among the many myths that emerge from and sustain these different discourses is that of Cuban Americans as a socially homogeneous group with common political concerns and economic interests in the US that stem from the primordial elements of their shared past. Cuban Americans are perceived as an ethnic group, and their ethnic identity has been largely defined in terms of a common ancestry, political conservatism, and an entrepreneurial drive. In actuality, what Cuban Americans do unquestionably share is that they, or their parents, came to the US from Cuba; and all, or at least most speak, Spanish. Beyond this, few assumptions can accurately be made about the identity of Cuban Americans in the US.

This analysis has shown that much of what defines a Cuban American ethnic identity in the United States was not simply transplanted from the island. Instead, the content and nature of Cuban American ethnicity has been defined, assigned, or invented in the context of the United States. Rather than

continue to attribute political, economic and social characteristics of Cuban Americans to their ethnicity, this approach examines how various political, economic and social processes constructed an ethnic identity. In this regard, the success of the Cuban success story is that it defined Cuban American ethnic identity in terms of success.

Notes

1. This quote is taken from a speech delivered by former United Nations Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick at a October 22, 1982 dinner in Miami, hosted in her honor by the Cuban American National Foundation.
2. The 1953 Cuban census classified 12.4 percent of the population as Black, and 14.5 percent as of mixed race (Fagen 1969, 21). For further discussion on the characteristics of pre-Castro Cuban society see Wyatt MacGaffey and Clifford R. Barnett, *Cuba: It's People, It's Society, Its Culture* (New Haven, Conn., 1962); and Lowry Nelson, *Rural Cuba* (Minneapolis, Minn., 1950).
3. See Chapter 5 for a discussion on competing theories of ethnicity and ethnic identity.
4. On May 18, 1993, a newly elected 13 member Dade County Commission, composed of 6 Hispanics, 4 Blacks, and 3 Non-Latin Whites, voted unanimously to repeal the 1980 anti-bilingual referendum.

CHAPTER 5
MANDELA IN MIAMI:
THE GLOBALIZATION OF ETHNICITY IN AN INTERNATIONAL CITY

After being released from 27 years of captivity in a South African prison, Nelson Mandela, leader of the African National Congress, travelled to the United States to thank the supporters who had remained loyal to the struggle against apartheid, and to encourage the U.S. government to maintain economic sanctions against the white regime in South Africa. Mandela's itinerary included stops in New York, Washington D.C., and Atlanta. In each of those cities he was welcomed with great fanfare. Huge crowds turned out to greet him, local leaders showered him with proclamations, and public officials handed him the city key. This was not the case in Miami. Mandela's appearance attracted a crowd comparable in size to that of Atlanta or D.C., but the tenor of the reception was unique. Not one local elected official formally greeted Mr. Mandela, nor was he presented with any proclamation of honor by civic leaders. As in other cities where Mandela stopped, there were hundreds of loyal and enthusiastic supporters surrounding the Miami Beach Convention Center; but there were also many angry protestors. According to one estimate, approximately 300 anti-communists, mostly Cuban Americans, stood on one side of the street waving placards that read: "Arafat, Gadhafi and Castro are Terrorists," and "Mr. Mandela, do you know how many people your friend Castro has killed just for asking the right to speak as you do here?" Across from this group were 3,000, mostly Black, Mandela supporters with placards

proclaiming: "Miami City Council = Pretoria," and "Mandela, Welcome to Miami, Home of Apartheid" (Portes and Stepick, Forthcoming).

Miami is notorious for social upheaval. Black neighborhoods have erupted in violence on numerous occasions, and the Cuban community is well known for its vocal and sometimes violent protest. So, the controversy surrounding Mandela's visit was immediately interpreted as another in a long series of conflicts pitting Miami's Latin immigrants against a historically disenfranchised Black population. After Mandela's departure the *Miami Herald* reported that: "The controversy - the latest rift between Miami's black and Cuban communities - continued to dominate Spanish-language and black oriented radio" ("Blacks Reject" 1990, 1B). Days later, another report stated the following:

When Nelson Mandela came to town, Miami's politicians and activists replayed their parts from past ethnic controversies, like wooden horses on a merry-go-round, unable to escape their ideological harnesses. Again, it was blacks against Hispanics, with precious little middle ground (Goldfarb 1990, 1B).

The response to events surrounding Mandela's visit was typical of a tendency to portray social conflict in Miami as the product of deep-seated tensions between members of different ethnic groups--and to place particular emphasis on the tension that is presumed to exist between Hispanics and Blacks. Irrespective of the degree to which these assumptions are accurate, their uncritical acceptance serves to obscure other relevant aspects of ethnicity and ethnic relations in Miami. One such aspect is the fact that much of the conflict which occurs among ethnic groups in Miami is purely symbolic in nature. Mandela is just one example of the battles in Miami that frequently take place about symbols, are waged through symbols, and as rewards offer little more than symbols.

Another aspect of social relations in Miami that is largely neglected by many existing analyses and interpretations is the extent to which the symbolic struggle within and between ethnic groups occurs in an increasingly global context. Ethnicity and ethnic conflict in Miami are profoundly influenced by actors, issues and events far beyond the boundaries of Miami. The city, itself, has come to be widely recognized as an 'international city', but little attempt has yet been made to explore the links between ethnic relations at the local level, and various social, political and economic processes operating at the level of the international system. This chapter examines those processes that invent ethnicity, and simultaneously explores how global interdependence shapes the contours of ethnic identity and ethnic group relations in a metropolitan area. The discussion draws heavily on the events surrounding Nelson Mandela's visit to Miami in June of 1990.

An International City

References to Miami as the 'capitol of Latin America' have become increasingly popular in recent years, but the city's destiny was accurately predicted almost one hundred years before when founding mother Julia Tuttle stated that: "Someday, Miami will become the great center of South American trade" (Parks 1981, 63). The transformation that has occurred in Miami since the city's incorporation in 1896 exceeds even Tuttle's futuristic imagination.

In the last thirty years alone, hundreds of thousands of immigrants have poured into Miami from throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, making it one of the most ethnically diverse cities in the US. The 1980 Census revealed that the foreign-born totaled 54 percent of the population of Miami-- twice the percentage of Los Angeles and more than double that of New York (Mohl 1986, 52). In 1990, 57 percent of the population in Dade County spoke a

language other than English in the home. Over 50% of the population are classified as Hispanic, and although Cubans comprise the bulk of that group, there are well over 200,000 non-Cuban Latins from Colombia, Venezuela, Panama, Ecuador, Peru, Argentina, Mexico, Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic. To this group must be added large numbers of Haitians, Jamaicans, Bahamians, and other immigrants from throughout the West Indies.

'Little Havana' now shares the headlines with 'Little Haiti' and 'Little Managua' as new immigrants establish centers of social and economic activity in their own neighborhoods. Creole joins Spanish as an "unofficial" language of Miami; and debates about the Chamorro government in Nicaragua as well as Aristide in Haiti, now take place along side on-going speculation as to when Castro will fall. As one observer noted: "Miami is probably the only city in the United States with three Christmas parades: X-mas, Three Kings and Kwanza" (Interview, June 12, 1992).

These are the elements that contribute to Miami's image as a mecca of cultural diversity, but Miami's status as an international city is founded on more than multilingualism and festive expressions of ethnicity. References to Miami as the 'Capital of Latin America' do not simply reflect demographic characteristics in Miami, but also recognize the extremely close economic and political ties between South Florida and countries throughout Central and South America, and the Caribbean. Miami's metamorphosis from a sleepy tourist town to a bustling center of international trade was fueled by links to the Latin American market; and when Latin America writhed from the burden of the debt crisis, Miami also felt the crunch.

An estimated \$6 billion in goods pass through Miami annually, and the city accounts for over 40% of the total trade between the United States and the Caribbean. Although the closest links are to the Caribbean, officials in Miami

are actively exploring how to expand trade with Mexico and not miss out on the potential advantages of a North American Free Trade Agreement (Rosenberg and Hiskey 1992). Similarly, local economic development offices have recently established an Africa division. The division's director, John Hall, explained: "We are now at the research stage, defining opportunities that exist in Africa for Miami in general, and black businesses in particular." He also pointed out that there is an interest in Africa to trade with Latin America - using Miami as a hub (Edwards 1992, 8).

This internationalization of Miami's economic and cultural arenas has not bypassed the political realm. Miami has been a location for international political activity since at least the 1800s. Much of Cuban liberator Jose Marti's struggle for Cuban independence from Spain was orchestrated from South Florida; and Latin leaders from Castro to Somoza have also used Miami as a staging ground for various political activities. *Newsweek* recently referred to Miami as "the Casablanca of Latin America - a city of schemers, emigres and refugees, a safe haven for flight capital and fleeing politicians," and pointed out that (*Newsweek* 1988, 24):

If it is not quite true that the whole city throbs to the beat of offshore drums, there is no question that events in Central America and the Caribbean can have a large impact here. The Sandinista revolution has pushed 70,000 Nicaraguan exiles into South Florida since 1979; the contra movement's U.S. headquarters is just across NW 36th Street from Miami International Airport. Little Haiti has its share of opposition leaders hoping for a new day back home, and two Panamanian dissidents, Roberto Eisenmann and Gilbert Mallol, are biding their time here as well.

Foreign policy decisions made in Washington, and designed to deal with international political issues, also affect the local economy in Miami. Some analysts have suggested that the US trade embargo against Cuba facilitated the globalization of Miami's economy by forcing Cuban exiles to exploit

international networks in their business dealings, rather than pursuing import-export dealings with the island (Allman 1987, 317). In 1992, ten months into the embargo against Haiti, local shippers and exporters in Miami complained that: "This embargo is just killing us. The whole river is dead;" and the *Miami Herald* referred to the Haitian embargo as: "the classic dilemma of global politics affecting the small players, who insist the policy is not only ineffective but is also unfairly burdening the denizens of the Miami River" (Bussey 1992, 1K).

Today, Miami is described as one of few cities in the US with its own foreign policy. Between 1982 and 1983, the Miami City Commission passed 28 official resolutions, ordinances, and motions dealing with U.S. foreign policy. The majority of these were purely symbolic expressions of anti-communism, such as the following question put before voters in November of 1982 (Stack and Warren 1990, 19):

Should funds of the City of Miami be expended to finance in whole or in part, any multinational commercial or cultural conference or convention where representatives of Communist-Marxist countries have either been scheduled to participate or invited to attend?

In 1992, presidential candidate Ross Perot invited several mayors of large US cities to meet with him. Most took concerns about crime, poverty, and urban decay. Miami Mayor Xavier Suarez questioned Perot about his plans for dealing with Cuba and the Castro regime. Similarly, while policy makers in Washington debated Representative Torricelli's bill to tighten the US embargo against Cuba, the Dade County Commission quietly passed a similar version of the federal legislation (Filkins 1992b, 1B).

Social relations in Miami are also heavily influenced by external factors. Neither the conflict, nor the cooperation, among different groups has been confined to the standard issues that normally comprise urban agendas

throughout the U.S. In 1986, when police rushed a crowd of participants at a downtown political rally into county busses in order to protect them from a larger and angrier crowd of protestors across the street, the controversy was not over zoning regulations or abortion rights. The issue was U.S. aide to the Nicaraguan contras (Warren et al. 1986).

Similarly, in 1992, when hundreds of local residents, business owners and politicians attended a huge political gathering in Miami Beach, the focus was not on urban renewal, or an upcoming local election. What took place instead was a community celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the reunification of Jerusalem--attended by American Jews, Cuban-American Jews, Christians, and Hispanic Christian Friends of Israel, as well as two area mayors, representatives from the state legislature and the only Cuban-American member of the U.S. House of Representatives.

The events surrounding Mandela's visit provide another recent example of the extent to which Miami is penetrated by the global arena, and an ideal optic through which to examine the interdependence between local ethnic relations and the international system.

Mandela In Miami

News of Mandela's visit to Miami first appeared in the *Miami Herald* on May 28, 1990. This brief announcement included no information regarding Mandela's itinerary, nor made mention of any plans to celebrate his arrival. This initial announcement was followed shortly thereafter by a report that read: "Mandela's visit to include union speech and little else" ("Mandela's Visit" 1990, 4B).

The union being referred to was the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSME). The union's members had been

loyal supporters of the anti-apartheid movement for thirty years; they were holding their international convention in Miami Beach, and Mandela had agreed to speak. The fact that Conference organizers kept tight control over the event became a source of frustration for many individuals in the weeks that followed, and a scapegoat for many others for months to come.

Union officials initially had prohibited members of the community from attending, and then decided to allow invited guests to view Mandela's speech on closed circuit television from an adjacent room. An outraged president of the local NAACP, Johnnie McMillian, responded: "That's like inviting us to dinner and making us eat in the kitchen. The NAACP is appalled. We won't take this sitting down" ("Mandela Speech" 1990, 1B). Many weeks later, after Mandela was long gone and the controversy raged on, Dade County Mayor Steve Clark issued a regret--not an apology--for what had happened. He emphasized that: "I was not invited to Mr. Mandela's meeting until the very last minute, and then only to sit in adjacent room and watch him on t.v." ("Dade Has" 1990, 23A).

Irrespective of the dealings with conference organizers, any official acknowledgment of the South African leader's scheduled arrival was very slow in coming. This did not escape the attention of several Black community leaders who expressed concern early on as to how the predominantly Cuban and Anglo politicians in Miami would receive Mandela. After all, it was customary that leaders of Mandela's stature be welcomed in some official capacity by those individuals elected to represent the community at large. Their concern did not stem from an expectation of sheer racial insensitivity on the part of elected officials, although many critics would and did make that claim; but rather reflected a historically complex and potentially volatile political reality in Miami.

According to various resolutions passed by the Miami City Council throughout the 1980s, Mandela's association with communism could officially classify him as *persona non grata* in the city of Miami (Stack and Warren 1990, 19). George Knox, attorney and much respected leader of the African American community in Miami, interpreted the local government reaction as follows: "Many of them are paranoid about openly embracing Mandela and the message it would send the Cuban community." Another prominent Black attorney, H.T. Smith, issued a similar statement ("Local Officials" 1990, 1A):

The political leaders believe that the black community is a nonentity politically, so why should they do what's right when it will possibly cause some political backlash from Cuban and Jewish constituents.

This frustration was not directed solely at Cuban or Anglo politicians. There is one Black on the Miami City Commission, and one Black on the County Commission--both drew sharp criticism for their apparent inaction. A local Black activist, Billy Hardemon of People United For Justice, had this to say of the one Black City Commissioner, Miller Dawkins: "His silence is almost criminal. This is a litmus test in my opinion. They're all political animals and the majority of voters in Miami are Cuban" ("Blacks Reject" 1990, 1B). Political mobilization along ethnic lines is a reality in Miami, and the Cuban community has been particularly successful at establishing itself as a formidable voting block. The recent reelection of Commissioner Dawkins is just one notable example of a local campaign funded and supported largely by Cuban-American voters ("Suarez, Four" 1990, 1B).

Despite the apparent ethnic and racial polarization in Miami, and a history of vocal protest on behalf of Cuban exiles, it was not at all certain that Mandela's association with communist regimes would automatically preclude

him an official welcome in Miami. In fact, the City Commission had already issued an unofficial proclamation--"unofficial" because of the persistent refusal of one particularly dogmatic Cuban-American commissioner to sign the document ("Suarez, Four" 1990, 1B).

A variety of events quickly unfolded, however, that served to fuel the flames of social tension for which Miami has become well known. Just days before coming to Miami, Nelson Mandela appeared on national television with Ted Koppel. During that interview, Mandela expressed appreciation and gratitude for those supporters who stuck by him throughout his captivity, and in so doing, he spoke kindly of Yasser Arafat, Moamar Gadhafi and Fidel Castro. Comments that may have done little more than raise eyebrows throughout the rest of the country caused outrage in a city where many view Castro, Gadhafi and Arafat as the embodiment of pure evil. The Cuban community in Miami was up in arms, and although the response was less visible, Mandela's comments regarding Arafat and Gadhafi also upset Miami's sizeable, and politically powerful, Jewish population.

The next day, Miami Mayor Suarez announced that "In view of the statements made last night, it would be difficult to give him [Mandela] any kind of recognition or key to the city ("Mandela Remarks" 1990, 1A). Days later, Suarez and four other Cuban American elected officials issued the following statement ("Suarez, Four" 1990, 1B):

We, Cuban Americans, find it beyond reasonable comprehension that Mr. Nelson Mandela, a victim of oppression by his own government, not only fails to condemn the Cuban government for its human rights violations, but rather praises virtues of the tyrannical Castro regime.

The City Commission rescinded its proclamation; and Mandela came and left Miami without any formal acknowledgement from the City of Miami, Dade County or the City of Miami Beach.

After Mandela's departure the tensions persisted--on the airwaves, in the newspapers and on the street. The anti-communist fervor of the Cuban exile community which had for the most part been tolerated by the rest of Miami was now directed at a symbol of great importance to Blacks. One Cuban American lobby group ran a half page advertisement in the Miami Herald which listed, under the headline "Think Again Mr. Mandela," a series of quotes by the South African leader praising Castro and Cuba ("Think Again" 1990, 21A).

While Cubans espoused anti-Castro rhetoric, African-Americans proclaimed that: "Apartheid in South Africa and the Black experience in America are two sides of the same coin" ("Many Watch" 1990, 1A). The Black community was visibly outraged, and considered the snubbing of Mandela to be a direct slap in the face. Patricia Due, one of the founders of the Congress of Racial Equality, complained:

I feel sick. How dare they do this to us? Mr. Mandela is a symbol. He is our link to our motherland. After all the blood, sweat, and tears of Black Americans, and people are still trying to tell us who we can hear (Fichtner, 1990, 1C).

Similarly, the NAACP stated that: "To reject Mandela is to reject us. He is our brother. If they say he's not welcome, they're saying we're not welcome too" ("Blacks Reject" 1990, 1B). This sense of powerlessness and injustice is not new to Miami's Black community, nor is the expression of that frustration in the form of violent protest. This time, however, the anger and frustration was channelled in a different direction.

A group of professionals, led by attorney H.T. Smith, had already issued a demand for an apology to the Mandelas and the community as a whole for the inexcusable treatment of a respected world leader. A Black sorority, Delta

Theta Sigma, attending their national convention on Miami Beach during Mandela's trip, issued a similar statement. When the demands for an apology fell on deaf ears, the group aimed to hit the city of Miami where it hurt the most--the tourism industry. The 'Boycott Miami Now' committee was formed, letters were written, and video tapes produced--urging blacks throughout the US to take their convention and tourism dollars elsewhere: "to keep the pressure on, and to spend your hard-earned dollars with those who treat you with the respect and dignity which you deserve" ("Two Local" 1990, 2B).

For three years after Mandela's visit, the boycott continued. Numerous conventions reportedly cancelled or changed their plans to meet in Miami as a result of the boycott; and although there is some disagreement as to the economic impact, the estimated loss of revenue for the city ranges from \$10 million to \$50 million. The Visitors and Tourism Bureau did create several minority scholarships for study at Florida International University's hotel management program, and agreed to the need for more Black employees in tourism industry.

What was most notable, however, was the complex political maneuvering that typically characterizes this racially and ethnically divided city. The day after he rescinded the proclamation to welcome Mandela, Mayor Suarez quickly tried to make peace with members of the Black community. The mayor showed up at a meeting called by African American County Commissioner Barbara Carey in support of Mandela, but received a very chilly reception. Reverend Victor Curry accused Suarez of trying to straddle the Black/Cuban divide, and remarked: "I think it would have been a good idea if he didn't show up" ("Blacks Reject" 1990, 1B). When Suarez attempted to draft a broad statement acceptable to Black, Jewish and Hispanic leaders, African American Reverend Willie Simms of the Dade County Community Relations

Board exclaimed: "He should have thought about that before opening his big mouth. He proved what an idiot he is" ("Blacks Reject" 1990, 1B).

In the beginning, Metro-Dade Mayor Steve Clark reportedly refused to discuss the issue, and was out of town. Clark later issued a carefully worded statement, "regretting" the Mandela incident, but not "apologizing". County Commissioner Joe Gersten responded angrily to a reporter: "Don't try to drag me into this." Elected officials throughout the city and county were coming under increasing attack, and making every attempt to distance themselves from the controversy ("Dade Has" 1990, 23A). For their part, some Cuban American leaders attempted to assure Blacks in Miami that their criticism of Mandela had nothing to do with the color of his skin. Asking to appear on WEDR - 99 JAMZ, a Black-oriented Miami radio station, Armando Gutierrez and other anti-Castro activists proclaimed ("Mandela Backers" 1990, 1B): "This is not a racial matter. Mr. Mandela is a confessed communist."

In 1992, Miami Beach Mayor Seymour Gelber, who is Jewish, became the first public official to apologize when he proclaimed April 27, "Nelson Mandela Day" in the City of Miami Beach. Many individuals and groups applauded his decision as an important first step in healing deep and unnecessary wounds. The gesture was not, however, without political repercussions. Many Cuban, as well as Jewish constituents were outraged; and several of Mayor Gelber's political opponents, including fellow city commissioners, quickly positioned themselves to take advantage of what was still a very emotional issue (Interview, July 6, 1992). The Mandela dispute became a major issue between two Miami Beach city commissioners hoping to succeed Gelber, and one former mayoral candidate began an active campaign to rescind Gelber's Mandela proclamation (*Sunpost*, May 21, 1992, 1).

The fact that the boycott persisted reflects a variety of factors. There is a tendency among the Anglo leadership to ignore problems in hopes that they will go away, or at least cause no more than the minimal level of damage to Miami's already badly tarnished image. There is also an intransigence of many Cuban leaders who, while insisting that the issue is not about race, stand firmly behind the belief that any friend of Fidel Castro's is no friend of theirs. One Cuban-American candidate for the Dade County Commission stated: "If it's an apology they're [Blacks] waiting for, it will not come" (Interview, June 2, 1992). Osvaldo Soto, chairman of the Spanish American League Against Discrimination, remarked (Street 1992, 11): "I cannot honor a man who has gone to Cuba to shake the hand of a man who has held my native country under oppression for more than 33 years."

Perhaps what contributed the most to the longevity of the boycott was the realization by Blacks that they had discovered a way to get the attention of the power structure. While there is a great deal of disagreement as to the economic impact of the boycott, few will dispute the fact the campaign itself has provided Blacks with greater political bargaining power, not to mention an increased level of social and political solidarity among what has, in the past, been a very fragmented group.

To the initial demand for an apology was added the following: an investigation into a recent incident of police brutality against Haitian immigrants, a review of US immigration policy, single-member voting districts, and substantial reforms in Dade's tourism industry to allow increased employment and business opportunities (Rowe, 1990, 12). And during the September 1992 primaries, the 'Boycott Miami Now' committee placed several paid political ads in the local Black paper urging voters to "Remember Mandela" and "Riot at the Polls" (see Appendix G).

Boycott organizers have also added force to their claims by referring to the boycott as a "Quiet Riot." As H.T. Smith explained (Smith 1992a, 8A):

Our choices were clear. We could once again resort to the emotion-filled chaotic riots that heap death and destruction on our own community. Or, we could take our struggle to moral high ground. Black Miami could coolly and dispassionately move the battle ground from the ghetto streets to the executive suites. And, in so doing, we could wage a Quiet Riot where not one life is taken, not one person is injured, not one fire is started, not one person is arrested, and not one business in our community is looted.

In praise of Circuit Court Judge Thomas Spencer's decision to move Officer William Lozano's manslaughter trial from the predominantly white area of Orlando to a more racially mixed Tallahassee, *The Miami Times* wrote ("Towards Justice" 1992, 4A):

There can be little doubt that Boycott Miami, and the alternative to street violence that it embodies, has been a key factor in this heightened sensitivity. ... This could be the start of a trend that would transform Miami from the "riot prone" city its reputation says it is to one where genuine, mutual respect for all races sets the framework for communal harmony.

The saga continued when, in June 1992, the Black-owned and operated *Miami Times* reported that South African Zulu Chief Buthelezi was in Miami and would attend a private luncheon hosted by the Cuban American president of the *Miami Herald*, Roberto Suarez. The outcry from the Black community was almost immediate. Buthelezi, according to one prominent Black attorney and civic leader, is a "documented agent of the South African government." H.T. Smith, leader of the Boycott Committee similarly referred to Buthelezi as "a collaborator of the Nazi-like apartheid regime" (Epstein and Crockett, 1992, 1B).

The *Miami Herald* quickly issued a statement that the luncheon had been cancelled, the Cuban American National Foundation quickly announced that it was stepping in to host the affair, and Buthelezi quickly cancelled his

scheduled Miami appearances (Crockett and Epstein, 1992, 1B). In an editorial the following week, the *Miami Times* ("No Joy" 1992, 4A) wrote:

He [Buthelezi] has so far chosen to play the White man's game and allow himself to be used in their gambit to maintain power even after majority rule. But it can at least be hoped that his knowledge now that there are Blacks in the Diaspora as far afield as the most southern part of the US who despise his tactics would persuade him to reverse his course.

On May 12, 1993, three years after Mandela left Miami, the Boycott Miami Now campaign came to an end. In an atmosphere of great optimism, a group of community leaders presented a 20-point agreement around which the boycott had been settled. The stated goals included the establishment of an African American-owned convention-level hotel in Dade County, hospitality management scholarships for black students, and increased purchasing contracts for black-owned businesses. Also included was the formation of "Miami Partners for Progress," a group of 15 boycott and business leaders who will monitor the implementation of this "Blueprint for Change" (Pugh 1993, 1A).

The event did not end without a warning from H.T. Smith that:

Failure to keep the promises we have made will have serious consequences because we believe in the future we will not have the credibility to harness the rage, the frustration and the indignation [of the black community] (Pugh 1993, 1A).

Nor did the boycott end without attention being focused, by the media and others, on the "noticeably absent ... Cuban American leaders, whose criticism of Mandela triggered the boycott." What was missing from the celebration and from the 20-point plan was any further mention of the Haitian population in Miami (Pugh 1993, 14A).¹

Global Linkages

Careful analysis of the events surrounding Nelson Mandela's visit reveals a great deal about the nature of social and political relations in Miami. It is clear, for example, that tensions persist in Miami, and that ethnicity continues to be a predominant factor in group stratification and political mobilization. Also evident is the potency of ethnic symbols, and the willingness of individuals and groups to manipulate ethnic identity in the pursuit of political and economic gain. An additional, and a particularly notable implication of the Mandela controversy, is the increasing need to place any analysis of Metropolitan Miami within the context of the international system.

The empirical reality of a changing world order has not gone unnoticed by analysts in any discipline; and calling attention to the international system is by no means a novel analytic approach. International relations theorists have for some time questioned the utility of the nation-state as unit of analysis, preferring to focus instead on the interdependence of the international system and the predominance of international regimes which transcend national borders.² A diverse body of literature classified under the heading of international political economy has also devoted a great deal of energy to examining the globalization of production and exchange.³ There has also been some attempt to link the macro-structural dynamics of the world system to micro-level research on urban politics.⁴

No attempt has yet been made to apply this type of analysis to the persistence of ethnicity and ethnic conflict in the new world order. This oversight likely reflects the persistence of certain widely held assumptions about the nature of ethnicity, and particularly the belief that ethnicity is "ancient, unchanging, or inherent in a group's blood, soul, or misty past"

(Conzen et al. 1990, 38). This belief leads to a conceptualization of ethnicity as a static, independent variable, while overlooking how ethnic identity and ethnic group relations are also dependent variables.

Underlying the discussion about Miami as an international city is an assumption that globalization of the cultural, political and economic arenas in Miami results from the substantial presence of large numbers of people belonging to different ethnic groups. Miami, for example, is the site of frequent parades, festivals, and ceremonies because the city is home to a variety of groups desiring to celebrate their distinct cultural heritage. Similarly, Miami's ties to the world market, and Latin America in particular, are frequently attributed to a substantial presence of immigrants who maintain links to their homeland and with fellow emigrants who settled in different locations throughout the world. Furthermore, the fact that local politics in Miami is so saturated with international issues is often explained by reference to the large population of immigrants for whom ethnic identity continues to be the most salient form of social identification.

This interpretation of the international dimensions of social, political and economic activity in Miami is not inaccurate, but it is incomplete. Certainly ethnicity and ethnic attachments have played a critical role in the globalization of Miami, but the content of ethnic identities in Miami, and the galvanization of ethnic sentiment for social, political and economic gain is simultaneously influenced by the various processes operating at the level of the international system. Overcoming this conceptual weaknesses is critical, but will not eliminate the numerous theoretical and methodological obstacles that necessarily complicate any attempt to link local level interaction with global processes. Theories of the international system are, by nature, grand theories. Much of the grand theorizing that has thus far taken place, for

example, is heavily criticized for imprecision, and a failure to acknowledge the role of human agency. In addition to a levels of analysis problem, it is extremely difficult to distinguish cause and effect relationships between various overlapping and interlocking forces of social, political and economic change. Recognition of the fluid and contextual nature of social identity can, however, enhance the study of ethnic phenomena by reversing the arrow of causality to explore the impact of international processes on ethnicity and ethnic relations in a metropolitan area.

Migration is one example of a process operating at the level of the international system which has profound implications for social relations at a local level. International migration brings people from different social, cultural and historical backgrounds into close proximity. The stratification of these people into various groups does not necessarily or automatically reflect identities or interests transferred from abroad. Rather, it is the interaction among and between these people that define individuals as members of distinct ethnic groups.

In Miami, ethnicity and ethnic relations must be viewed in the context of relatively recent and large scale immigration to South Florida. The migration process did not simply transplant various ethnic groups from one location to another, but was one of many interconnected processes that influenced ethnic identities and the nature of ethnic group interaction in Miami. In other words, neither the content of ethnic identity, nor the common concerns around which members of an ethnic group unite can be directly traced to their place of origin. As S.R. Charsley (1974, 355) explains: "They are not simply the prolongation of pre-migration customs and patterns, but are the result of an interaction between these and the values and requirements of the receiving society."

One implication is that the nature of ethnicity and ethnic relations in Miami cannot be accurately explained by mere reference to demographic characteristics such as a population that is 57 percent foreign-born. What must also be taken into account is where the immigrants come from, why they left, how they arrived, and under what circumstances they adapted to their new surroundings. These are factors that profoundly influence the interaction between and among immigrants and established residents, and that shape the ethnic identity of individuals and groups. These are also factors that extend well beyond the confines of Metropolitan Miami.

Ethnic relations in Miami are not only influenced by the movement of people across national borders, but by the international flow of goods and services as well. The local economy in Miami is tightly linked to the world market and particularly to the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean. Geographically, the city is in an ideal position to benefit from increased levels of international trade and commerce, and trends in the global economy are regularly cited as explanations for Miami's transition from a sleepy southern town to a bustling international metropolis. This transformation has not, however, benefited all groups equally. Hispanics in Miami, by virtue of their language skills and established personal and professional contacts worldwide, were particularly well placed to capitalize on the potential advantages offered by an increasingly interdependent world capitalist economy. Other groups in Miami were not so well placed. This illustrates how global economic trends can influence ethnic relations at a local level by altering the environment in which individuals and groups interact.

Ethnic tension in Miami, for example, is frequently attributed to direct competition among ethnic groups for scarce economic resources. Existing analyses do not support this zero-sum portrayal of ethnic group interaction in

Miami's labor market. What is supported, however, is the extent to which Miami has been influenced by the global economic system. The result is not direct labor market substitution of one ethnic group by another, as Portes and Stepick (Forthcoming) explain, but "a new urban economy in which the immigrants raced past other groups, leaving the native minority behind."

In addition to international migration and trends in the world market economy, the international political environment also influences ethnic relations at the local level. This is well illustrated by contributors to a 1981 volume on the transnational dimensions of ethnicity. According to the volume's editor John Stack (1981, 20), the resurgence of ethnicity throughout the world is tied to the global environment in two respects: (1) through the politicization of global communication and transportation networks; and (2) in accelerating patterns of political and cultural fragmentation. The world political system has been transformed by technological advancements that facilitate transnational ties among ethnic groups around the world. The global penetration of the domestic arena provides ethnic groups with greater opportunity to exchange ideas, information, wealth and political strategies; and results in a powerful "demonstration effect" such as occurred in the 1960s when the global mass media fueled student political protest throughout North America and Western Europe (Stack 1981, 20). Linkages are also posited between global political fragmentation and ethnic groups in both the developing and developed world. The pace of political, economic, and social change throughout the Third World allegedly exacerbates ethnic cleavages in those countries. In the West, the increasingly urban and bureaucratic nature of advanced industrial societies alienates the masses of citizens, and fuels the need for communal attachments (Stack 1981, 24).

This work provides valuable insights into the role of ethnicity in a transnational world.⁵ It also reveals, however, a tendency to attribute a great deal of independent explanatory significance to ethnicity without examining the content or construction of ethnic phenomena. Greater emphasis must be placed on the processes that result in social stratification and political mobilization along ethnic lines, and which assign meaning and legitimacy to ethnic identity.

The Invention of Ethnicity

Mandela's visit to Miami seemed to fuel an explosive clash of primordial sentiment between distinct ethnic groups. And at some level this was certainly the case. But neither the mobilization of groups in Miami along ethnic lines, nor the symbols around which they rally can be taken for granted. Use of the categories--Black, Cuban, Jewish, and Anglo--assumes the existence of easily identifiable groups with shared interests, and fails to recognize that the labels themselves mask a variety of distinct social identities that cross cut and overlap ethnicity. Cuban immigration to Miami, for example, has taken place in relatively distinct waves--characterized by varied socio-economic and racial compositions. The result is a Cuban population in Miami that is very socially, politically and economically heterogeneous. There are now white Cubans, black Cubans, Jewish Cubans, old Cubans that speak little English and young Cubans that speak little Spanish, Republican Cubans, Cuban Democrats, and ample evidence to challenge the notion of a persistent communal unity.

The situation among Blacks in Miami is also similar to the heterogeneity and fragmentation of the Cuban community, with an additional complexity posed by the fact that black is obviously a racial distinction as opposed to one

of national origin or otherwise. Miami is home to Bahamians Blacks, Jamaican Blacks, Haitian Blacks, as well as North American Blacks. Interaction among these various groups has been minimal, and is often characterized more by distrust and suspicion than by any sense of shared interests and common concerns. Tension between Bahamian Blacks and African Americans dates back to the 1800s and the founding of the city of Miami. Today, this particular distinction is less recognized, but a more recent rift exists between Haitian immigrants and the native Black population. None of these tensions are extreme, but the cultural diversity of Miami's Black population has certainly worked against the establishment of a common social or political agenda.

Irrespective of this diversity, however, the tendency for individuals in Miami to identify themselves, and be identified by others, as members of a particular ethnic group is widespread. Mandela's visit, along with a variety of similar incidents, also indicates that despite few notable exceptions, political reactions and opinions in Miami continue to divide fairly consistently along lines of race and ethnicity. In fact, when asked during in-depth interviews in 1992 whether politics in Miami consistently divides along lines of race and ethnicity, 63 percent of the respondents answered with an emphatic "yes". (See Figure 5-1) What needs to be explained is why.

Among theorists who have grappled with the persistence of ethnic phenomena, there is an on-going debate between those that explain ethnicity in terms of "deep historical and experiential factors;" and those who maintain that ethnic cleavages arise because of "specific and immediate circumstances" (Glazer and Moynihan 1975, 19-20). The former, or the primordial position, emphasizes the cultural, psychological and affective dimension of ethnicity; or 'the powerful emotional charge' that appears to underlie so much of ethnic behavior (Young 1986; Shils 1957; Geertz 1963). The instrumentalist




FIGURE 5-1
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO INTERVIEW QUESTION #
DO POLITICS IN MIAMI CONSISTENTLY DIVIDE ALONG LINES OF ETHNICITY?

perspective, also referred to as 'mobilizationist,' 'circumstantial,' or 'situational,' rejects primordial attachments as the explanation for the reemergence and persistence of ethnic factors, and focuses instead on the "conscious efforts of individuals and groups mobilizing ethnic symbols in order to obtain access to social, political and material resources" (McKay 1982, 399).

The emotion that has poured forth from various individuals and groups--before, during and after Mandela's trip to Miami--coupled with frequent references to deeply held values, kinship ties, and cultural attachments, provide evidence of a certain affective, primordial dimension of ethnicity. Cubans passionately recounted stories of friends and relatives who have been persecuted by the Castro regime. Blacks equated what was taking place in Miami with racial domination in South Africa, and asked: how dare they attack our link to the motherland? Surrounding events also indicate, however, that behind the very visible shouts and tears, there was no shortage of individuals prepared to harness that energy in the pursuit of social, political or economic gain. Spurred on by the influential and dogmatic broadcasts of Spanish radio in Miami, many local leaders found themselves in a familiar struggle to be "El Cubanismo"--or the most Cuban. Cuban, in this case, defined as very patriotic and very anti-Castro. When Mayor Gelber decided to issue a formal apology, many individuals and groups supported his gesture, but just as many others moved quickly to capitalize on the politically charged environment. And leaders of the Boycott Miami Now committee immediately recognized the social and political potential of an issue around which African-Americans, Bahamians, Jamaicans and Haitians could unite.

These circumstances suggest that an exclusive focus on either primordial or instrumental factors is of insufficient explanatory power to

account for the extreme complexity of ethnic phenomena. As Crawford Young (1986, 450) argues: "The necessity to weave together the instrumentalist and the primordialist dimensions of ethnicity is self-evident." Fortunately, there have been several promising attempts to reconcile these two apparently divergent approaches. In an attempt to explain ethnic political participation in Africa, Kasfir (1979) concludes that a combination of the assumptions in both perspectives may sometimes explain an aspect of ethnic politics, and it is the job of the analyst to examine how the different factors can vary from one case to another. Yancey, Erickson and Juliani (1976) stress that ethnicity is an emergent phenomenon--the development and persistence of which is dependent upon structural conditions. Rather than accept cultural heritage as the defining characteristic of ethnic groups, they highlight various social forces which promote the crystallization of ethnic identity. In "an exploratory synthesis of primordial and mobilizationist approaches to ethnic phenomena," James McKay (1982) delineates the complex interaction between 'affect' and 'circumstance.' Rather than asking which approach has more explanatory power, he presents a matrix model which accounts for a diversity of situations in which both primordial and mobilizationist factors are operative in varying degrees.

A new body of literature, characterized by Werner Sollors' (1989), *Invention of Ethnicity*, has become increasingly popular in recent years. This approach draws on the most valuable insights of existing theory, while improving on many of its weaknesses. Ethnicity is not viewed as ancient, unchanging, or inherent in a group's blood, soul, or misty past. Nor is ethnicity reduced to a rational means-ends calculation of those intent on manipulating it for political or economic ends:

Rather ethnicity itself is to be understood as a cultural construction accomplished over historical time. Ethnic groups in modern settings are constantly recreating themselves, and ethnicity is continuously being reinvented in response to changing realities both within the group and the host society. Ethnic group boundaries, for example, must be renegotiated, while the expressive symbols of ethnicity (ethnic traditions) must be repeatedly reinterpreted (Conzen et al. 1990, 38).

Ethnicity, in other words, is a dynamic force that evolves through interaction between and among different groups in a given context that fluctuates over time. The invention of ethnicity takes place through social and political discourse, and draws heavily upon various symbols and ideologies. These symbols, however, are not merely static products of a primordial past, but are also interpreted and reinterpreted to be made relevant to contemporary situations. Analyses of invented ethnicity must examine not only the symbols that provide content to ethnic identity, but also the strategies through which symbols are assigned meaning, applied to concrete situations and modified to changing contexts (Stern and Cicala 1991, xiii).

Chapter Four detailed the invention of a Cuban American ethnic identity based on common heritage, shared suffering under tyrannical oppression, entrepreneurial spirit, and individual success. This identity draws heavily on various symbols linked to the international arena, and was invented in a context heavily influenced by international issues, actors and events. Emotional references to Castro and the evil threat of communist expansion have appealed to the exile sentiment of the Cuban community, and have facilitated unprecedented social, political and economic mobilization along ethnic lines. The constant manipulation of these symbols by local politicians, community leaders and the media further legitimizes and strengthens their appeal, to the point that anti-communism and anti-Castroism are, today, part and parcel of Cuban American ethnicity.

Cuban American ethnic identity is largely defined in terms of economic, social and political success; and has, in turn, facilitated such success among Cubans in Miami. Blacks in Miami have not had the same success in designing an ethnic identity that meets their social, political and economic needs. In an analysis of Blacks and ethnicity in the U.S., Martin Kilson argues that Whites have denied Blacks a viable ethnic identity primarily through authoritarian restrictions upon political participation. According to Kilson, ethnicity is an essential attribute of viable social status in American life; and Blacks have been deprived of that attribute due to: (1) the historical refusal by white supremacist American society to accord Blacks a quality of ethnic characterization comparable to that accorded white ethnic groups; (2) the lack of a true and viable Black American heritage to shape and sustain a cohesive identity or awareness; and (3), a high degree of ambivalence among Blacks with regard to the importance of Black unity (Kilson 1975, 240-245).

Many Blacks in Miami tend to support Kilson's thesis, and point to numerous decisions by the Anglo power structure in Miami--ranging from the construction of highways through thriving Black neighborhoods, to an at-large election system which dilutes minority voting strength, to a subtle divide and conquer strategy with respect to Blacks and Cubans--all of which have eroded existing solidarity among Blacks and obstructed the potential for future ethnic social or political mobilization along ethnic lines.

The recent boycott represents an unprecedented form of social and political mobilization on behalf of the Black community in Miami. Mandela is the powerful symbol around which this mobilization occurred. The snubbing of the South African leader, who represents the struggle against racial oppression world wide, struck a very sensitive cord among Blacks in Miami. The meaning and application of that symbol for Metropolitan Miami, however,

occurred through the manipulation of the Mandela symbol by local leaders, politicians and the media in the pursuit of various social, political and economic gains.

Evidence suggests that the manipulation of Mandela as a symbol has been a relatively successful strategy on the part of certain Black leaders in Miami. The predominant ethnic discourse of any group, however, is rarely accepted by all of its members. This is the case among Cuban Americans, such as one politician and Dade County employee who, when asked about the political solidarity among Cubans in Miami, responded (Interview, June 16, 1992): "Jorge Mas Canosa does not speak for me, he never did and never will." It is also the case among Blacks with regard to the boycott. One prominent African American civic leader had this to say about the boycott and the principles upon which it is founded (Interview July 2, 1992):

It makes no sense. I don't give a damn about Mandela ... There's no need to practice international brotherhood. Africa has never claimed me, I wasn't snubbed, and nobody in power in Africa ever stood up for my struggle.

The attempt to portray the boycott as an alternative to street level violence through reference to a "Quiet Riot" is also contested by various members of the Black population in Miami.

The boycott is not representative, absolutely not. It's not reaching the street. These are Black lawyers working for White law firms. H.T. (Smith) has always had this total fixation with Mandela (Interview, June, 10, 1992).

Another African American civic leader remarked (Interview June 18, 1992): "The boycott is only representative of those who are doing it;" and a former Black elected official referred to the "Quiet Riot" as "H.T. Smith's personal power trip" (Interview, July 27, 1992).

Just as a "Quiet Riot" can take on symbolic significance in a city scarred by a history of civil unrest, Mandela evokes an emotional response among a local population bitter from years of racial oppression. Interestingly, however, Mandela, like Castro, is an international figure physically far removed from the local context of Metropolitan Miami. Also like Castro, Mandela is a symbol whose meaning and relevance for Miami is heavily influenced by the international system. Cold War politics and a US foreign policy focused intently on halting communist expansion, assigned a great deal of legitimacy to the symbols and rhetoric of anti-communism which comprised Cuban American ethnic discourse in Miami. Similarly, as a world culture of democracy allegedly sweeps the globe, South Africa has come under increasing international pressure to dismantle its apartheid system. The fact that Nelson Mandela is now widely recognized as a key figure in South Africa's democratic future enhances his significance and legitimacy as a symbol of the struggle for racial equality among Blacks in Miami and around the world.

The symbolic and global nature of ethnic identities in Miami also characterizes the relationships--whether conflictual or cooperative--between ethnic groups. The struggle that took place in the context of Mandela's visit was not directly about jobs, territory or positions of political power. It appeared to be an ideological confrontation focused on a single individual whose symbolic significance for one group was in direct confrontation with his symbolic significance for another. This has been the case in Miami whether the issue is the English language, communism, or the holocaust.⁶ Many observers and participants also contend that any resolution of the Mandela dispute is currently paralyzed by the highly symbolic issue of an apology. Arthur Teitelbaum, regional director of the Anti-Defamation League, remarked (Parker 1991, 15):

Are expressions of pain and regret acceptable substitutes for the words "I'm sorry?" The point has been made. Now what? Shall we be confounded because the boycotters have failed to obtain a coerced apology from the mayor?

Ethnic group discourse in Miami does rely heavily on symbols--many of which are drawn from issues, actors, ideologies and events operating at the level of the international system. Once appropriated to the local level, the symbols utilized by any particular ethnic group, and the discourse to which they give rise, interact closely with the discourses and symbols of other groups. Ethnicity, in other words, is a negotiated phenomenon. Ethnic symbols and the strategies to endow them with meaning exist in a particular context and evolve through interaction within and between groups. As Stern and Cicala (1991, xii): write: "Choosing an ethnic expression, applying it to diverse situations, and transmitting it through time and space are based on decision-making and community interplay that require a great deal of creativity and inspiration".

Group discourses in Miami frequently intersect, overlap and inform one another; and, during this process, the appropriation, manipulation and reinterpretation of various symbols is widespread. Certain symbols popular within one group may be borrowed by another in an attempt to legitimize their own ethnic discourse. Cubans in Miami, for example, often compare the evils perpetrated by the Castro regime to the holocaust against Jews in Nazi Germany (Rieff 1987b, 71). Similarly, in response to the highly critical Americas Watch report detailing the Cuban exile community's attacks on free speech in Miami, Jorge Davila Miguel, columnist for El Nuevo Herald wrote (Miguel 1992, 31A):

What would happen in Miami Beach if someone started a magazine or a radio program which tried to "put into perspective" the virtues of the PLO and Yasser Arafat or, in Liberty City, the values of apartheid? The reactions of outrage might be considered justified.

When African American columnist Robert Steinback defended Mandela against what he viewed as very unjust and inappropriate treatment by many within the Cuban and Jewish populations in Miami, he pointed out that Mandela affirms Israel's right to exist even though Israel maintained solid business ties with South Africa and asked (Steinback 1990, 1B):

Has the Cuban exile community vocally expressed solidarity with those who fight for freedom in South Africa, or even with the plight of the black underclass in this country? Why should Mandela renounce the staunch support he got from Castro?

The battle over redrawing Florida's legislative districts in 1992 was also characterized by a great deal of ethnic polarization and symbol manipulation. Several Jewish legislators, alarmed at the prospect of losing political clout amidst a burgeoning Hispanic population in South Florida, resorted to emotional recollections of the holocaust in an attempt to protect their districts. State Representative Elaine Bloom of Miami Beach complained to a three-judge panel that: "No one cares about the Anglo population or the Jewish population in Dade County" (Nickens 1992, 1B). She and seven other lawmakers, five of them Jewish, filed the following petition with the federal court (Bousquet 1992, 1A):

Jewish voters must be protected. Fewer than 50 years ago, European Jewry were victims of the greatest persecution the world has ever seen, the Nazi Holocaust ... Jews have been discriminated against in the United States and the state of Florida.

Similar types of symbolic interaction take place in an atmosphere of cooperation. During a May 31, 1992 'Rally for Israel' in Miami Beach, a Hispanic pastor from a local group, Amigos Cristianos de Israel (Hispanic

Christians in Support of Israel) rose to the podium to proclaim to a predominantly Jewish audience: "You might wonder why I'm up here. I love you. Lots of other Christians out there love you and support you. We identify with your cause, your persecution, and your unwillingness to compromise." The audience applauded loudly. Once the pastor was seated, the Jewish Rabbi presiding over the ceremony returned to the podium, thanked him, and responded: "We, too, hope that someday soon Cuba will be free and democratic." The audience again erupted in applause.

Ethnic symbols in Miami are also appropriated and manipulated within groups. Sam Safenstein of the New Jewish Agenda adamantly defended Miami Beach Mayor Seymour Gelber's decision to issue a "Mandela Day" proclamation. He argued that to reduce Mandela's lifelong dedication to an issue of ANC aid from questionable sources was "ludicrous;" and issued the following "reminder to Jews: It was Czechoslovakia--then part of the Soviet Communist Bloc, labeled as US enemy #1--that sold arms to Israel in 1948 which proved decisive in its war of liberation" (Safenstein 1992, 20). Similarly, by referring to the boycott as a "Quiet Riot", organizers draw on a very potent symbol of resistance to construct an ethnic discourse that appeals to even the most radical elements of the Black population, at the same time invoking threat within the larger Miami community as a whole.

In certain cases, one ethnic group may also reinterpret the content of another group's identity through its own symbolic lens, or attempt to impose its own ethnic discourse on to that of another group. Amidst the controversy surrounding Mandela's visit, Cubans in Miami struggled forcefully against portrayal of the conflict in racial terms, and argued instead that ("Racial or Ideological," 1990, 4A):

The Cubans, who have suffered communism, who know it because they have lived it, do not want for the people of South Africa the substitution of their present regime with a communist tyranny. The Cubans in exile want for that people the elimination of racial segregation and all the injustice that this implies, wishing for that nation the full prevalence of human rights and of political freedom.

In addition to the appropriation, manipulation and reinterpretation of various symbols, some groups in Miami attack, or call into question the symbolic content of other groups' ethnic identities. One Cuban American respondent interviewed in 1992 chastised the Black community's "fixation" with Mandela: "I tell H.T. Smith, 'Yeah right, H.T., you're going back to Africa. What are you going to do with the Mercedes?'" (Interview, June 8, 1992). One African American county official referred to the Cubans in Miami as "people who talk about fleeing a dictator, now ruling a dictatorship" (Interview, June 10, 1992). Another African American, employed by the Mayor's office, complained (Interview, July 8, 1992):

Hispanics say they are patriotic--hah! They came here of their own free will. They don't accept our constitutions, they don't ask to be allowed in, don't give up the language, and don't give up the fight over there. What we do here has nothing to do with over there.

This very symbolic nature of ethnic group interaction and ethnic identity in Miami does not, however, negate the potency of these symbols as tools to be manipulated in the pursuit of more tangible political, economic or social gains. The Cuban community in Miami, for example, has been very successful at linking symbolic issues, such as anticommunism, to a more complete and substantive political and economic agenda (Stack and Warren 1990). In the case of the boycott, not only did Black leaders attach a variety of concerns to the original demand for an apology, but also used both the boycott and Mandela in an attempt to forge a Pan-African ethnic identity in Miami among Blacks of distinct cultural and historical backgrounds. Various

Black leaders spoke passionately about brotherhood and links to the motherland. One African American community activist, speaking about the Mandela incident and the subsequent mobilization of Blacks, explained: "I call it the 'Cousin Theory.' We're all cousins. Where you're living now just depends on where the slave ship stopped" (Interview, October 30, 1992). Furthermore, after years of animosity between African Americans and Haitians, immigration policy toward Haitians and police brutality against Haitians, became top priorities of Boycott Miami Now, an organizational group comprised primarily of North American Blacks.

The success of these political strategies is debatable, and certainly difficult to quantify. Cuban American leaders such as Jorge Mas Canosa, do appear to wield a great deal of power. There is some indication, however, that issues such as the United States Information Agency's broadcast of Radio Marti into Havana are, for Cubans in Miami, becoming less relevant in the face of growing concerns over health care, education, and job security. Extreme emphasis on symbolic issues may also be counterproductive if nontangible values are secured in the absence of any alteration in the basic distribution of resources (Edelman 1985, 40; Stack and Warren 1990, 13).

The "Quiet Riot" in Miami has focused attention on the plight of the Black community; and has, at least among some Blacks, enhanced a sense of dignity, pride and ethnic solidarity. Other individuals within Miami's Black community, however, questioned the effectiveness of the boycott strategy, and the relevance of Mandela to their local plight. Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether Mandela is a symbol powerful enough to unite North American Blacks, Jamaicans, Haitians and Bahamians in Miami around a common political agenda.

Irrespective of any substantive gain, mobilization around ethnic symbols does serve to transform ethnic groups into political actors - not just at the local level, but nationally and internationally as well. Castro and communism are symbols that have, and continue to fuel expeditions by exiles in Miami hoping to liberate the island. As recently as July 4, 1992, one group of Cuban American combatants had their invasion attempt thwarted when the boat broke down inside Cuban waters. the *Miami Herald* reported: "There they were, four would-be raiders dressed in military garb, standing ankle deep in water in a broken boat drifting toward Cuba. Yelling on the radio for the U.S. Coast Guard to come get them NOW" (Hancock 1992b, 1B)!

Jorge Mas Canosa, a private Cuban American citizen, who does not currently, nor has ever held elected office in the US, also engages in a variety of transnational negotiations normally associated with elected officials and foreign diplomats. For example, the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), under the leadership of Jorge Mas Canosa, created Operation Exodus--a very successful private immigration service that brings Cubans into the US from third countries. With funding from the US government and private donors, a staff of 64 directors and 70 trustees "has smoothed the way" into America for more than 8,000 Cuban immigrants. According to one official who supervises the program for the INS: "The foundation does the casework. They get to choose the people we will consider" (Slevin 1992, 21A).

Jorge Mas Canosa and the CANF lobbied hard to secure US government support for UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) rebels fighting to overthrow the Marxist government in Angola. In 1988, Mas Canosa travelled to Angola to sign a commitment of common cause with UNITA--making the CANF the first private, tax-exempt organization in America to execute a treaty with an African rebel group (Slevin 1992, 21A). And in

August of 1992, Mas Canosa travelled to Mexico City to meet with President Salinas de Gortari. The meeting marked the first time since 1959 that Mexico, a faithful friend of Havana, welcomed one of Castro's foes. One source reported that during the meeting Salinas made key concessions on trade with Cuba in exchange for CANF support for the North American Free Trade Agreement (Chardy 1992, 4A). Similarly, on October 14, 1992, a Public Broadcasting System special entitled "Campaign For Cuba" reported that Mas Canosa had worked closely with Boris Yelstin, offering to lobby for US government aid to Russia in exchange for the withdrawal of military and financial support from Cuba.

The Black community in Miami has yet to exercise the same degree of influence locally, nationally or internationally. The boycott, as well as voter drives and other forms of political mobilizations that have taken place around the Mandela issue, have caused the local power structure in Miami to recognize Blacks as a viable political force in Dade County. By adding immigration policy to the list of demands, boycott organizers in Miami have taken their claims to the level of the federal government. Expeditions by regional NAACP president Johnnie McMillan and other local African American leaders to Haiti, as well as increased contact between local Blacks and the African National Congress as a result of Mandela's visit, also indicate the increased potential for transnational activity on the part of Blacks in Miami.

Concluding Remarks

All summer long the ghost of South African anti-apartheid leader Nelson Mandela has haunted Miami as surely as a bearded wraith named Fidel Castro has deviled the city for three decades. Like Cuban Miami's absentee archvillain, black Miami's imported superhero is now a touchstone and tuning fork for local reality, a lens required for viewing life at the end of America (Rowe 1990, 12).

Today, scholars of ethnicity agree on the need to study ethnic phenomena contextually, including further empirical exploration of how ethnic identity is formed, and what processes activate ethnic identity in the pursuit of particular goals (Kasfir 1979, 95). Similarly, real world events now occurring around the globe demand that greater attention be paid to the emergence and resurgence of ethnicity in both the developed and developing world. The Miami case, and particularly the events surrounding the visit of Nelson Mandela, provide an ideal opportunity to illuminate the essence of ethnicity and ethnic group relations in the context of a changing world system.

Miami's status as a global city is widely recognized by analysts and observers of various backgrounds who tend to emphasize the impact of ethnic diversity on the internationalization of Miami. Large numbers of immigrants have created a multicultural social milieu; the ties those immigrants maintain to their native countries and cultures has facilitated commercial and financial linkages between Miami and Latin America in particular; and the presence of these newcomers has introduced new, international political issues and policy concerns into the local political arena.

Underlying this interpretation of the internationalization of Miami is the conceptualization of ethnicity as a variable which significantly impacts social, economic and political activity in an urban area. Although this is an accurate assumption, it fails to recognize that ethnicity may also be a dependent variable. Just as ethnic diversity has influenced those processes of globalization, so, too, have those processes influenced ethnicity and ethnic relations in Miami. They have done so not simply by diversifying the local population, or by altering the economic conditions in which ethnic groups interact, but also by injecting new symbols into ethnic political discourses at

the local level, and altering the context in which those symbols are assigned meaning.

The events surrounding Mandela's visit to Miami suggest that ethnicity is not a preconscious form of cultural attachment, nor is it merely a rational construct. The fluid and contextual nature of ethnic identity and ethnic relations in Miami requires that ethnicity, itself, be reconceptualized, and that theories of the international system be amended to account for the role that ethnicity continues to play in a new world order. The challenge, therefore, is to articulate the complex and dynamic set of processes which invent and reinvent ethnicity, and to link those processes to an equally complex and dynamic set of processes that comprise the international system.

In an attempt to meet that challenge, this analysis of the globalization of ethnicity in Miami takes to heart Donald Horowitz's (1977, 7) suggestion that the study of ethnicity move away from "metaphors of blood and stone" to those of "clay and putty;" but also emphasizes that any examination of the contours of that clay and putty must be placed in the context of a dynamic and interdependent world system.

Notes

1. Six of the 15 points which made reference to a beneficiary group specifically used the term "African-American." The other nine stated "black," or "black-owned."
2. Keohane and Nye's edited volume, *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, is perhaps the most well-known work on the topic, but has also spurred a huge volume of related literature since its publication in 1971. See, for example, the special issue on "International Regimes," edited by Stephen Krasner in *International Organizations*, 36:2 (Spring) 1982.
3. The concept of a world-system is most often attributed to Wallerstein's (1976), *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. For a comprehensive and insightful collection of works focusing primarily on the linkages between the United States, Latin America, and the Caribbean, see Sanderson's (1985) edited

volume on *The Americas in the New International Division of Labor*. Also see Johan Galtung's discussion of the transnational quality of dependency in "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," *Journal of Peace Research*, 2(1971): 81-117.

4. In Smith and Feagin's (1987) volume, *The Capitalist City*, contributors provide an examination of how various processes of economic restructuring -- plant closures, plant start-ups, the expansion of service and other type jobs -- impact household and community restructuring at the local level.

5. For equally insightful, but similarly flawed approaches to ethnicity and the international system, see Astri Suhrke and Lela Noble's (1977) *Ethnic Conflict in International Relations*, and Judy Bertelsen's (1977) *Nonstate Nations in International Politics*.

6. Throughout the summer of 1992, residents of Miami Beach engaged in a heated battle over whether or not the City of Miami Beach should fund cost of maintaining and operating the Holocaust Memorial. The memorial is located on city property, but some critics argued that tax dollars should not go toward the upkeep of a religious monument. Public hearings on the matter were characterized by emotional references to the horrors of the Holocaust, and accusation of Naziism among those opposed to city support for the memorial.

CHAPTER SIX
CONTESTED REALITIES/SHIFTING TERRAIN:
TOWARD A THEORY OF ETHNICITY IN THE POSTMODERN WORLD

"The most charming thing about Miami is that no one knows what it is." ¹

John Keasler
Miami News Columnist

Is Miami the "land of opportunity?" A "paradise lost?" A "sophisticated tropics" or a "Banana Republic?" Is it the "city of the future," or a "city on the edge?" Is Miami America's Riviera, or America's Pretoria? Miami is all of these things -- a composite of images that overlap and intersect, compete and collide. From this welter of myth and reality the city's boosters have capitalized on, even perpetuated, Miami's elusiveness and romanticized the city's ambiguity as a form of "magic." But beyond the glitz and the glitter Miami provides a lens, albeit a bold and magnified one, through which to view other places, issues and ideas.

The vagaries of geography and history have conspired in their uniqueness to construct a city in South Florida like none other in the United States. Yet, fascinating though these idiosyncrasies may be, the significance of Miami lies not in its particularities, but, rather, in the broader implications such specificities hold for the theory and method of contemporary social research. The single-minded student of racial and ethnic conflict who approaches such problems from a conventional standpoint quickly confronts

a bewildering array of claims and counterclaims, grievances and assertions, heroes and victims – few of which can be readily anchored to the objective conditions to which they presumably refer, but which remain, nonetheless, powerful and consequential political forces. Most such claims exist in direct opposition to contradictory assertions, as each perspective vies for attention and dominance within the "public mind."

Further complicating the welter of contrasting images is the additional realization that neither the claims themselves, nor the coalition of individuals and groups who give them voice, remain constant for very long, but shift and turn, and acquire new meanings and shed others, all in the very process of their articulation. Circumstances such as these displace the analytical object from the comfortable domain of linear reasoning and positivist thought to pose numerous epistemological, theoretical and methodological challenges for conventional social science inquiry.

Most attempts to interpret social, political and economic phenomena in Miami begin with the assumption that the stratification of individuals and groups along lines of ethnicity is rooted in deeply held values and primordial attachments. Social conflict is presumed to result from a clash between different cultures, as well as a competition for limited resources, that pits these distinct groups in a zero-sum struggle for economic, political and social well-being. The approach I have presented here challenges these widely held assumptions, and argues instead that neither the issues or the problems over which groups struggle, nor the identities and interests around which members of a group coalesce, are the direct or unmediated outcome of objective conditions or empirical facts. As such, this research project is guided by an alternative assumption – namely that issues, problems, interests and identities are not soundly anchored to an objective empirical reality, but

are themselves images of reality created through discursive processes that define or assign meaning to social phenomena -- or that construct social reality.

The perspective does not deny the importance of class divisions, social hierarchies, and the concentration of wealth and political power. The point, rather, is to understand that different groups, variously situated within the city's social structure, actively promote competing images of Miami, some of which achieve greater currency than others. Each element of the various images draws upon an acceptable repertoire of cultural values and symbols. Many of the constituent elements are firmly ingrained and relatively stable themes of North American culture, such as the rights of citizenship, private property, and equality before the law. The salience of other themes rise and fall in accordance with local, national and international events, as evidenced by the declining relevance of Cold War themes as a viable discursive resource. Viewed in this way, social and political outcomes are related to power and position but hardly in a direct fashion. Critical to the exploration of the process -- and the central focus of this analysis -- is the discursive element of image construction.

Constructed Realities

An examination of public discourse in Miami from 1960 to 1990 revealed a multitude of comments, complaints, problems, issues, actors and threats. These were social constructions, not firmly grounded in an objective reality but defined through the claims-making activity of various individuals and groups. Specific claims, whether they be about job displacement, Cuban entrepreneurship or Nelson Mandela, were surrounded by other claims which made reference to similar concerns, however loosely or problematically

related. The outcome was a number of narratives or themes that existed simultaneously, assigning specific meanings to the disparate elements, issues and activities that comprise social reality. Neither the construction of these narratives, nor the claims which provide their content, was arbitrary.

Rather, both were comfortably situated within particular configurations of social, political and economic power and interests at specific points in time.

The Liberty City riots focused local, national and international attention on Miami, and the causes of the rebellion became a topic of discussion and debate among the media, politicians, community leaders, and local government task forces. This discussion highlighted a variety of factors which contributed to the anger and frustration of Blacks in Miami. These factors included a lack of trust in a law enforcement system which was replete with examples of police brutality against Black residents, and diminished faith in a court system of judges and juries that seemed committed to looking the other way. Also relevant was a sense of hopelessness and despair in the face of low employment rates, high rents, and inadequate city and county services — all of which persisted amidst years of unkept promises by local politicians and community leaders to address these pressing concerns.

The riots of 1980 temporarily put these issues back on Miami's public agenda, but also propelled to the top of that agenda the issue of immigration and its impact on the local African American population in Miami. A frequent claim that surfaced in the discussion and debate attributed the riots to Black anger at the loss of jobs to Cuban refugees, and frustration with growing labor market competition between new immigrants and established residents. The fact that the 1980 riots occurred just weeks after the Mariel boatlift, and following a long year of record arrivals of Haitian refugees, lent credence to

this complaint. The empirical evidence did not, however, support the notion of a Hispanic takeover of Black jobs.

Chapter Three addressed this discrepancy between the social definition of reality in Miami and objective conditions. Rather than attempt to settle the labor market debate in Miami, that analysis explored the emergence and legitimation of the job displacement claim itself. Complaints about job displacement were traced back to the early 1960s when the Cuban refugee influx coincided with both an economic downturn that brought high unemployment to the area, and with the spread of civil rights gains to South Florida which increased the political and economic expectations of the local Black population. The claim that the refugees would take jobs from US workers reflected the frustration of an urban population suffering economic stagnation, the concerns of Black leaders fearful that the newcomers would detract much needed attention from the African American cause, and the desperation of local officials attempting to secure adequate assistance from Washington to cope with the local impact of the refugee crisis.

The discourse on displacement appeared to subside in the 1970s, as Miami entered what was frequently referred to as the "decade of progress." In 1980, however, in the midst of worldwide recession, a Latin American debt crisis which reverberated through Miami, a record influx of Haitian refugees, an Anglo population visibly frustrated with the latinization of Miami, and one of the worst race riots in US. history, immigration as a social problem was again catapulted to the top of Miami's public agenda.

The complaints about a loss of jobs to immigrants were surrounded by a variety of other claims which held Cuban immigrants responsible for issues and indiscretions ranging from an increase in the incidence of gambling among African Americans in Miami, to a local business environment

characterized by crime and corruption. Whether it be the "120-decibel level of casual Cuban conversation" (Resnick 1990, 10A), or animal carcasses floating in the Miami River, Cuban immigrants were portrayed not only as a threat to the job base of local residents, but to the moral fabric of American society as well. The job displacement claim, although not well supported by empirical analysis, was the cornerstone of a broader public discourse which defined immigration as a foreign invasion and the immigrants as unwelcome intruders.

The Cuban success story was similarly based on shaky empirical grounds, but closely related to the tug and pull of vested interests -- locally, nationally and internationally. The image of Cuban immigrants as hard-working, patriotic survivors of communist oppression arose from a series of claims, comments, characterizations and concerns that simultaneously served the social, political and economic interests of various individuals and groups. The discourse on tyranny arose in large part from the claims-making activity of US. politicians, government officials, and the media, and was a definition of reality that reflected and fortified US. foreign policy concerns during the Cold War. For Cubans in Miami, this narrative expressed the psychological tumult inherent in immigration to a foreign land, and the obstacles the refugees encountered in gaining acceptance and incorporation into American society. Statements made by the business elite in Miami calling for a 1,000 more refugees, reflected their personal satisfaction, as well as financial gain from the economic turnaround in Miami during the late 1960s and 1970s.

During the early 1990s, the visit of Nelson Mandela, and the subsequent Black tourism boycott, consumed public attention in Miami. The controversy surrounding these events was widely interpreted as another example of pervasive ethnic conflict in Miami, and as evidence of particularly deep-

seated hostility between Latins and Blacks. Analysis revealed, however, that the Mandela conflict was not directly about jobs, political power or a clash of primordial ethnic values. To a large extent, what took place was a struggle over meaning. Mandela was a symbol whose ideological significance for one group was in direct confrontation with what he signified to another group. He was, at the same time, a symbol of liberation and a supporter of tyrannical repression.

Not only did the emergence and legitimation of public discourses in Miami mirror patterns of vested interests and symbolic attachments, but the specific symbols and ideologies on which these different definitions of social reality drew also reflected the context and configuration of social, cultural, economic and political resources available to particular groups at a given time. As a recent immigrant group, the discourse of Cubans in Miami drew heavily on symbols of kinship, common ancestry and shared traditions. The potency of this cultural capital was fortified by a continued influx of new arrivals from Cuba. As an established resident majority, at least prior to the 1990s, Non Latin Whites had access to the powerful symbols of US. citizenship, nationality and language -- all of which were skillfully manipulated by politicians campaigning for "American" seats, media editorials bemoaning the loss of spoken English in Dade County, and bumper stickers making passionate references to the American flag.

As a disenfranchised racial minority in Dade County, Blacks not only suffered limited political and economic resources, but also lacked access to the same sort of cultural and symbolic capital available to Non-Latin Whites and Cuban immigrants. The structure of Dade County's local political and economic system has been characterized as unresponsive to Blacks, and used to explain the explosive rioting (Stack 1991, 293). This same set of circumstances may

also explain why the unprecedented political mobilization of Dade County Blacks during the boycott, or "Quiet Riot," drew not on symbols of citizenship or American civic culture, but on the threat of social violence.

Contested Symbols and Competing Claims

The narratives operating in Miami during the past thirty years, and their constituent claims, did not exist in isolation. Each definition of reality and the symbols contained within, interacted with, informed, and often directly clashed with others. Cuban-Americans, for example, readily admit that their shift from "exile politics" to "ethnic politics" was, in part, a conscious reaction to perceived discrimination by Non-Latin Whites in Dade County (Stack and Warren 1990). At the same time, many Non-Latin Whites and Blacks engaged in a discourse that directly challenged the Cubans' self-portrayal as humble and hard-working exiles banished from their homeland. While Cuban Americans espoused patriotism, Non-Cubans complained that the immigrants lacked respect for the principles of democracy. Cuban Americans told tales of their rise from rags to riches, and Non-Cubans associated the Latin community with corruption and unscrupulous business practices. Cuban Americans emphasized their desperate flight from tyranny, while one African American, drawing an implicit contrast to slavery, remarked: "They came here of their own free will" (Interview, July 8, 1992). And while Cuban Americans complain very vocally about the Castro dictatorship, Non-Cubans in Miami accuse the immigrants of behaving like dictators themselves.

When Nelson Mandela became Black Miami's "imported superhero" just as Castro had long been Cuban Miami's "absentee archvillain" Cubans in Miami were quick to attack the symbolic content of a Black ethnic discourse focused on Africa in much the same way their own symbolic ties to Cuba were

increasingly chastised (Rowe 1990, 12). And in 1992, Jewish leaders from Dade County conjured up the holocaust as a key issue in the battle to redraw legislative districts in South Florida. In this local environment saturated by passionate political appeals to culture and tradition, the tendency to manipulate ethnic symbols, and to mobilize around ethnic identity, was contagious. A close look at these conflicts reveals that in Miami various issues, actors and events acquire a meaning and political potency not easily explained by conventional analytical frameworks, or, more specifically, through reference to empirical data. Whether it be a battle over the county's official language, a city referendum on communism, or an apology from local politicians who would not welcome South African leader Nelson Mandela because he publicly supported Cuban President Fidel Castro, much of what constitutes social conflict in Miami is best described as a struggle over symbols, waged through symbols, and offering as a reward little more than symbols.

The confrontation among groups was, in many cases, very direct. In other instances, however, the use of discourses as a weapons of attack and defense was more subtle. When some Non-Latin Whites praised the Cuban refugees for their willingness to embrace the ideals of hard work and self-sacrifice they implicitly characterized other groups (read: Blacks) as less willing to do so. When Cubans emphasized the color-blind character Cuban society they implicitly blamed Non-Latin Whites for the racial hostility that plagued Miami. Furthermore, by accusing the Anglo-elite of an attempt to "divide and conquer" minority groups in Miami, both Blacks and Cubans recognized that certain definitions of social reality, such as job displacement, served to pit Blacks against Hispanics, and deflected attention from

inequalities and injustices deeply embedded in the social, political and economic structures of Dade County.

Shifting Terrain

The symbolic nature of group interaction in Miami does not negate the potency of these symbols as tools to be manipulated in the pursuit of more tangible political or economic gain. Discursive activity, in other words, is not inconsequential, nor do the images that it constructs remain constant. The competing definitions of social reality in Miami fluctuated over time, and their constituent claims were not issued consistently, nor were they always put forth by the same individuals or groups.

During the 1970s, for example, the civic-business elite in Miami portrayed the Cuban refugees as an economic and cultural asset to Dade County. The 1973 declaration of Dade County as a bilingual and bicultural county was partly viewed as a recognition, if not expression of gratitude, for the contributions of the Cuban newcomers. By the 1980s, however, media reports, the editorial pages of the *Miami Herald*, and the overwhelming Anglo support for the anti-bilingual referendum indicated that this view had begun to sour. In the 1990s, many Non-Latin White leaders appeared eager to embrace, at least publicly, the virtues of multiculturalism. Yet, interview results showed this group still likely to blame social tensions in Miami on the rapid and continual influx of immigrants -- more likely, in fact, than many Blacks.

Just as the attitude of the Anglo establishment toward the immigrants appeared to fluctuate, certain prominent figures within the African American community in Miami also changed their viewpoint not only with regard to the impact of immigration, but with regard to the circumstances confronting

Blacks in Miami in general. As co-author of *The Miami Riot: Crossing the Bounds*, Dr. Marvin Dunn, professor of psychology at Florida International University and respected community leader in Dade County, discussed the Cuban influx into Miami as one of the factors that contributed to the Liberty City riots in 1980. He pointed specifically to a "devastating job takeover" experienced by Blacks, and emphasized the success of Cuban immigrants in diverting attention and resources away from Miami Blacks (Porter and Dunn 1984, 195). Similarly, in a May 1976 speech at a Bi-lingual Conference in Miami, Dunn once warned:

There are other signs which convince me that cultural conflict on a massive scale may soon be upon us. The fact is that there is hard and bitter competition, especially between low income blacks and Latins, for the few jobs that are left to many of the residents in our economically depressed community. Blacks who held the most menial jobs in this city had to share those jobs with Latins after the great Cuban influx ("Looming Conflict" 1976, 1B).

Despite the fact that the 1980s seemed to fulfill Dunn's forecast, his public statements regarding the immigrant takeover changed during the 1990s. In a 1991 edited volume, *Miami: The Sophisticated Tropics*, Dunn wrote:

There are many misconceptions about black Miami. One of these is that all, or most, black Miamians are poor and have been muscled out of the job market by newly arriving immigrants, black, white, and particularly brown. This has been a lingering legacy from Miami's time of fire: the 1980s, when the city was rocked by a series of racial disturbances. Yet there has not been any compelling evidence to support such a view (Beebe 1991, 151).

In 1990, Dunn also joined several Cuban American scholars in preparing a Ford Foundation report on relations between established residents and newcomers in Miami. The report challenged the job displacement thesis, and highlighted the recent economic and political gains of Blacks in Dade County relative to both Non-Latin Whites and Cubans (Stepick et al. 1990). When interviewed for this study in 1992, Dunn responded to the job

displacement question as follows: "That has always been overstated. We really know nothing definite" (Interview, June 30, 1992).

During a political protest rally in Miami in 1984, another well known public figure in Dade County's African American community shouted before a large and angry crowd of Blacks that:

I'd rather be Black in South Africa than be Black in South Florida. In South Africa you know you're going to be treated like a nigger. In South Florida they treat you nice before you go to sleep at night, and you don't know what to expect in the morning.²

This same individual, during an interview in July 1992, not only stated that ethnic and race relations in Miami had vastly improved since the 1980s, but also vehemently rejected any symbolic linkage to South Africa remarking that: "I don't give a damn about Nelson Mandela" (Interview July 2, 1992).

The Cuban success story was also characterized by fluctuating comments, claims and concerns. During the 1960s and 1970s, the social and political energies of the Cubans in Miami remained focused almost entirely on their anticipated return to the island. Complaints about Castro, warnings about the evils of communism, and laments about the agony of exile dominated discussion and debate among the Cuban refugees. By the 1980s, Cubans in Miami began to exhibit social and political behavior more akin to that of traditional immigrant groups. Larger numbers of Cubans became US. citizens, voter turnout among Cuban Americans increased, and although deep concern over Cuba and Castro remained, Cubans in Miami began to take a more active interest in local political, economic and social issues. In the 1990s, public statements put forth by some Cuban American leaders are indistinguishable, in content and form, from those of the Anglo establishment in Dade County.

To a large extent, the changing nature of public discourse in Miami responded to shifts in the social, political and economic context of the local,

national and international arenas. Discursive activity, however, not only reflects but also reinforces and redefines established configurations of social, political and economic interests. The claims, comments and concerns detailed in Chapter 3 defined immigration as a threatening invasion, but also defined social reality in a way that reinforced the status quo, or the "mobilization of bias," in Miami. Similarly, the claims that contributed to the success of the Cuban success story simultaneously fortified the ideological strength of democratic capitalism and reinforced the myth of the American dream. The many tales of 'rags to riches' told by Cuban immigrants themselves served to explain, defend and protect the status of a group that had relatively rapidly made the transition from an exile population to an established social, political and economic force in Dade County. In 1990, when the boycott organizers and others manipulated the symbolic strength attached to Mandela and South Africa, they altered the perceptions of identity and interests among previously unallied Black groups in Dade County.

Tri-Ethnic Politics

The discussion and debate surrounding various issues in Miami--immigration, Cuban success, and Mandela--revealed a common tendency to separate the population of Metropolitan Miami into three distinct groups -- Blacks, Hispanics, and Anglos, or Non-Latin Whites. The tri-ethnic framework dominates most every analysis of Miami, but is, itself, poorly grounded in objective conditions. Use of the terms Anglo, Black and Hispanic seem almost unavoidable in any discussion of Miami, as the preceding chapters indicate. These chapters also indicate, however, that the categories themselves conceal as much about the nature and complexity of social, political and economic phenomena in Dade County as they reveal. Subsumed under the heading

"Anglo," for example, is a substantial Jewish population that increasingly resents the loss of its own ethnic distinctiveness. Hispanic is a completely fallacious term that masks relevant distinctions of class, race, religion, nationality, political ideology, age, and gender among the Latin population in Dade County. Furthermore, the category 'Black' in Miami signifies little more than the skin color of a particular individual or group.

The processes that assign meaning to social issues and problems also define individual identity and influence the formation and fluctuation of group alliances. Through the frequent utilization and manipulation of the terms Black, Hispanic and Anglo, for example, these categories whose content is detached from empirical conditions become identities endowed with independent explanatory significance.

The discourse on displacement defines long time foes -- Blacks and Anglos -- as allies in a resistance against the Hispanic invaders. This "us vs. them" social and political identity draws heavily on notions of citizenship, established residency, and a shared American culture. What is obscured by this definition is: (1) the long history of social tension between Non-Latin Whites and Blacks in Miami which predates the massive influx of Cuban refugees; (2) the fact that many Hispanics have resided in Dade County for as long, or longer, than many Blacks and Non-Latin Whites; and (3) the tendency of both Anglos and Blacks, in other contexts, to challenge the notion that they do, in fact, share a common culture.

Just as the discourse on displacement defines social identity in Miami along the dubious lines of natives versus newcomers, the Cuban success story defined Cuban-American ethnic identity on similarly debatable grounds. The narrative surrounding Cuban immigration to the US. defined Cuban Americans as a homogeneous, unified, and economically successful immigrant group.

Data presented in Chapter Four provide ample evidence to challenge this image of Cubans in Miami, and points out that although Cuba and Castro are potent symbols around which Cuban-Americans unite, the content and nature of Cuban-American ethnicity was not transplanted from Cuba, but invented in Miami. Once invented, however, Cuban American ethnic identity proved to be a powerful political tool -- locally, nationally and internationally.

Numerous analysts have emphasized that there is no Black "community" in Miami, and, for the most part, social, political and economic behavior in Miami supports that contention. Use of the category "Black", however, dominates discussion by the media, politicians, and government officials -- Black and White. Mandela's visit in June of 1990 illustrated the predominance of the tri-ethnic framework, as well as the capacity of labels, themselves, to take on a particular political significance when used and manipulated by local leaders, politicians and the media. The African American leaders who organized the boycott, for example, added to their list of grievances a concern for the plight of Haitian refugees. They simultaneously began to emphasize the common ancestry of Black groups in Miami who came from distinct cultural backgrounds, and had previously been indifferent to one and other at best, and at worst hostile.

Constructed identities -- like constructed issues, problems, crises and threats -- are ambiguous, fluid, and frequently contested. Some African Americans in Miami rejected Mandela as a symbol of their cultural identity, and some Cubans in Miami adamantly distanced themselves from the meaning Jorge Mas Canosa assigns to Cuban American identity. Anglos complain about being referred to as Non-Latin Whites, and Jews in Miami resent being subsumed under the heading Anglo. In March 1990, the one African American on the Miami city commission angrily challenged the nomination of a Black

Hispanic to a committee position designated for a Black. Commissioner Dawkins demanded a letter from the nominee stating that he was indeed Black. When told that the nominee identifies himself as Black and Hispanic, Dawkins replied: I didn't ask if he's Black and Hispanic. I asked if he's Black ("Dawkins" 1990, 1B). For weeks, newspapers, radio stations and government chambers throughout Dade County were consumed by a raging debate over what constitutes blackness.

Toward A Theory of Ethnicity

Conflict within and between social groups is not unique to Miami, nor is the tendency to portray the conflict in ethnic terms. Contrary to the optimistic predictions of liberal pluralists and modernization theorists, advances in science, technology, communications, transportation and education have not resulted in peaceful political and economic development world wide. Nor has global class struggle brought about the socialist revolution forecasted by Marxist scholars. Instead, as Benjamin Barber (1992) explains, the world is simultaneously coming together and coming apart; and it appears to be coming apart along lines of ethnicity. The debate is over whether these are fault lines, rumbling for centuries prior to an unavoidable quake; or are they artificial boundaries imposed upon the masses for the benefit of a small but powerful elite. In other words, some analysts view contemporary conflicts as a resurgence of primordial identities deeply rooted in cultural attachments and shared values of an ancient past. Others see only skillful political manipulation by a wealthy few who attempt to maintain their economic and political dominance in a world capitalist system deeply stratified along lines of class. The complexity of social relations in Miami and elsewhere

is not accurately addressed by either set of explanations, and demands an alternative approach.

By reconceptualizing social reality, this analysis takes a step toward an alternative theory of ethnicity and ethnic relations in the postmodern world. Reality is defined, or meaning assigned through discourse -- accounts, claims, statements, analogies, metaphors and language about or pertaining to issues, problems, events, crises and threats. Discourses emerge within particular constellations of social, political and economic relations. These relations of power not only inform the emergent discourses, but also become tools for furthering particular interests. Finally, constellations or configurations of power and interest can, themselves, be altered through discursive processes.

The implications of this approach for the study of ethnicity and ethnic relations are many. Rather than accept as given either the identities of individuals and groups or the issues around which they struggle, this approach examines the processes which define certain social conditions as problems relating to or resulting from ethnicity, and the forces which make ethnicity a predominant form of social stratification and political mobilization. Issues of ethnic conflict and ethnic identities are not viewed only as independent variables, but are treated in a manner that simultaneously takes into account their dependent variable status as well. This recognition of the fluid and contextual nature of social identity and social reality moves the study of ethnicity beyond metaphors of blood and stone, to examine the processes and forces which shape and construct ethnic identities and ethnic group relations.

As invented or imagined phenomena, however, ethnic identities are not devoid of empirical referents; nor is ethnic struggle completely detached from material conditions. Ethnic identity is comprised of various symbols, concepts

and ideas which draw on the notion of shared experiences and a common past. Rather than attempt to establish the truth or falsity of the conditions and claims that provide raw material for ethnic discourses, this approach focuses on how these conditions and claims are interpreted and perceived, and how those interpretations and perceptions are manipulated, used and changed over time. As Nelson Kasfir (1979) points out, even if ethnicity is a form of false consciousness, it is still consciousness -- the origins and uses of which warrant empirical investigation.

Just as ethnic identity draws its content from available symbols and ideas, the invention process itself, including the interaction that occurs within and among different ethnic discourses, is situated amidst established configurations of political, economic and social power. As Kevin Yelvington (1992, 3) cautions in his paraphrase of Marx: "People invent their ethnicity as they invent their history, but, not exactly in ways which they please." Discourses, ethnic or otherwise, are closely linked to resources. Individuals and groups have varied access to resources such as money, wealth and influence. These varying degrees of access determine not only the content and nature of group discourse, but also the capacity of groups to advance their particular vision of social reality to a prominent position on the public agenda.

Ethnicity, in other words, like history, is profoundly influenced by structural forces; but never in a unilinear or deterministic way. To allow for the dynamic and fluid nature of ethnicity, this framework recognizes the capacity for identities and realities, once invented, to take on an independent explanatory significance irrespective of their basis in fact. The content of ethnic identity and the nature of ethnic group relations do not simply reflect vested interests and power relations, but redefine and reinforce those

interests and relations as well. In this way, identity, itself, is a resource, and language or discourse a form of capital essential to the production of meaning in the same way industrial capital is essential to the production of material goods. Analyses of the role of power and influence in social interaction must take into account not only the access of individuals and groups to material resources, but to a limited repertoire of discursive resources as well.

Furthermore, the utilization and manipulation of discourse must be viewed, to borrow from Edelman's discussion of the "political spectacle," as "strategies, deliberate or unrecognized, for strengthening or undermining support for specific courses of action or for particular ideologies" (Edelman 1988, 11).

A particularly important implication of the Miami case is that the context in which identities, issues, symbols and ideas acquire meaning, and exert influence, is not local, but global in scope. The discursive resources available to groups in Metropolitan Miami is dependent upon the world system. A variety of complex interrelated factors link social and political identity to the international arena, and theories of ethnicity, international relations and social reality must be amended to account for this relationship.

Concluding Remarks

The goal of social science, in its most basic sense, is to illuminate existing social and political realities. The pursuit of this goal has long been premised on the assumption of a world of facts with determinable meaning; people who react rationally to the facts they know; and analysts who act as neutral observers of facts, and the final arbiters of accurate knowledge (Edelman 1988, 1; Best 1989, xiii). What this conventional approach fails to recognize is that facts can rarely be separated from values; meanings are multiple and changing, and observers and what they observe construct one

another. What emerges from the dynamic interplay of actors, interests and varying contexts is not an objective, monolithic reality that remains constant over time; but rather, a very fluid set of socially constructed and politically contested "realities".

An emphasis on elusiveness and ambiguity is not meant to portray a hopeless state of affairs for the analytical endeavor of social science, nor to encourage abandonment of the continuous pursuit of knowledge. Instead, analysts must ask different questions, actively challenge deeply held assumptions, formulate alternative frameworks, and be willing to incorporate into those frameworks the very fluid and contextual nature of the social and political world.

This analysis illustrates the numerous insights to be gained by applying such an approach to the study of ethnicity and ethnic group relations. Miami also provides an ideal setting in which to elucidate the complexities of social reality in the postmodern world. Ethnic conflict is a topic of critical and growing relevance, and Miami, as many of its supporters and critics both suggest, may be a bellwether of social relations for other areas around the globe. Many of the demographic characteristics that have converged so dramatically in Miami during the past thirty years foreshadow predicted population trends for the metropolitan US as a whole. This is particularly true with regard to the large numbers of Hispanics in Miami -- a population anticipated to soon become the largest minority group in the US. In other metropolitan areas that have experienced social upheaval, including Los Angeles, New York and Detroit, explanations similar to those which circulate in and about Miami have been put forth to account for the conflict. This is true in Germany, France, and the former Yugoslav Republic as well. The details of each case are unique; but it is likely that a careful analysis would

reveal similar ambiguities and political nuances in the emergent definitions of social reality.

Furthermore, as the discussion of the globalization of inter-ethnic relations in Miami indicates, ethnicity, itself, can no longer be viewed in a purely domestic context. Ethnic identities and ethnic interaction in a given locale are influenced in a variety of ways by the international system. This situation is particularly pronounced, but in no way unique, to Metropolitan Miami. The upsurge of hate crimes against Arab-Americans during the Gulf War, and after the arrest of a Muslim suspect in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, dramatically illustrate the linkages between ethnic group relations and international politics. So, too, do the violent attacks on Asian-Americans by unemployed automobile workers in Detroit.³ Ethnicity, as a form of social and political mobilization similarly exerts an independent impact on the global arena. As the nation-state loses its significance as a unit of analysis in international political affairs, events and activities in Miami simultaneously indicate a growing need to recognize the role of ethnic groups as transnational actors in a changing world order.

As a metropolitan area built on image and myth, Miami is often described as a city that continuously invents and reinvents itself. The insight to be gleaned from the Miami case is that image is not merely a smoke screen to be penetrated by social science in its rigorous pursuit of empirical reality, but that image is reality and reality is an image -- both of which are in a constant state of flux. If social reality is to be better understood, and perhaps improved, then social science must embrace, rather than continue in its efforts to circumvent image. The hope is that this attempt to re-imagine Miami may suggest possibilities for imagining a more peaceful world.

Notes

1. Quoted in T.D. Allman (1987, 10), *City of the Future*.
2. This individual was speaking at a rally to protest Mayor Ferre's decision to fire former Black City Manager Howard Gary. The quote is taken from an audio cassette recording of the 1984 rally.
3. In 1983, two White automobile workers used baseball bats to beat and kill Chinese American, Vincent Chin. Witnesses later testified that the two assailants were making obscene remarks about Asians and Japanese cars (Frank Wu, "The Fallout From Japan-Bashing," Washington Post, February 3, 1992, A11).

APPENDIX A LABOR MARKET ANALYSIS

The current analysis grows out of an earlier investigation of the labor market impact of Cuban immigration to Miami. Census data on occupational status and mobility in the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area of Miami, from 1940 to 1980, were used to examine the claim that Cuban immigration exerted a negative economic impact on Blacks in Miami's labor market.

I originally hypothesized that the massive influx of Cuban immigrants in the 1960s, and their subsequent incorporation into the local labor market, would reverse a downward trend in the occupational inequality between Whites and Blacks. Using an index of occupational dissimilarity I measured the percent of either population -- Whites or Blacks -- that would need to be redistributed for the percentage distributions in each occupational category to be equal. The index itself is calculated by determining the percent difference between Whites and Blacks in each occupational category, totaling those differences and dividing by two. The results indicated that, with the exception of a slight increase in 1950, occupational dissimilarity of Whites and Blacks in the Metropolitan Miami labor market declined gradually, without interruption between 1940 and 1980 (see Figure A-1).

Census figures were also used to document the changing occupational distribution of Blacks in Miami from 1940 to 1980. Although various individuals and groups complained that the influx of Cuban immigrants during the 1960s halted or reversed the movement of Blacks into middle and upper level occupational categories, the data do not support that claim. The

percentage of Blacks in professional and managerial occupations, as well as sales, clerical, kindred and craft occupations increased between 1960 and 1980.

I also used a table published in the 1970 Census to compare the occupational mobility of Blacks and Hispanics in Florida and Georgia between 1965 and 1970. As a southern state with a large Black population, Georgia provided a partial control for variables other than massive Cuban immigration that may have influenced the status of Blacks in the labor market. The 1970 Census included a question about current occupation and respondent's occupation five years prior. A table was then constructed to show the number of individuals that changed occupational categories between 1965 and 1970. A diagonal line drawn through the table identified those workers that remained in the same category; the percentage of workers above the diagonal line experienced upward occupational mobility, and those below the line experienced downward mobility. The results show no significant difference in the occupational mobility of Blacks or Hispanics in Florida and Georgia.

These findings offer nothing in the way of a definitive statement on labor market competition in Miami, but do suggest that the rise of the job displacement thesis was not due to the gravity of the problem itself.




FIGURE A-1
OCCUPATIONAL DISSIMILARITY BETWEEN WHITES AND BLACKS IN METROPOLITAN
MIAMI
1940 - 1980

Source: United States Bureau of Census. 1940-1980. Characteristics of the Population.

APPENDIX B RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This analysis of claims-making activity in Miami, Florida was designed to identify the variety of comments, observations, complaints and concerns that have characterized public discourse in Miami over the past thirty years. The data are drawn almost entirely from statements made during in-depth interviews, and from claims that appear in the periodical and popular literature on Miami.

I conducted a total of sixty interviews in Dade County from May through November of 1992. Using a reputational technique to select those individuals most cognizant of ethnic relations in Miami, I began with a list of key figures whose names appeared frequently in the media, and who were suggested to me early on as valuable contacts by researchers working in similar fields at both Florida International University and the University of Florida. At the end of each interview, I asked for recommendations of other individuals whose knowledge of and experience in Miami would be useful to my project. I identified those individuals whose names were mentioned most frequently, and made every effort to interview them. In most cases, my efforts were successful. All of the Hispanics, and all but one of the Black nominees contacted agreed to be interviewed. Interestingly, Non-Latin Whites, or more specifically, Anglos, were not as frequently recommended, nor as willing to be interviewed. To some extent this supported portrayals of the Anglo elite in Miami as a shadow government, on the defensive. In all fairness, however,

some of these individuals were not contacted until after the hurricane in August 1992, during which time their schedules were understandably tight.

I made a conscious effort to interview an equal number of respondents from each of three major ethnic groups in the Miami area. Of the sixty interviews I conducted, 20 were with Black respondents, 20 with Hispanic respondents, and 20 with Anglos. Among the Black interviewees, there were individuals of both Bahamian descent, and those whose ancestors migrated from North Florida and Georgia. Although unsolicited, several respondents mentioned this distinction in the course of the interview. This group also included one Haitian American.

The majority of Hispanics turned out to be Cuban American, although I did interview one individual from Nicaragua, one of Panamanian descent, and one from Puerto Rico. The Hispanic group also included one Black Cuban. At least one-third of the Anglo respondents were Jewish, which roughly reflects the proportion of Jewish residents among the Non-Latin White population in Dade County.

Although not broadly representative of the community at large, this group was generally representative of the elite in Dade County. Respondents included politicians, attorneys, business people, journalists, community activists, civic leaders, elected and appointed government officials, city and county employees, as well as ministers, rabbis, and priests. If any occupational or professional category is underrepresented, it is the city and county commissioners. In one case, this results from a refusal to be interviewed; but, for the most part, these officials were not frequently nominated by other respondents. Several of the individuals interviewed explicitly suggested that real power and knowledge in Dade County lies not with the politicians, but with the business community.

The local newspapers in Dade County provided a very valuable source from which to gather claims, particularly in terms of gaining a historical perspective. In terms of written media, the *Miami Herald* is the predominant voice in Dade County. In what appears to be unique to Miami, the city's main newspaper publishes both a Spanish and English version of the paper on a daily basis. In addition to the *Herald* and *El Nuevo Herald*, Miami is also home to a well-established Black press, the *Miami Times*; and a Hispanic-owned and operated *Diario Las Americas*. There are also a multitude of other smaller papers that cater to the Jewish population on Miami Beach, and other immigrant communities from throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.

The Miami-Dade County Public Library maintains a large and well-indexed collection of local periodicals. The *Herald*, *Times* and *Diario* are all indexed jointly by subject headings. I completed a thorough review of these indexes from 1960 to 1991, focusing on the following subject headings: race, riots, refugees, public opinion, Cuban, Black.

Many other documents and sources also provided valuable data on claims-making activity in Dade County. National media coverage of Miami has been extensive, particularly during the last decade; and the city has been the subject of several insightful and well-researched popular works as well. Through the kindness and cooperation of different individuals and groups in Miami, I also had access to court depositions taken during the Voting Rights Act law suit, and to transcripts, minutes and videotapes of various conferences, meetings and public hearings that addressed issues related to race and ethnic relations in Dade County.

Finally, the participant observation component of this research project was critical. As a stranger to the community (and the fortunate recipient of a research grant) I was able to devote myself entirely to observing Miami in

much the same way a cultural anthropologist observes a distant tribe. I sat in on task force meetings of the Dade County Community Relations Board, attended city and county commission meetings, joined local political clubs, and participated in a wide variety of cultural celebrations and local festivities. Although less methodologically rigorous, my understanding of ethnicity and ethnic politics in Miami was enhanced immeasurably by living and breathing Miami for seven consecutive months.

APPENDIX C
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR COMMUNITY INFORMANTS

Personal Questions

- 1) How long have you lived in Miami?
- 2) What is your occupation and/or involvement with civic affairs in Miami?

General Questions About Ethnic Relations In Miami

- 3) Has ethnic hostility in Miami increased, decreased, or stayed the same since the 1980s?
- 4) Between which groups is the level of hostility the greatest?
- 5) Why?
- 6) How would you describe relations between the other groups?

Questions Related To Immigration

- 7) What impact has immigration had on Dade County?
- 8) Have Hispanic immigrants taken jobs from Black workers in Miami's labor market?

If so, in what occupations or industrial sectors?
- 9) In your opinion, do [Blacks/Hispanics/Anglos] suffer discrimination in the local work place?

If so, by whom?
- 10) Is language still a divisive issue in Dade County?

Why?
- 11) As an ethnic group, how much solidarity exists between [Blacks/Hispanics/Anglos] ?
- 12) What are the issues that divide/unify this group?

Boycott

- 13) Do you support/agree with the Black tourism boycott?
- 14) What impact has the boycott had on Dade County-- economically, politically, socially?
- 15) How have various ethnic groups in Miami responded?

Politics in Miami

- 16) Do you think [Blacks/Hispanics/Anglos] are fairly represented by local government?
- 17) Do politics in Miami consistently divide along lines of ethnicity?
- 18) Can you provide examples of when it has?
- 19) Can you provide examples of when it has not?
- 20) What role do leaders or politicians play in either encouraging or discouraging ethnic polarization?
- 21) What impact do you think a move to single member districts will have on ethnic relations in Dade County?

Concluding Questions

- 22) How would you describe interaction among Miami's ethnic groups outside of the political or economic sphere? -- i.e. schools, churches, civic affairs?
- 23) What do you think is the biggest problem now facing Miami?

APPENDIX D ANTI-BILINGUAL REFERENDUM PETITION

DADE COUNTY PETITION FOR A UNITED DADE COUNTY

ORDINANCE NO. _____

ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE EXPENDITURE OF COUNTY FUNDS FOR THE PURPOSE OF UTILIZING ANY LANGUAGE OTHER THAN ENGLISH, OR PROMOTING ANY CULTURE OTHER THAN THAT OF THE UNITED STATES; PROVIDING FOR GOVERNMENTAL MEETINGS AND PUBLICATIONS TO BE IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE; PROVIDING EXCEPTION; PROVIDING SEVERABILITY, INCLUSION IN THE CODE, AND AN EFFECTIVE DATE.

BE IT ORDAINED BY THE PEOPLE OF DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA:

SECTION 1. THE EXPENDITURE OF COUNTY FUNDS FOR THE PURPOSE OF UTILIZING ANY LANGUAGE OTHER THAN ENGLISH, OR PROMOTING ANY CULTURE OTHER THAN THAT OF THE UNITED STATES, IS PROHIBITED.

SECTION 2. ALL COUNTY GOVERNMENTAL MEETINGS, HEARINGS AND PUBLICATIONS SHALL BE IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE ONLY.

SECTION 3. THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ORDINANCE SHALL NOT APPLY WHERE A TRANSLATION IS MANDATED BY STATE OR FEDERAL LAW.

SECTION 4. IF ANY SECTION, SUBSECTION, SENTENCE, CLAUSE, PHRASE, WORDS OR PROVISION OF THIS ORDINANCE IS HELD INVALID OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL, THE REMAINDER OF THIS ORDINANCE SHALL NOT BE AFFECTED BY SAID HOLDING.

SECTION 5. IT IS THE INTENTION OF THE PEOPLE OF DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ORDINANCE SHALL BECOME AND BE MADE A PART OF THE CODE OF METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA.

SECTION 6. THIS ORDINANCE SHALL TAKE EFFECT ON THE DAY AFTER THE ELECTION APPROVING THIS ORDINANCE.

WE the undersigned electors of Dade County, Florida, petition the Board of County Commissioners to pass the above and foregoing ordinance, or to submit the said ordinance to the electors of Dade County, Florida, in accordance with Article VII, Section 7.01 of the Charter of Metropolitan Dade County

(PLEASE SIGN LEGIBLY
AND PRINT NAME UNDER
SIGNATURE LINE)

RESIDENCE OR
PRECINCT
INCLUDE CITY

DATE
SIGNED

TELEPHONE

SIGN			
PRINT			
SIGN			
PRINT			
SIGN			
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STATE OF FLORIDA)
COUNTY OF DADE) SS

BEFORE ME, personally appeared _____, who having been duly sworn deposes and says that he/she circulated the above petition containing _____ signatures and that each signature was made and affixed thereto in the presence of the affiant.

WITNESSED AND SUBSCRIBED: _____

APPENDIX E
CITIZENS OF DADE UNITED MEMBERSHIP FORM

MEMBERSHIP

APPLICATION:

New member _____

Renewal _____

Date: _____



CITIZENS OF DADE UNITED

P.O. Box 141655, CORAL GABLES, FLA., 33114

Tel.#(305) 226-0199

Emmy Shafer, pres.

C.O.D.U. GOALS: ELIMINATE BILINGUAL GOV'T....RETAIN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE & AMERICAN CULTURE...DEPORT ILLEGAL ALIENS...FIGHT CRIME:

What has CODU done? Collected 137,000 signatures for the Nov.4, 1980 vote against bilingual gov't.which 60% of Dade County's voters voted for...held a march protesting illegal refugees, bilingual gov't.& crime...spoke against bilingual gov't.operations: to the Fla.legislature in Tallahassee...County & City Commissions & budget hearings...Dade School Board...Numerous TV & Radio programs & CODU has their own CABLE TV PROGRAMS (Educational Cable#2). CODU needs your support for this battle. \$5 MIN.PER PERSON/YEAR MEMBERSHIP & NEWSLETTERS..or \$10,\$20,\$50 , \$100 if you can. Send check/money order please. Be sure to give us your tel.#.

NAME(print) _____ ADDRESS _____

CITY _____

STATE _____

ZIP _____

TEL.# _____

APPENDIX F
CUBAN REFUGEE CENTER BULLETIN

YOUR OPPORTUNITY TO HELP WORTHY CUBANS HELP THEMSELVES

— AND TO AID THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM EVERYWHERE —



Photo: Albert Coys, Miami. A Cuban Refugee

Sponsors And Jobs Are Needed For

- ... courageous men, women, children who have fled their communist-controlled homeland
- ... individuals and families eager to earn their living in freedom ... to regain their self-confidence, dignity, and pride in accomplishment
- ... people who have retained in adversity a delightful sense of humor, but who need job opportunities to restore the smiles with which they faced their own sunny world ... before tyranny took over

CUBAN REFUGEES ARE GRATEFUL FOR HELPING HANDS IN THIS LAND OF FREEDOM — TO GUIDE THEM TOWARD THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR WHICH THEY ARE QUALIFIED.



Photo: Courtesy MIAMI HERALD

"Where's Auntie ... Where are Mama's friends who were to meet me?"
... A lollipop diverts a Cuban child in a tense moment before relatives are located after his arrival at the Miami airport.

... The wide-eyed boy is one of thousands of children sent by parents to relatives who have already fled to the United States ... The parents plan to follow ... Then all the family will be free from the teachings and restrictions of Cuba's communist regime.

How To Plan Your Sponsorship of Cuban Refugees

Ask full resettlement information from: J. Arthur Lazell, Deputy Director for Resettlement, Cuban Refugee Center, Freedom Tower, Miami 32, Florida.

NOTE:

- (a) Refugee transportation costs to your city are paid by the U. S.
- (b) There is now a "transition allowance" of \$100 for families receiving public assistance in Miami who go to other cities. (For individuals, \$60.)
- (c) Should unforeseen complications develop in the resettlement, U. S.-financed assistance, including medical care, is provided in the resettlement community at no cost to the sponsor.

... Not all who flee Cuba come by fast plane ... These weary children were in a small boat that slipped past armed guards, then had motor trouble enroute to the Florida coast ... Sickened by the sea and lack of rations, two families and their children were rescued by the U. S. Coast Guard and brought safely to Miami ... Nearly 50 persons every week risk their lives in small craft escapes to freedom.

Sponsor Cuban Refugees . . . FULFILL THEIR FAITH IN FREEDOM

CUBAN REFUGEE CENTER, Freedom Tower, MIAMI 32, FLORIDA

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE — SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

APPENDIX G
"REMEMBER MANDELA" REGISTRATION DRIVE
SEPTEMBER 1992

RIOT AT THE POLLS REGISTER AND VOTE



The Miami Times
800 N.W. 54th STREET • MIAMI, FLORIDA 33127

Your Community Newspaper Since 1923

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
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH


Born on June 16, 1964, Sheila Croucher attended primary and secondary schools in Beavercreek, Ohio. In 1982, she began undergraduate school at Bowling Green State University, majoring in interpersonal and public communications. After graduating, she worked for a year at the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council in Toledo, Ohio. Because of the University of Florida's strong emphasis on Latin America, Sheila began graduate studies there in 1987. She combined her interest in immigration and ethnicity to specialize in comparative urban ethnic politics. Her academic training in this area was enhanced during two summers spent working as a contractor for the U.S. Department of Labor's Division of Immigration Policy and Research. After graduation, Sheila will be returning to Ohio to teach comparative ethnic politics and political thinking at Miami University.

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.



Steven E. Sanderson, Chairman
Professor of Political Science

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.




James W. Burton, Cochairman
Professor of Political Science

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
Richard K. Scher
Associate Professor of Political Science

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Charles H. Wood
Associate Professor of Sociology

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Goran Hyden", is written over a horizontal line.

Goran Hyden
Professor of Political Science

This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

August 1993

Dean, Graduate School

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA



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